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PREFACE 
The present study has three main goals. The first is to contribute to 
the anthropological building of a model of the technoeconomic organization of 
industrial complex societies. The second is to understand the role of the 
social organiza:ion of power in these societies. Finally, byond all academic 
purposes, we wish to pay tribute to those men who suffer the consequences of 
the assymetrical exercise of power in present day societies around the world, 
and especially in Latin American and the Dominican Republic. Hopefully, by 
achieving the first two objectives, their organizations might change their 
present status of social, political and economic dependence. 
Anthropological work in social units other than the primitive isolate 
requires general and comprehensive models not yet in existence. Starting from 
simple beginnings in the twenties, anthropologists have grown increasingly 
worried by the presence of "civilizations", "nations", "complex and urban 
societies", and "cities" (cf. Kusher 1969). First they studied 11 isolated 11 
cultural systems, for instance a local community, taking into account its 
large cul tura 1 matrix. Later they described 11outs i de factors" which affected 
the assumed isolated cultural system. With Steward's (1955) recognition of 
11 levels of sociocultural integration" and "national sociocultural systems", 
anthropology has come to recognize that nations or systems of the higher level 
do not consist merely of more numerous and diversified parts. Therefore, it 
would be methodologically incorrect to treat each social unit as though it 
were an independent system in itself. 
Probably guided by Redfield 1 s question about the structural differences 
vi 
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between the primitive isolate and greater systems some anthropologists came to 
conclude that national institutions are so complex that even small competence 
in their operations seems to require specialization. The analysis of these 
national instituions, then, have been left open for study by specialists in other 
disciplines. Nevertheless, economic, po1 itical and legal variables in industrial 
societies are not closed systems. They are integrated into a sociocultural system. 
Thus other social scientists have discovered that they must pay attention to 
shifting group relationships and their adaptational activities if their studies 
are to reflect this cultural dimension of institutional 11 real ity1 1• As Wolf 
reminded us (1956:1066) 
institutions are ultimately but cultural pattenrs for group relation-
ships. Their complex forms allow groups to relate themselves to each 
other in the multiple processes of conflict and accomodation which 
must characterize any complex society. They furnish the forms through 
which some nation-oriented groups may manipulate other nation-oriented 
or community oriented groups. 
In the anthropological 1 iterature the constant object of study has 
normally been not the "whole social system11 as a unit but groups of people. 
In other words, we have limited ourselves to segmental analysis of cultural 
systems in most cases. The problem of how these supplementary groups and the 
structures resulting from their operations are articulated is normally pre-
sented amid the increasing interest with complex sociocultural systems. The 
issue, however, is hardly resolved. Even such studies as Steward's in Puerto 
Rico (1956) does not adequately face this problem. In it, we are presented 
with an analysis of the adaptational operations of social units selected for 
study because patterns of land use or operational roles, but how these g_;oups 
of peasants and prestigious families are linked to the national sphere is not 
analyzed. In addition, it is difficult even to imagine what the 11national 
sphere11 is. 
In this situation, one starts suspecting with Schneider (1961 :215) that 
vi i i 
although complex societies is an in-problem in anthropology, 11the tT'eatment 
a lly accorded 11complexity
11 today consists mainly in simply referring to gener 
"complexity" and then ignoring the matter. The fundamental problem is that of 
dealing with the range of different kinds of societies within the framework of 
a theory of society''· 
In the last decade a number of studies have faced this problem. For 
instance, Mitchell (1966) struggles with the basic conception of the town or 
city and the extent to which either can be viewed as a single social system. 
He seems to be saying that a city can best be viewed as a set of overlapping 
social fields rather than one of inter-locking institutions, structures, norms, 
or other values. In 1961 (cf. 1969), Epstein distinguished between effective 
and extended networks within the urban social organization. And Plotnicov's 
study of Jos, Nigeria (1967) uses situational analysis as derived from Mitchell, 
Epstein and Gluckman to deal with urban behavior and adaptation. He takes 
significant areas of social interaction and observes the development of stan-
dards of behavior appropriate to the social environment in which they occur. 
These works study social units of operation within contemporary indus-
trial societies. They tend to indicate that kinship networks are virtually 
assimilated within more inclusive societywide social networks. In addition, 
they offer valuable insights and descriptions into the social networks studied. 
These descriptions and analyses of the 11supplimentary interpersonal sets ... 
not only reveal a great deal about the hidden mechanisms of complex society ... 
(but) also reveal much of the social dynamic, of the changing distribution of 
forces in the social body ••. (and) indicate the way in which the parallelogram 
of social forms in one society differ from that of another" (Wolf 1966 b:20). 
The scope of research of these studies, however, has to be augmented 
beyond the social structure of industrial complex societies in order to provide 
us with a model of these societies and their cultural systems. If not, like 
ix 
d . the ''culture of poverty 11 and urban ethnic ghettos, these tn recent stu ies on 
social networks might be understood as isolated, self-originated, and self-
perpetuating groups with a distinctive sub-culture (see Valentine 1968). 
Two main reasons account for the need of a wider scope of research 
and for the elaboration of models of complexity. First of all, a theoretical 
position of cultural materialism: the explanation for cultural differences 
and similarities is to be found in the technoeconomic processes responsible 
for the survival of the material requirements of biosocial survival. In other 
words, the technoeconomic parameters of sociocultural systems exert selective 
pressures in favor of certain types of organizational structures and upon the 
survival and spread of definite types of ideological complexes. 
In principle, therefore, all of the major problems of sociocultural 
differences and similarities can be solved by identifying the precise nature 
of these selective parameters. Nonetheless, as a general principle. it does 
not commit itself to the explanation of any specific sociocultural type or 
any specific set of institutions. It goes without saying, that this is not 
to argue for an absolute unconditional one to one effect upon the cultural 
forms and functions growing out from the technoeconomic organizatbn. This 
would ignore the actual interaction of the technoeconomic organization with social 
structures, ideologies, and personality configurations in the social system. 
But only a recognition of causal priority in conformity with the prediction 
that group structure and ideology are responsive to the interaction between 
behavior and environment as mediated by the human organism and its cultural 
system. 
The second reason justifying wider scope of research lies behind 
Polanyi 1 s (1944) The Great Transformatbn. The social structure of industrial 
complex societies is presently subjected to the virtual dominant influence of 
a market economy. In the market place every cultural object is priced 
)C 
including such non-commodities as land, human labor and money. Thus social 
security disappears and competition and individualism reinforce their presence 
in the human group. Through this technoeconomic organization we all find our-
selves playing in the market place and even exposing ourselves {labor) as a 
cornnodity for a price (wage). Where the market economy exists, it appears 
to be the main, although obviously not the only one, institution perpetuating 
and articulating the links among social units in the society, and even between 
the societies themselves. As Jules Henry (1966:97) recently acknowledged while 
presenting some theoretical considerations for the study of the United States 
culture: '~he economic system has certain consequences for personality .•. 
The consequences and the emergent personality traits can be detected in all 
phases of culture11 • 
In this perspective White's civil societies (1959:296 ss.) has to be 
reconsidered from its or~inal formulation as transformation of interpersonal 
relations and the state-church as an integrative mechanism. Instead, industrial 
complex societies appear as sociocultural systems transforming energy resources 
according to a structural pattern of a market economy regardless of interpersonal 
relations. 
In dealing with social networks or group relationships in a market economy, 
we cannot neglect the fact that the exercise of power by some social units over 
others is present on all levels of articulation. Certain economic and political 
relationships are crucial to the functioning of any industrial complex society. 
Regardless of what other functions such a society may perform, its integrating 
units must both produce surpluses and exercise power to transfer a part· of these 
surpluses from the producing units to manufacturing, distributing and consuming 
units. This means that all interpersonal and intergroup relationships in 
industrial complex societies (or all complex societies?) must at some point 
establish and conform to power transactions. 
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The determinant influence of power in industrial complex s<>4:ieties has 
been well emphasized by Adams and his associates (1970). By using a framework 
of power structure, they study the relationship that integrated the Guatemalan 
peasant into the nation. In their study, power appears as a feature of every 
social relationship spreading its effect differentialy through the entire 
society. Once society itself is understood as a system articulated through 
power networks, social development itself is evolution: 
If development is in some sense growth and expansion, what is the con-
nection between it and evolution, that theoretical area of anthropology 
that has usually been concerned with growth and expansion? ... The 
answer that emerged was that development was itself, in a sense, evolu-
tion. It comprised that aspect of evolution having to do with the build-
up of goods and human time usage, the expansion or growth of the material 
and economic side of life. More than this, however, with the concept of 
power in hand, it was not merely that technology and economics related 
development to a larger evolutionary framework, but that their concerns 
were part of a more inclusive subject matter. This, it turned out, was 
again power, for power had to do with the control of both individuals 
and goods, voters and laborers (Adams 1970:4 and 5). 
The present study intends to contribute to this line of research of 
anthropologists in industrial complex societies. It is a look into the organi-
zation of power growing out of the social networks of a group of units within 
the tobacco market. The marketing of this crop and the preliminary conditions 
for the economic transactions were originally studied with the intention of 
determining the interaction of a particular market system, its power organization, 
and the social networks of the units operating within a common system. The 
problem of the system's complexity was a prime target of the study as well as 
the organization of the different units within the system. From the exchange 
of the following strategic resources: tobacco, capital and liquid assets in 
the market place originates a distinctive segmentary technoeconomic organization 
which secures and protects a rational flow of these resources in society. 
This organization we will refer to as an eco-market system. 
One of the more significant contributions of the present study is its 
xi i 
methodological approach in addition to its object of analysis. It ..does not 
deal with "the culture" of one group, of one commuh.ity, of one city, or of one 
nation. Instead, it analyzes the social organization of power resulting from the 
production, purchase, processing, packing and exporting of tobacco until it 
reaches manufacturers in Europe or in the United States. This work then is the 
analysis of one product in order to understand the social consequences resulting 
from it structural flow. In this analytical perspective the operations of the 
peasants, the middlemen, the warehouses, the local packers, the exporters, and 
the international dealers, all come within the framework of one common system 
of adaptation. The various environments articulated through the flow of 
tobacco between these units overlap through a reciprocal feedback process 
consisting of social networks, 1 iquid assets, tobacco and capital. 
The value of this methodological approach is open to evaluation. Especially 
because of its technoeconomic exclusiveness and the apparent isolation with which 
the operating units within the tobacco eco-market system might seem to be operating. 
These "optical illusions'', result from the methodological need to abstract and to 
delimit the cultural system under investigation. The insights provided by this 
approach into the natura·of industrial complex societies outweigh the disadvan-
tages. The advantages of this approach are as follows: First, it provides a 
framework for an examination of the activities and interactions of social units 
from different social classes, and national and international environments. 
Second, it tries to understand their operations in relation to the complex 
organizational structure they are a part of and to take into account the reciprocal 
processes resulting from the whole environmental system. Third, it provides an 
insight into the origin of the social stratification in the society and the 
resources of power within the system. Fourth, it acknowledges the structural 
complexity and the overlapping operating units in these societies while trying 
at the same time to build a model illustrating how the units come into contact 
xii i 
and articulate into the system. Fifth, it does not ignore the fact that economic 
or market transactions are supported by social networks. 
The export tobacco production in the Dominican Republic has a number of 
relevent cultural aspects associated with it in the larger cultural frame of 
reference of the Caribbean. First, its production is not contingent upon a 
plantation organization nor is it a crop requiring large capital investments 
in the producing country. On the contrary, it is produced by minifundist 
peasants who traditionally have constituted a free peasantry and are market 
orientated. 
Secondly, the crop is exported to European and North American manufacturers 
through the financial intervention of international dealers who subsidize the 
operations of a complex national organization to secure the crop and reduce their 
capita 1 risks. 
Third, the distributive system resulting from the operations of exporters 
and the local warehouses, plus the production activities of the peasants seem to 
be customarily free of governmental intervention. 
Fourth, tobacco export is one of the three main sources of revenue in the 
Dominican Republic with sugar and coffee. 
Finally, since it is an export commodity, its analysis will offer an 
insight not only into forms of dependence of some national groups from power 
elites, but also into the financial dependence of a whole nation upon foreign 
capital investors. 
At this point it is necessary to recognize my personal indebtedness to 
Dr. Ken Sharpe for suggesting to me the present line of research; and to Mr. 
Antonio Lluberes and Mr. Frank Moya for helping in the historical research. 
Without the assistance of these scholars the present work would have been 
incomplete. Special gratitude is also due to my professors at Loyola University 
of Chicago who have introduced me into the field of Anthropology. Above all 
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But this work is indebted to no one more than to those who helped in 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Traditional Anthropological Method 
In the Social Sciences, Anthropology traditionally has been identified 
as the science concerned with the study of primitive andexotic cultures. This 
understanding of Anthropology might seem valid if we realize that: 11 From its 
conception, anthropology has --at least in principle-- considered all cultures 
at all times and in all places to be its legitimate province. In practice, 
however, anthropologists have generally concerned themselves with non-Western 
cultures, and especially with the small-scale and exotic among these" (Kaplan 
& Manners 1972:190). 
Pre-literate and "primitive' 1 societies have been studied by anthropolo-
gists as isolated, small, self-contained and culturally homogeneous. Corresponding 
to this formulation of the object of study, a characteristic method and technique 
became peculiar to anthropologists. The cultural or ethnographic method consisted 
in observing a sufficient number of individuals to ascertain the typical or 
expected behavior of the society's members which is then described as the 
culture. On the other hand, participant observation became both practicable 
and desirable for data-gathering as technique among small, homogeneous and iso-
lated bands, tribes and villages. 
Tribal culture is a construct based essentially on behavioral traits 
that characterize all members of the society. Although there are 
some differences associated with sex, age, role, and status, there 
are no major occupational, regional or social groups or segments that 
differ significantly from one another and can be said to have sub-
cultures, and there are larger, supra-personal institutions that can-
not be understood fairly well by studying the behavior of individuals. 
(Steward 1956:5). 
2 
But today this primitive and isolated world is disappearing. We are 
· --with certain reserve-- McLuhan's 11 global vi 1 lage11 (1967:67). approaching 
And as weaver and White rightly point out, the time is overdue for a reassess-
ment of anthropological methodology and techniques in order to study complex 
societies (1972:109). Whereas autonomy and intra-group functional independence 
may have been useful methodological assumptions when there existed a greater 
degree of cultural isolation, this is not the case any more. More complex 
sociocultural systems such as modern nations are not dealt with so easily. 
These assumptions of the traditional ethnographic method that culture consists 
of shared behavior will not serve to describe nor to explain the functioning 
of a government or a system of international commerce. 
Industrial Complex Societies 
Industrial complex societies not only seem to be the most recent level 
of social evolution, but also to have a relatively recent appearance in the 
stage of anthropological studies. Normally, a society seems to deserve the 
1
.qual ification of 11 industrial complexity11 when it has, at least, the fol lowing 
characteristics: (1) a division of labor articulated through centers of role 
specialization; (2) levels of articulation; (3) wider environmental adaptation 
coordinated by centers of control; (4) a distributive system based upon industrial 
production and a cash economy of market systems. 
(1) Its.elaborate divisbn of labor is organized by centers of role 
specialization. These centers consist of one or more social units. Both the 
integrating units and the center itself operate in order to fulfill certain 
social requirements by means of (i) a sophisticated technology and (ii) an 
interchange of information and other means within them. 
The existence of a division of labor is not a sufficient reason for 
classifying a society as an industrial complex society. An intricate division 
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already present in archaic kingdoms and empires growing out from their 
of labor was 
h ·ism of redistribution and in the guilds of pre-industrial cities. The social mec an 
·ization of the society through specialized centers is a further step toward 
organ 
complexity for at least two reasons. First, these centers of role specialization 
consist of various unit~ each one specialized in specific technical functions. 
Secondly, none of these centers appear to be self-sufficient while exercising their 
adaptational functions. 
The appearance of the centers of role specialization probably is because 
of population and productive pressures. This will not only increase the dependence 
of the social units upon cooperation (see Durkheim's concept of organic solidarity 
1933: ch.3), but contrary to Durkheim's predictions will also increase competition 
and conflict as result of self-motivation in an adatational context (see Marx and 
Engel's concept of class struggle 1955). This situation is one of antagonistic 
cooperation. 
(2) These centers of role specialization will be articulated among them-
selves in what Adams (1970:54) has methodologically referred to as levels of 
articulation which range from the local to the international sphere of social 
activity. The 1 inkage between the groups will be both vertical (role centers at 
different levels) and horizontal (centers at the same levels) integrating operating 
networks and system of networks. The articulation of different specialized centers 
and of their specialized operating units, will constitute a complex adaptive sys-
tern of the society both to its social and to its natural environment. The com-
plexity residing in the supplementary operations of the centers of specialization 
and the structures resulting from their adaptational networks. 
(3) Industrial complex societies have an adaptational capacity to a variety 
of strategic environmental resources and to various environments. In relation to 
each one of these resources and environments one or more centers of role speciali-
zatbn will be adapted; thereby, normally, the greater the number of these role 
4 
centers, the wider the range of operations of the society. 
The wider range of environmental adaptation is facilitated through the 
operation of centers of control in the society. The most significant of these 
centers of control is the State itself. In addition, a group of centers of 
role specialization might also have specific centers of control inter-locking 
their operations. The social function of these centers of control is basically 
to regulate the operations of social units within their domain and to guarantee 
the flow of strategic resources within the different units. This articulation 
is achieved mainly by overlapping different environments and thereby the activi-
ties of the units within the environments. 
(4) Finally, economically the distributive system of the society is 
usually based on industrial production and articulated through a cash economy 
of market systems in contrast to a subsistence economy. The sociocultural 
consequences of a 1 ~arket system11 has been best explained by Polanyi: 
The transformation {resulting from the Industrial Revolution) implies 
a change in the motive of action on the part of the members of the 
society: for the motive of subsistence that of gain may be substi-
tuted. All transactions are turned into money transactions; and 
these in turn require that a medium of exchange be introduced into 
every articulation of industrial life. All incomes must derive from 
the sale of something or other (such newly defined commodities as 
labor, land, money), and whatever the actual source of a person's 
income, it must be regarded as resulting from sale. No less is 
implied in the simple term "market system11 (1944:41; pp. 74-75, 68-76). 
Obviously, there is interaction between division of labor and market 
exchange. As Belshaw noticed, the market does not come into existence to 
enable persons to dispose of surpluses. It comes into existence as a function 
of the division of labor, so that those who concentrate on production of one 
sort may obtain the produce of others {1965:78). But the complexity of the 
society's distributive system is not well characterized nor explained by calling 
upon the market exchange relations resulting from the society's division of labor. 
market system is normally dependent upon the use of a specific technological 
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know-how and the recognized cultural value. The use of specialized machines in 
an agrarian and commercial society typically affected these societies. 
The use of elaborate machinery and plant involved the development of 
the factory system and therewith a decisive shift in the relative 
importance of commerce and industry in favor of the latter. Industrial 
production ceased to be an accessory of commerce organized by the merch-
ant as buying and selling proposition; it now involved long-term invest-
ment with corresponding risks. Unless the continuance of production 
was reasonably assured, such a risk was not bearable. But the more 
complicated industrial production became, the more numerous were the 
elements of industry the supply of which had to be safeguarded. Three 
of these, of course, were of outstanding importance: labor, land, and 
money. In a commercial society their supply could be organized in one 
way only: by being made available for purchase. Hence, they would have 
to be organized for sale on the market --in other words, as commodities. 
The extension of the market mechanism to the elements of industry --labo~ 
land and money-- was the inevitable consequence of the introduction of 
the factory system in a commercial society (Polanyi 1944:75). 
In summary, the development of the industrial market system was accompanied 
by a change in the organization of the society itself which now became almost 
dependent bh the economic organization. The domestic units are no longer the 
units of production but the factories. In addition, new segmentary systems for 
the distribution of strategic resources have to be gradually elaborated and co-
ordinated to replace former kin based distributive systems and secure the financial 
and capital investments in production. Thus, one of the main differences between 
so-called primitive societies and industrial complex societies' technoeconomic 
organization and economic activities is a legitimate field of social and economic 
achievement open to the operating units and their manifestation of satisfaction. 
In other words, the political economy becomes increasingly differentiated. It 
is a difference in the scale and complexity of the system resulting from industrial 
production and market systems, as well as from the emergence of elaborate networks 
interconnecting centers of role specialization. 
Challenge to Anthropology 
The traditional theories, methods and techniques of anthropology have 
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not prepared anthropologists to study the cultural system of these complex 
societies. The subcultural groups of the latter, such as communities, occupa-
tional classes, ethnic minorities, and the 1 ike, may not be exclusively studied 
by the traditional ethnographic method. Also, modern nations have certain 
nation-oriented institutions and features, such as governmental structures, legal 
systems, economic patterns, and religious organizations, which differ qualitatively 
from anything known in band and tribal cultures and which cannot possibly be grasped 
by ascertaining the behavior of the typical individual associated with them. 
But it is not only a questbn of theories, methods and techniques. Referring 
to urban anthropology, Gulick denounced ten years ago both anthropologists unjus-
tified statements when referring to urban situations, and their lack of urban field 
stuqies. 
Because of their commitment to the all-inclusive idea of culture, 
anthropologists tend to claim the universal applicability of their 
principles of human behavior and accordingly have made sweeping 
pronouncements on the nature and problem of whole societies, many 
of which include urban environments (or cities). So indirectly 
and probably often unwittingly, anthropologists have encompassed 
cities. But only to a minor extent, in comparison to the research 
which non-anthropologists have done in cities, have they done 
research directly in and on cities (1962:445). 
Even traditional studies of formerly remote and independent peasant 
societies have been affected by present day complexity of sociocultural systems. 
With the growth of cities and megalopolis, the country people are forced into 
establishing ties of dependence with them and to ~evelop economic and political 
relationships, as well as relationships of status, with the city people, thus 
becoming what Redfield cal led 11 that special kind of rural folk we cal 1 peasantry!' 
(1947:306). Even more today peasants are defined in reference to their subordinate 
relationships to a group of controlling outsiders {Wolf 1966:3-4; 13); and Adams 
argues that: 
The 1954 revolution in Guatemala, supported directly by the United States 
and fol lowed by tf-e reject ion of many of the advances made by the two 
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volutionary governments, reinforced a fact that was already evident 
re 11 · · · b 1 t d t d h 1 · f to some of my co eagues: rt was 1mposs1 e o un ers an t e 1 e 
trajectories of peasants and poor peoples in contemporary society 
without understanding the larger society within which they lived; and 
it was equally necessary to see how the larger society related to the 
world (1970:3). 
At the present time the cultures of the world appear to be evolving and 
adapting to (or being incorporated within) one of a few cultural types, with a 
distributive system growing out from an industrial technology and an exclusively 
cash economy in a market system economy. Concomitantly, they manifest an increas-
ing trend toward the interdependence of social, political and economic units. 
Thus, anthropology is confronted today with the study of complex sociocultural 
systems. This generates the following set of major problems: 
(l)The modification and elaboration of a set of theoretical, methodological 
and descriptive concepts since much of the empirical data as the basic concepts 
and theories of anthropology have been derived from the study of primitive and 
relative autonomous social units. 
(2) To develop new cultural theories, methodologies and research tech-
niques that in face of present day large-scale and complex societies will main-
tain and reinforce one of anthropology's main contributions to social studies: 
its comparative method and holistic approach. In this perspective, it is vital 
to anthropology that an attempt be made to relate such apparently inscrutable 
phenomena as the social structure and the ideology of a complex social system 
to the basic technoeconomic( arrangements by which the total sociocultural 
system interacts with its natural and cultural environment. This research 
should be conducted cross-culturally in order to determine functional inter-
relationships of cultural patterns which occur independently among societies 
in different parts of the world. 
(3) In conjunction with the two preceding points, anthropology should 
probably understand and strive to overcome the 11dilemma 11 in which urban sociology 
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in the United States finds itself according to White and Weaver: 
community studies with an increasing number of exceptions, are not 
related to the larger issues of structure; •.. quantitative approaches 
tend to become overly narrow in terms of their theoretical import, to 
the degree that they are divorced from behavioral study in social con-
texts and rely upon survey data exclusively (1972:106) . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
CHAPTER I 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In this first chapter some theoretical and methodological considerations 
which guided the field work and helped to organize its findings are schematically 
presented. It has to be acknowledged that the present study operated within the 
frame of what Pelto (1972:7) has called a "general theoretical point of view". 
One which shapes various aspects of data collection and interpretation, without 
providing a set of axiomatic propositions from which research questions are 
derived. This type of research is mainly defensible "because no general theory 
exists at present which can effectively anticipate and prescribe all the relevant 
factors and variables affecting any given aspect of culture or social organization" 
in complex societies (Pelto 1972:7). 
Culture as an Adaptive Mechanism 
Culture 
One of Anthropology's most cherished concepts is that of culture. In the 
process of adapting to the environment human societies develop and organize a set 
of adaptational features ranging from tools and customs to language and beliefs. 
These extrasomatic adaptational devices are referred to as culture. For matters 
of clarity, culture might be defined as the systemic organization of artifacts, 
institutions, ideologies, and the total range of customary behavior with which 
a society is equipped for the exploitation and transformation of the energy 
resources of its particular environment--or environments--and the subsequent 
distribution and use of them in time. 
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culture is a diachronic process through which human societies are able As such, 
th ·1 r environments The main function of culture being the trans-to adapt to e . 
t ion of those strategic resources necessary for the maintenance and expansion f orma 
of the society. In order to achieve this goal various groups within society have 
to organize their operations, select between different adaptational alternatives, 
and compete for control of their respective ecosystems. The cultural process of 
adaptation is historical by nature and has proven to be an endless task of dead-
locks and innovations. 
Between society and culture a very close interrelation is established. 
As a matter of fact, society and culture both represent facets of components in 
basic human situations. 
If, for instance, society is taken to be an organized set of individuals 
with a given way of life, culture is that way of life. If society is 
taken to be an aggregate of social relations, then culture is the content 
of those relations. Society emphasizes the human component, the aggre-
gate of people and the relations between them. Culture emphasizes the 
component of accumulated sources, irrrnaterial as well as material, which 
the people inherit, employ, transmute, add to and transmit (Firth 1952:27). 
Energy 
Leslie White was the first anthropologist, to our knowlede, that systemati-
cally utilized the concept of energy. He explained the functioning of culture as 
resting upon and being determined by 11the amount of energy harnessed and by the 
way in which it is put to work" (1949:367-368). Cultural systems operate only 
by harnessing energy in one form or another, and by transforming it in the pro-
duction of human need-serving goods and services. 
We may distinguish three factors in any cultural situation or system: 
(1) the amount of energy harnessed per capita per year; (2) the efficiency 
of the technological means with which energy is harnessed and put to work; 
(3) and the magnitude of human need-serving goods and services produced 
(1949:368). 
The following pages include White's concept of energy but i5 usage departs 
from traditional undertanding of it. Energy will not refer exclusively to the 
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1 or cultural ability to do work nor to a variable within a formula for physica 
cultural development (cf. White 1959:ch 2; specifically pp. 40-49). White's 
understanding of energy as the ability to do labor is too restricted for the 
purposes of this study; mainly because it unnecessarily remains an undefined 
potentiality amid an operating adaptational system. In addition, it seems to 
be reducible at times to society's technological output (White's product) apd 
at others to the society's technological capacity ("energy and work are inter-
changeab 1 e terms"). If used in either sense, it is an over-emphasis on one 
variable of the cultural system. 
Still in other instances, energy resources might be reduced to a physico-
biological variable. Because the amount of work that the human organism is 
capable of producing will depend largely upon the food intake, energy is reduced 
to sheer diet calories. But an analysis of industrial complex societies through 
the theoretical perspective of food energy harnessing becomes cumbersome and 
methodologically inadvisable; (for a good analysis of the energetics of primitive 
cultural systems in terms of calorie consumption see Kemp 1972, and Rappaport 1972). 
If it is granted that cultures might be viewed as mechanisms for ecolog-
· ical adaptation through the transformation, distribution and use of energy, then 
energy is the means, environmentally available, for subsistence, survival and 
expansion of the operating unit's existence. The subsistence, survival and expan-
sion of the unit might be understood biologically and/or socially. Biological 
existence refers to the physical or organic sustenance and protection of life 
of the integrating members of the units. Social existence alludes to the expan-
sion and maintenance of the unit's adaptational network; thereby it includes the 
web of social relations emanating from the unit's environmental activity. 
In a sociocultural system energy resources range from mere raw products 
to manufactured goods, and will include all those resources necessary to permit 
the harnessing, transformation, distribution and consumption of the energy resources 
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within the system. The employment and value of these energy resources will be 
contingent upon a cultural perception of them. While energy resources have an 
• tive element to them, they are also subject to a cultural ·perception both 
obJec 
of their transformation and uses. Most important, energy resources themselves 
are culturally defined and as such their value and employment relies upon an 
evolutionary cultural process • 
. Because energy potentials are culturally perceived and defined, the 
discovery of new energy resources or uses of them, regardless of the means through 
whlth this is accomplished, should be expected to introduce a radical or partial 
readjustment of the cultural system. The effects of the cultural change being 
more or less radical in association with the strategic value of the energy 
resources involved in the process of change. 
It remains for future empirical research to resolve the question of (a) 
which energy resources are more strategic (vital) in a sociocultural system; and 
{b) which ones are more commonly employed for their instrumental value to provide 
access or control over any other resources. In the meantime two considerations 
are relevant to non-instrumental energy resources in general. First, while the 
.units in a complex society might adapt to different networks or sub-systems 
dependent on different energy resources, not all of them have the same determinant 
position for the socio-cultural organization. And secondly, the unit's existence, 
in terms of which energy resources have been defined, is a relative term for it 
can be distinguished, at least, a level of bare subsistence, moderate and affluent 
well being (cf. Samuelson 1967:17; Lenski 1966:36, 37-38). 
Preliminarily, the energy resources upon which society's cultural system 
is contingent upon might be categorized into nuclear and peripheral energy resources. 
Nuclear energy resources are responsible for the subsistence and expansion of the 
social units regardless of its evolutionary cultural sophistication. Peripheral 
energy resources are associated with a secondary level of subsistence in which 
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Ory or supplementary sources as well as prestige and comfort factors deter-access 
the unit's form of existence once it has been secured by the nuclear resources. mine 
This classification tries to arrive at a distinction between indispensable and 
dispensable energy resources for the unit's existence while adknowledging that 
this distinction is being mediated by a historic-cultural perception. 
Ecological Adaptation 
One of the safest observations which can be made abo~ culture is its 
adaptive nature. In fact, cultural ecology's main goal seems to be ''the study 
of the process by which a society adapts to its environment" (Steward 1968:337). 
Evolutionary theory can be characterized as a succession of levels of adaptation, 
each level being distinct and providing human society with different capacities 
--both social and technological-- to sustain and propagate life. 
By ecological adaptation is meant the process by means of which units 
obtain and maintain control over strategic energy resources of their environment 
for productive, distributive and consumptive ends. Operating units are any 
selected unit of analysis, be it a man, a human group, or a whole society, adapting 
and exploiting their environment. They are methodologically defined in relation 
to their output regardless of individual composition. This process of ecological 
adaptation can only be fully understood in a historical perspective because of 
the alternative strategies of adaptation it embraces and the options actually 
followed. In addition, the resources of the operating units are influenced by 
the historic experience of the operating units. 
In any case operating units, as well as society itself, are unavoidably 
faced with the problem of optional strategic adaptation to the different energy 
resources of their environment. Man himself, as human groups in general, like 
all other 1 iving beings, is confronted with the problem of adjustment to his 
environment in terms of subsistence, protection from the elements, defense from 
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. s reproduction and organization of social life. Basically from these 
enem1e ' 
fundamental needs grow man's social action and thus the adaptive nature of the 
cultural system. 
Broadly speaking, society's cultural mechanism of adaptation might be 
studied on two levels. First, with regard to the way cultural systems adapt to 
their total environment. For instance, we should consider such interrelationships 
between population, culturally styled necessities, the division of labor and cen-
ters of specialization, centers of control, social networks, technoeconomic organ-
Jzation, and the ways of dividing natural resources among those who need and use 
them. Secondly, we should consider this systemic adaptation with regard to the 
way operating units within a given culture adapt to one another. 
Most recently, Bennet (1971 :11) has suggested a third strategy closely 
linked to the former. Emphasizing adaptive behevior, he looks into ''the coping 
mechanisms or ways of dealing with people and resources in order to attain goals 
and solve problems. Our emphsis here is not on relationships between institutions, 
groups, or aggregates of data, but on patterns of behavior: problem solving, 
decision making, consuming or not consuming, inventing, innovating, migrating, 
staying". Bennet 1 s strategy, although recognized as significant, will not be 
followed systematically in this study. 
Environment 
It is impossible to think of adaptation without reference to some environ-
mentor to the energy resources in the environment for which operating units might 
or might not be competing. Explicitly, by the environment of a particular operating 
unit is meant any significant variable or set of variables beyond the unit itself 
whose relevancy relies upon its potential use as an energy resource, or its 
procurement value for energy resources. For analytic purposes of exposition, 
two main supracategories might embrace these variables: natural and societal 
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elements. Thus the adaptational process might not only be examined in relation 
natural environment, but also in relatbn to the social environment. to the 
While on the one hand, the environment is composed of a set of objective 
strategic resources, on the other 
the environment is not a natural thing; it is a set of interrelated 
parts, a product of culture •.. What this envrironmental is, is not 
discoverable objectively; it is a matter of perception (Leach 1965: 
25 and 37). 
Leach could have said that the environment, as the energy resources composing it, 
ts a product of cultural perception. For any definition of what a strategic 
resource is or the possible procurement advantage provided by another operating 
unit will always be mediated by the cultural system within which the unit operates. 
The term environment in actual field situations and for explanatory pur-
poses might be too broad and vague, especially when studying a complex system. 
What is the adaptive environment of a specific unit in a total system? In order 
to answer the question Barth's expositon of the development and perpetuation of 
cultural differences by ethnic segmentation and economic interdependence in North 
Pakistan (1968) might become helpful. In this paper Barth significantly uses the 
biological concept of 11niche11 and speaks of an ecological niche as ''the place of 
a group in the total environment, its relation to resources and competitors" 
(1968:387). 
Accepting Barth's use of ecological niche, for the purposes of this study, 
the semantic connotations of the concept will be elabo~ated. First, the use of 
niches will not only refer to the place of a group in the total environment, but 
of any operating unit instead. Second, an ecological niche will delimit the 
concept of environment to a position within a complex of relationships within 
a geographic area or a social sys~m or both. Third, emphasis is given to the 
fact that niches become adaptively relevant and advantageous because of their 
available energy resources, or because the adaptational advantages which might 
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be procured through the interrelation with other operating units. Fourthly, ecolog-
ical niches are selectively and competitively occupied by the units and involve the 
cultural procurement systems of the society plus other relations between units and 
of units to natural resources. Finally, the basic adaptation of an operating unit 
within its ecological niche might be to the micro-environment of which it is a 
part, as well as to a single micro-environmental feature (such as a plant or a 
specific operating unit) which might even cross-cut several environments. 
The adaptation of the operating units to their environments will be achieved 
through a complex of relationships organized in connection with energy resources and 
other operating units. If this adaptational activity is traced the resultant graph 
will represent the unit's 1 ~daptational networ~'. By the adaptational network of 
an operating unit is meant the web of relationships connecting the unit with either 
social or natural elements through which an environmental position is obtained, 
maintained and enlarged. The term network is not employed to refer exclusively 
to a structure in the tradition of Radcliffe-Brown with its formal and normative 
connotations. It is here employed as embracing principles of responsibility, 
election, accomodation and economy of effort. 
For methodological purposes the adaptational network of any unit might be 
studied througha system approach (see Watson et al. 1971:ch3). Such processes as 
feedback, outputs, mapping of the environment by control centers and centers of 
role specialization and even homeostatic and morphogenic processes, employed in 
systems theory could be of methodological relevance for the description and under-
standing of the adaptational process of operating units. 
Adaptational Gap 
Up to this point ecological adaptation has been presented as if it were 
a mechanical or automatic process adjusting environment and operating units. Nothing 
is further from reality. If adaptation implies maximizing the biological and social 
17 
life chances of the operating units, maximization is almost always a compromise 
·internal organization of culture end the external pressure of the environ-of the 
ment. Every culture carries the penalty of a past within the frame of which, 
barring total disorganization, it must work out its future (see Sahl ins 1968:369). 
Adaptational systems might or might not be successful when evaluated 
in terms of either a cross-cultural (etic) criteria or a cultural criteria (emic). 
Thus the concept of '~daptational gap 11 is here introduced to refer to the second 
alternative which probably (this is still subject to empirical verification) 
results from two features of the system. First, the fact that the operating 
unit's adaptational systems are open ones competing for scarce energy resources 
with other social units in their environment. Second, because of the self-centered 
and non-altruistic nature of human action and of social life within the cultural 
system itself (cf. Lenski 1966:25-42; 441-442). 
In any case then, to adapt is not to do perfectly well from some objective 
(etic approach) or cultural (emic approach) stand point, nor even necessarily to 
improve performance. It will be to do as well as possible under the circumstances, 
which might not turn well at all. 
·Culture as a System 
Cultural Sub-systems 
The concept of culture itself has been generally distinguished for explan-
atory and descriptive purposes in terms of subsystems. The major subsystems gen-
erally selected for stydy by anthropologists include: ideology, social structure, 
technoeconomics and personality. The latter, at the present time will not be 
included in the discussion. 
Technoeconomic: Broadly speaking what Marx and other authors have con-
ceptualized as economic infraestructure has been successively substituted first 
by the concept of technology and more recently by technoeconomics which seems 
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best suited to refer to the 11modes 11 and ' 1means 11 of production. The technoeconomic 
subsystem focuses not only on techniques and tools used by operating units in meet-
ing their adaptational goals, but also on the social arrangements employed by the 
units in applying its technical equipment and knowledge for production, distribu-
tion and consumption of energy resources. 
Every technoeconomic is a particular kind of social system. In addition 
to denoting specific sources of energy, artifacts, and customary ways of behaving 
towards the environment, a technoeconomic subsystem refers to the organization of 
labor, access to means of production, modes of distribution and allocating energy 
resources, and tf-e definition of the socioeconomic status of the different oper-
ating units. These are some of the spheres in which the most fundamental cultural 
adaptations and adjustments have to be made after technological advances have 
become possible. In addition, it is in these spheres that people in most societies 
exhibit their fundamental conservatism because of the social consequences of these 
changes, and where power play becomes most determinant. 
The importance of the technoeconomic organization to explain culture 
changes and even the organization of the cultural system itself has been clearly 
defended by White when speaking of tf-e technological stratum: 
We may view a cultural system as a series of three horizontal strata: 
the technological layer on the bottom, the philosophical on the top, 
the sociological stratum in between. These positions express thar 
respective roles in tf-e cultural process. The technological system 
is basic and primary. Social systems are functions of technologies; 
and philosophies express technological forces and reflect social 
systems. The technological factor is therefore the determinant of 
a cultural system as a whole ... This is not to say, of course, that 
social and technological systems are not affected by philosophies. 
They do and are. But to condition is one thing, to determine quite 
another (1949:366; see part I II). 
Social structure: Structural studies in anthropology deal mainly with the 
way in which parts of a given system relate to each other. In the analysis of the 
relations between the parts and the whole, methodological precedence has been 
frequently given to 11social1 1 variables over "cultural" variables. The main reason 
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for this approach is that social relations, or human groups' interactions, 11can 
be observed directly'' in contrast to cultural patterns of behavior. 
social structure conceptualizations range from Evans-Pritchard's conf ig-
uration of stable groups to Leach's set of ideal norms or rules, and Levi-Strauss' 
formal models of social relations. However, as a cultural subsystem, social 
structures have traditionally been conceived as the normative pattern of social 
behavior. The best example of this approach is the work of Radcliffe-Brown who 
defined social structures as "the continuing arrangement of persons in relation-
ships or controlled by institutions, i.e., socially established norms or patterns 
of behvior 11 (1958:177); or in more sophisticated and abstract terms: '' ... human 
beings are connected by a complex network of social relations. I use the term 
social structure to denote this network of actually existing relations" (1952: 
190; cf. Barnes 1954:43). 
Insightfully, Levy Strauss noticed that Radcliffe-Brown identified and 
thus confused social structure with social relations because of his empirice-
morphological approach. Social structures should not refer to social relations 
but to the models built upon the systemic understanding of the former. In this 
perspective, social relations are the empirical raw data from which the social 
structure transformational models are built (cf. Levy Strauss 1963:ch. 15). 
In addition to the understanding of social structures in the Radcliffe-
Brown tradition, Raymond Firth (1951:39-40) observed that structural forms set 
a precedent and provide a limitation to the range of alternatives possible. 
Thus in order to acknowledge structural change a new concept was needed. While 
the continuity principle of society is found in the aspect of social structure, 
the change principle is found in the concept of organization "by allowing eval-
uation of situations and entry of individual choice''. It should be noticed that 
although the undeniable value of the social organization concept, when it is 
Understood as dependent upon ''individual choice11 , will lead to the conclusion 
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t deviant personalities are the ultimate source of modification in the social tha 
structure. Especially since structural change is not permanent in space or in 
i and Firth does not acknowledge the origin of this change from new cultural t me. 
devices emerging within or encroaching into the systemic organization of society. 
on the descriptive and functional level, the strategy of studying socio-
cultural systems from the perspective of social relations an'd their networks is 
most profitable because it is the acting and interacting of individuals that will 
be observed in the field; (see more recent formulations of this approach in Bott 
1957, Clyde Mitchell 1969). However, the explanatory value of the structural 
approach has long been put into question, especially when it comes to the question 
of origins and social change. The social structures are frequently formulated in 
normative and synchronic perspective. In addition, their value seems to be more 
than theoretical, methodological. 
Ideology: The ideological s.ubsystem of a cultural system covers the 
realm of values, norms, knowledge themes, philosophies, religious beliefs, ethical 
principles and the like. The term ideological is not here used as referring to a 
set of rationalizations being enforced by power upon a society; although this 
·possibility is not excluded. Instead its meaning refers to the unquestionable 
observation that man is a symbolic organism. And furthermore, that he is dependent 
upon symboling to conduct his social life to such an extent that culture and 
ideology has even been identified. For instance, Goodenoug (1964:36) defines 
culture as an ideological system in itself. For him, culture 11 is not a material 
phenomenon; it does not consist of things, people, be:1avior or emotions. It is 
rather an organization of these things that people have in mind, their models for 
perceiving, relating and otherwise interpreting them. 11 (See Tyler's definition 
of culture in terms of semantic domains in 1969:11). 
The question of how much of a determinative role ideological factors 
Play in cultural maintenance and change remains a highly controversial one; 
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(cf. Childe 1941; Redfield 1953; Levy Strauss 1962:117; Berger and Luckman 1966). 
Nevertheless, available studies seem to indicate that technological and social 
organizations in over all give rise to ideological transformations. The operatfng 
•t's conception of the relations between the cultural system, the process of 
un• 
ecological adaptation, and environment, is a function of modification of their 
awn technoeconomic and social structure organizations. 
The analytical consideration of culture in terms of subsystems grants the 
opportunity of employing different research and explanatory strategies by just 
emphasizing one or the other subsystem of culture. In addition, it provides the 
formulation of a functionalist model providing for interactive effects and accomo-
dations between the parts of the system. Finally, it guarantees the provision 
for analysis of system-origin, system-maintaining and system-destroying varaiables. 
Subsystems Interaction 
The analysis of the cultural system in terms of subsystems is today best 
known in anthropology by such definitions as "a culture is an integrated organi-
zation of technology, social structure, and philosophy adjusted to the life 
problems posed by its natural habitat and by nearby and competing cultures" 
(Sahl ins and Service 1960:53). These definitions are in line with previous defin-
itions made by evolutionists (i.e., White 1949:366; 1959:6-8) and cultural ecolo-
gists (i.e., Steward 1955:40-41). But undoubtedly, Marx's strategy for the 
explanation of cultural evolution is behind contemporary formulation of cultural 
subsystems. 
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into 
definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely rela-
tions of production appropriate to a given stage in the development 
of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations 
of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real 
foundation, on which arises legal and political superstructure and to 
which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of 
production of material life conditions, the general process of social, 
political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men 
that determines their existence, but their social existence that 
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determines their consciousness .•. The changes in the economic founda-
tion lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense 
superstructure (1970:20-21). 
Recent field studies have contributed to condition the causal role which 
HarX assigned to the economic infraestructure in view of the interaction of the 
different subsystems; (see Cancian 1972:189-199; Bennet 1968:303; Polany 1968: 
63-65; Nash 1967). Nevertheless, the most powerful generalization about cultural 
systems seerrS to be found by studying the relationship between the qualitative 
and quantitative aspects of the technoeconomic system for the harness and distri-
bution of energy as the independent variables and the quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of the other cultural domains of sociocultural phenomena as the dependent 
ones. Because causal dependence upon the technoeconomic subsystem is not an abso-
Jute one to one effect, to explain particular socio-historical situations we have 
to consider the interaction between the different subsystems. But in any case, 
the cultural materialist research strategy requires that priority be given to 
studies concerned with the-material conditions of the sociocultural system. 
Furthermore, cultural materialists' hypothesis should be abandoned for cultural 
idealists' hypothesis only after the material circumstances have been given care-
ful consideration. 
The understanding of the 11relations of production 11 is complicated beyond 
Marx's definition in the preceding quotation by the presence of centers of control 
in complex societies, especially the state. In stateless societies technological 
change seems to be closely related to institutional change. But non-technological 
political institutions seem to be able to harness and employ sufficient power 
in state societies as to underlie and direct technological change itself. For 
instance, in stateless societies labor specializations are almost alwa~ tied to 
immediately available local resources and do not depend on transportation and 
importaion of raw or finished materials. Items secure" in trade are not essential 
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to survival even when they may be important in spheres of cultural adjustments. 
eut trade that furnishes the raw materials for specialized production requires 
regulatory bureaucracies to negotiate treaties, assure safe passage and establish 
·,valencies in money, weights and measures, and to insure the dependability of 
equ 
supply. These activities can be carried only by state bureaucracies. 
Thus the relations of production appear not as an autonomous and self-
supporting range of the cultural system in complex societies, regardless of their 
decisive causal influence upon it. Centers of control have to be understood as 
connected and interacting in an infinite feedback process with the economic 
structure as defined by Marx. Furthermore, this interacting process takes place 
amid specific environmental parameters. The problem to solve in a research of 
Industrial complex societies is then to discover the control exercised upon, and 
the circumstances determining the harness and distribution of energy resources 
within the cultural system. In other words, the power domains delimiting the 
modes and means of energy harness and distribution and the parameters of the re-
sulting causal influence of the technoeconomic subsystem upon the cultural system 
at large. If this research strategy is not followed, the explanation of cultural 
change and of the social organization of the cultural process will tend to ignore 
the institutional complexity of the cultural system and its dynamics as well. 
In general, it should be concluded that in industrial complex societies 
the cultural system should be analysed as the historical result of the subsystem's 
interaction. Theoretical formulations shou1d acknowledge technoeconomic condition-
ing, especially to explain the sociocultural organization and its process of 
change, because of its causal effect upon the cultural system. The functional 
causality of the technoeconomic subsystem upon the cultural system relies in the 
control of the means of production plus the control exercised by the units upon the 
process of harness, elaboration, distribution and consumption of energy resources. 
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subsystem Articulation 
The recognition of cultural subsystems has undeniable theoretical as well 
as methodological advantages. This should not make us conclude that the subsystems 
are mutually exclusive or self-sustaining. On the contrary, they are analytical 
aspects of one complex reality, the cultural system. Thus, for instance, culture 
might be studies as social structure at the technoeconomic level just as ideologies 
are related to the other two subsystems. It is for this reason that when an anthro-
pologist of any theoretical persuasion moves from an ethnographic descripton to an 
explanation, he is normally forced to employ theoretical orientations which have 
been developed from studies in all cultural subsystems. 
If the aim of the anthropologist is explanation and the formulation of 
theories, he will discover that each of these orientations (theoretical 
orientations resulting from studies emphasizing one or the other of the 
subsystems) logically implies the other and that, therefore, all tend 
to converge when applied to a similar set of problems {Kaplan and 
Manners 1972:88). 
The Analysis of Cultural Subsystems 
Social Action and Social Organization 
Social actions constitute the core of the subsystems of any culture. With-
out it the adaptational network of the operating units will be non-existent and 
ecological adaptation impossible. Operating units' adaptation is contingent upon 
environmental energy resources through their social actions. It is through these 
relations that the adaptation of the units is apparent and from them the cultural 
system develops. 
One profitable method availabe to anthropology for the study of complex 
social systems is the analysis of social actions. Since the sociocultural sys-
tem is to be understood as a working adaptational system, social actions should 
be understood as a social organization, and not as an erratic unarticulated 
behavioral output of the units within society. Thus a methodological approach 
for the study of adaptational processes may be developed by analyzing the social 
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an ization of the cultural system. In this perspective social actions are not or9 
understood as isolated and random behavior but as a systemic set of relations 
for environmental adaptation by means of acts of choice and decision. Regardless 
of the degree of structural patterning and of complexity, the directional activity 
of the cultural system reveals itself as being contingent upon its internal organi-
zat ion. 
As previously defined, culture is a "systemic organization" of various 
elements for the exploitation, transformation, distribution and use of energy 
resources. The systemic organization by which culture is defined has to be under-
stood in association with the cultural system's social organization. It is directly 
upon society itself that culture is contingent. Through the organization of the 
adaptational activity of the operating units within society the cultural system 
is structured and understood. 
The term 11organization11 , however, requires some further specification. 
Most frequently social actions are identified with social structure while social 
organization is taken to be synonymous with social structure. But as Firth has 
argued, social structure stands for form while social organization stands for 
process in social life. While continuity is expressed in the social structure, 
variance in social life is embodied in social organization. 
In studying a field of social relations, whether we are using the notions 
of society, of culture, or of community, we can distinguish their structure, 
their function, and their organization. These are separable but related 
aspects. All are necessary for the full consideration of social process. 
Briefly, by the structural aspect of social relations we mean the prin-
ciples on which their form depends; by the functional aspect we mean the 
way in which they serve given ends; by the organizational aspect we mean 
the directional activity which maintains their form and serves their ends 
(Firth 1951:28; see 1964:35). 
Thus by social organization is meant the~ the systemic ordering of social 
actions by acts of choice and decision. Still in other words, it is the set 
of systemic strategies followed by the operating units in their process of 
ecological adaptation. 
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It is ·the organizational configuration of social actions that becomes 
relevant for the study of complex cultural systems. In contrast to structures, 
which in anthropological literature are associated with one cultural subsystem 
as well as with order, continuity and form, social organization pervades the 
cultural system and is to be regarded as a primary aspect of co-ordination and 
cooperation between the operating units for adaptational purposes. 
As here employed, the term social organization has a number of methodo-
logical advantages over that of social structures as understood in the Radcliffe-
erown tradition. First, it refers to the working arrangements of social actions. 
Thus it is not limited to "structural" arrangements but includes a wider range 
of possibilities characteriz~d in the process of ecological adaptation and in 
the process of cultural change itself. Second, organization does not refer to 
the total sum of social acts in the cultural system. It refers only to those 
that are significant to the directional flow of the cultural system. In this 
respect the social organization of societies have to be understood as heuristic 
models that, regardless of their scale, are constructed from the social acts. 
Third, social organization pervades the cultural system since it penetrates every 
single input and output of the system. Fourth, one of the principal character-
istics of the social organization is its systemic nature; i.e., the directional 
activity of the operating units forming the system affects the ordered whole. 
Accepting a broad classification, the operating unit's social organiza-
tion will include social and economic relations. In the following section an 
analysis of these relations will be included in order to discover the nature 
of them. 
Social Actions as Exchange Forms 
Social organization, at least, can be subdivided for analytical pur-
poses into social and economic organization. The core of the social organiza-
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tion is its social relations while at the core of the economic organization, 
Integration is obtained through economic relations. 
social relations are characteristic because of their systemic exchange 
nature. Some operating units communicate by means of a common set of symbols 
and objects in order to obtain an explicit or implicit goal. The goal achieve-
ment might be valuable to one or to all of the units involved in the interaction. 
In any case, social actions include a reciprocal give and take. For this reason, 
social relations have been interpreted as instances of exchange. For example, 
Blau defines social exchange as "voluntary actions of individuals that are 
motivated by the returns they are expected to bring and typically do in fact 
bring from others'' (1964:91). Social exchange theory has been most influenced 
from Mauss' interpretation of gift-giving and gift-receiving. The French sociolo-
gist discovered a structure in most primitive institutions: 
All these institutions reveal the same kind of social and psychological 
pattern. Food, women, children, possessions, charms, lan~ labour, ser-
vices, religious offices, rank, --everything is stuff to be given away 
and repaid. In perpetual interchange of what we may call spiritual 
matter, comprising men and things, these elements pass and repass be-
tween clans and individual~ ranks and sexes and generations (1967:11-12). 
This gift exchange taking place through social channels bases itself on three 
obligations: the obligation to give presents, the obligation to receive them, 
as well as to repay them (Mauss 1967:10; Sahl ins 1965:162). 
The need to reciprocate for benefits in order to continue receiving them 
serves as a starting mechanism of social interaction and group organization for 
the operating units. The adaptational advantages to be gained from entering 
into exchange relations furnish incentives for social interactions, and the 
exchange processes serve as a mechanism for regulating social interaction, 
developme - of a network of adaptation and a rudimentary social organization. 
The norm of reciprocity merely reinforces and stabilizes tendencies inherent in 
the character of social action itself. 
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Thus as Mauss himself recognized (1967:70) the nature of social exchange 
Is a kind of hybrid. It results neither in purely free and gratuitous protesta-
tions, nor in purely interested and utilitarian production and exchange. Social 
exchange involves calculated risks and implicit agreements. In a recent study 
of agricultural operators in Canada, Bennet found that while 
Jasper agriculturalists prefer to view cooperative economic exchange 
as a spontaneous expression of benevolence, good will, and neighborly 
assistance ••. The most important rule of exchange equivalence was: 
do not permit the exchange to get too far out of balance; although, 
it is good to let it be a little out of balance because this builds 
credit. There was a second rule which more directly governed the 
actual equivalence: try not to exchange things that are markedly 
different in value {or with people who have few resources for reci-
procation), otherwise the balance becomes difficult to maintain (1968: 
291 and 293; cf. Benedict 1968:2-3). 
Exchange: Social and Economic 
Some anthropologists and sociologis~view social exchange as the basic 
principle upon which all of the actions of the operating unit are contingent. 
But contrary to this tradition some distinctions can be established at least 
between ritual, social and economic behavior. 
First of all, much ritual and religious behavior is not necessarily 
governed by expectations of return, gain-loss considerations or manipulation of 
wants. Their expressive significance, lacking decision-making for specific 
advantages, may mean they are oriented to the pursuit of ultimate values rather 
than to the pursuit of immediate adaptational rewards in their adaptational 
networks. Thus they lack an exchange nature, at least in social terms. An 
analogical consideration applies to altruistic behavior in its pure form when 
existing. 
In order to diffe1Y1tiate between ritual behavior and exchange relations 
Blau proposes the following criteria. First, the action must be led toward ends 
that can only be achieved through interaction with other operating units. Secondly, 
it must seek to adapt means to further the achievement of these ends (Blau 1964:5). 
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In this perspective social exchange might appear to be reducible to 
economic behavior because of their gain-loss considerations. Thus all social 
action will be equivalent to an economic relation. It has even been argued that 
because pre-money moral values were based in social exchange reciprocities with 
gain-loss considerations, they should be termed economic transactions (cf. Belshaw 
l965:51; Bennet 1968:303; for a critical review of the problem see Dalton 1971). 
One main characteristic differentiates social from economic exchanges: 
(i) in contrast to economic relations, social exchange entails unspecified obli-
gations (cf. Blau 1964:315; Sahl ins 1965). Furthermore, it should be left open 
for empirical verification whether or not social exchange is characterized more 
frequently than economic exchange by {a) including a higher degree of personal ism 
and directness in the network, and (b) consideration of a broader set of guide-
1 ines of the ideological and normative sphere at the operational level than does 
economic exchange. 
Admitting a difference between economic and social exchange, it seems 
safer to maintain, that economic exchange is but one form of output of an 
important type from a wider set of adaptive responses. available to the operating 
units for adaptational purposes. It is the attempted calculation of price and 
cost to the unit in its adaptational network. Both economic and social exchange 
then become a specialized field of the adaptive organization of the operating 
unit. 
Exchange as an Adaptational Strategy 
Be it social or economic, exchange in social life has a most important 
characteristic: it is a logistic and transactional output by means of which 
the operating units through a reciprocal exchange either implicitly or explicitly 
try to obtain or maintain certain strategic position in their environment. Its 
rational standing is one of means to ends. 
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Operating units do not enter into exchange relationships only because 
of a psychological process such as those underlying the feel.ing of attraction 
between individuals, but mainly to obtain various kinds of advantages in their 
environmental position. The economic and the social organization of the oper-
ating units are in line with the adaptational dimension of the cultural system 
of which they are the elements. Social and economic exchange have an adapta-
tional dimension: they are a way of securing something in an environmental 
context. Exchange becomes a calculated risk within the cultural system in 
every single adaptational network. 
It is this ever-present transactional nature of exchange in social and 
economic relations that is strategically most valuable for the study of cultural 
systems of complex societies. By understanding power in a broad frame of reference 
of control, power relations appear at the core of every exchange relation. Control 
is exercised for regulating and/or directing the operating unit's adaptational 
process by means of interchanges. 
This is not an argument stating that all exchange relations have the 
same power dimension or the same adaptational strategic importance. It is only 
stating that there is a power dimension at every social and economic exchange 
linking operating units in their environment. It remains for empirical research 
to determine the significance of specific exchanges in cultural situations and 
the means through which they are controlled. 
Power in Industrial Complex Societies: A Hypothetical Model 
In general, power has been used to refer either to the tactical control 
that is exercised by an operating unit over the environment of another (cf. Weber 
1947:152; Adams 1970:119), or to the unlegitimized use of control over another 
Un '1 t ( ) cf. Buckley 1967:195 . In a social relationship we will take power to 
mean the dialectical resultant of the effective control that one operatingunit 
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holds over the environmental resources of adaptation of other units and the 
latter's ability to resist the former. 
Power relations are a mechanism available to the operating units for 
adapting to their environment. It is not only a matter of units establishing 
a complex of relationships in their adaptational networks, but of exchanging 
through them adaptational advantages and obtaining control and access to energy 
resources at the base of their sociocultural organizations. 
Power situations are features of every social action. They are the 
link uniting operating units and thus constituting the adaptational network. 
They spread their effect differentially through the entire environment but 
anything that threatens the ecological niche of another operating unit provides 
the basis for the exercise of power. Every operating unit will probably be related 
to others in some manner that can be initially estimated on the basis of a gen-
eral understanding of the larger system of adaptation. In addition, by seeing 
power in social actions as a rational evaluation of a situation in which an 
operating unit decides to do what is best for it, a common or at least over-
lapping, cultural system is implied (cf. Adams 1970:117). 
An important element in every power situation is the defensive feedback 
of the operating unit affected by the control being exerted upon its environment. 
Blau in a different theoretical setting proposes four situational alternatives 
for an operating unit to escape from the power domain of another: 
Individuals who need a service another has to offer have the following 
alternatives: first, they can supply him with a service that he wants 
badly enough for him to offer his service in return ... Second, they may 
obtain the needed service elsewhere, assuming that there are alterna-
tive suppliers ..• Third, they can coerce him to furnish the service ..• 
Fourth, they may learn to resign themselves to do without this service, 
possibly finding some substitute for it ... Finally, if they are not 
able or willing to choose any of these alternatives, they have no other 
choice but to comply with his wishes (1964:118-119). 
An essential quality of power lies in the fact that the various operating 
units command different resources of control. And, if nothing else, they can 
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obligitariness" (1954:4; cf. 1962:72). He classified types of legitimacy 
according to the means by which it was guaranteed. One of his most fundamental 
distinctions was between subjective guarantees involving "purely disinterested 
motives" and objective guarantees which depend on "entirely self-interest" (1947: 
126-130). On the other hand: 
legitimacy may be ascribed to an order by those acting subject to it 
in the following ways: (a) by tradition, a belief in the legitimacy 
of what has always existed; (b) by virtue of affectual attitudes, 
especially emotional, legitimizing the validity of what is newly 
revealed or a model to imitate; (c) by virtue of a rational belief 
in its absolute value, thus lending it the validity of an absolu~e 
and final commitment; (d) because it has been established in a 
manner which is recognized to be legal. This legality may be 
treated as legitimate in either of two ways: on the one hand, it 
may derive from a voluntary agreement of the interested parties on 
the relevant terms. On the other hand, it may be imposed on the 
basis of what is held to be a legitimate authority over the rele-
vant persons and a corresponding claim to their obedience (1947:130). 
At the core of the matter is the cultural perception which one operating 
unit has over the control other units are exerting over the environment and the 
latter's justification of this power exertion. Legitimacy then is the process 
by means of which ideological consent is blended with power exercise either in 
the exchange relations between operating units, or in the complex of relation-
ships constituting an environment. 
Normally an operating unit tries to justify its exercise of power by an 
appeal to legitimacy either in the form of custom, of law or belief. Custom 
refers to any habitual or usual course of action, or any established practice 
in the environment. An appeal to law implies a justification of power exercised 
through rules of conduct enforced by sanctions administered by a determinant 
locus of power. Finally by appealing to belief, a request is made to consensus 
in social actions by referring to non-ordinary and sacred causes, whether of 
a religious nature oiof social dimensions, which are above and against established 
Practices. 
The process of legitimacy is closely related and dependent upon a 
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always command different amounts of physical force that they can bring into play. 
The indicators of power and the means of effective control of the interchange of 
energy resources will vary greatly even within operating units of different levels 
of articulation in the same environment. In any case, the adaptational threat of 
will be effectively exercised when the units have some common value or need power 
of energy resources and an understanding of the adaptational networks of the 
units in the environment. 
sources and Means of Power 
One crucial question pertaining to data gathering and data analysis in 
the study of power relations as mechanisms of adaptation deals with the sources 
and the means of power available to the units. In other words, the "how" and 
''why" of power relations and their significance in the cultural system, especially 
within concrete ecosystems. 
In power situations a distinction might be made between potential and 
effective power. The latter refers to the actual exercise of power while the 
former acknowledges the possibility of a future exercise of it. This distinction 
signals a deeper reality, i.e., the existence of sources of power upon which 
effective exercise of it is based. A difference is then apparent between sources 
of power and the means through which power is conveyed into the adaptational 
network. The former acknowledges the exchange nature of social action and the 
need of the operating units to possess or control certain adaptational features 
in order to bargain in their environments. Means of power acknowledges the fact 
that it is not sufficient to have command over certain resources of power unless 
it is exercised in actual social situations. 
In industrial complex societies the main resources of power, especially 
at their technoeconomic subsystem, are: (1) control over energy resources; 
(2) control over the processes of energy transformation; (3) control over the 
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distributive system of transformed energy resources; (4) control over an oper-
ating unit's access to the exploitation of energy resources; (5) control over 
an operating unit's access to the process of energy transformation; and (6) 
control over an operating unit's access to the distribution and uge of the 
energy surplus. 
Congruent with traditional sociological interest it could be asserted 
that the process of decision-making and decision-implementing in light of the 
adaptational process characteristic of sociocultural systems becomes important 
when explained in relation to power decisions. However, in the perspective of 
the present considerations, emphasis should be given to the discovery and study 
of the means of power available and utilized by the operating units. It is 
one thing to have power (potential) and another to use it (effective). The 
means of power are embodied in the adaptational network of the operating units, 
especially in their social and economic actions, and include the channels and 
strategies through which power resources are conveyed into actual situations of 
control. The means of power might become associated with specific symbols of 
power. 
Legitimacy 
The exercise of power varies in its strategic manifestations. At the 
present time it suffices to distingui~ three strategies: authority, influence 
and force. To clarify their difference some remarks are made in this sub-section 
in relation to legitimacy and the round of legitimate action in adaptational 
processes. 
Operating units justify their possession and use of power by legitimizing 
it. Through this process of justification a shift occurs moving the basis of 
POiier from might to right (cf. Lenski 1966:55; Parson 1947:22). For Weber 
legitimacy was the endowment of a rule ''with the prestige of exemplariness or 
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d 'fication of the technoeconomic and social structure of the cultural system co I 
to which certain or all of the operating units in the system contribute. Phrased 
in another way, to a valorative codification of the adaptational process of the 
society to its environment. The ideological subsystem then has a 11practical", 
every day relapsing in social life through the framing and patterning not only 
of a model of social relations in general, but of legitimized action concretely. 
Within this context, the main goal of any research of complex societies should 
be to discover the process by means of which the units codify their environment 
and legitimize or not the exercise of power in their networks. Through this 
approach the establishment and maintenance of what Freire (1970) refers to as a 
"culture of silence" in developing societies will become explainable and most 
meaningful. 
POiier Strategies 
Three main strategies of power relations were identified. They are: 
(1) authority which is the exercise of power by any one operating unit within 
the sanctioned range of legitimate action accepted in the adaptive network in 
which the unit is operating; (2) influence involves the exercise of power by 
one operating unit within the permitted but not sanctioned or prohibited range 
of legitimate action accepted in the adaptive network in which the unit is 
operating; (3) Force (distinguished from "physical force" meaning any kind of 
physical aggression) is the exercise of power by any one operating unit in 
opposition to the sanctioned and/or permitted range of legitimate action in 
the adaptive network in which the unit is operating. 
The recognition of these three strategies of power evades in a certain 
way the Marx-Weber controversy on whether or not the essence of the state is 
"Power" (here defined as 11force11 ) or 11authority11 (cf. Horowitz 1969). The core 
of the cultural system and of the state institution is power regardless of 
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it is exercised under one or another strategy. Nonetheless, the issue 
whether 
in deciding the process by means of which in some societies specific 
remains 
pawer relations have or have not become legitimized. 
pawer and Reciprocity 
The essence of power relations is the exchange nature manifested through 
actions of controls. In other words, it is the reciprocal constitution guided 
by the adaptational interests of the operating units. For this reason Sahlin's 
model of reciprocity (1965:145-149) can be translated in terms of power relations. 
Power networks are not necessarily symmetrical. As a matter of fact, 
normally uneven control over environmental energy resources results in assymetri-
cal exercise of power. The exchange nature of power relations can be studied 
in the frame of adaptational strategies according to the directional flow of 
advantages. In this setting a model of power can be identified which includes 
three extreme poles in a triangula- continuum (generalized, balanced, and negative 
reciprocity), and a resulting situation from the actual tension of power relations 
(unbalanced reciprocity). 
(i) Generalized reciprocity: the modal exercise of power by means of 
which a unit, while benefiting the adaptational interests of another unit (or 
units), preserves or increases its sources of power while tactically endangering 
or not endangering it. While the manifest flow of advantages involved in the 
relation move in one direction, they preserve or even increase, the source of 
power of the donating unit. 
(ii) Negative reciprocity: the modal exercise of power in which one 
unit preserves or increases its sources of power without conceding adaptational 
advantages to another unit (or units), proper exception of the maintenance of 
life. Thus the actual interchange of advantages approximates a one directional 
flow of exchange. 
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(iii) Balanced reciprocity: the modal exercise of power in which 
operating units either because competing on equal power resources for the 
control of the other's environment, or because mutually agreed so (alliance) 
for strategic reasons, are not able to or do not convert their relationship 
into one of the generalized or negative or unbalanced nature but instead main-
tain a proportionate or commensurate exchange. The flow of adaptational 
advantages is bi-directional without offering superiority to either one of 
them over the other's environment. 
(iv) Unbalanced reciprocity: any modal exercise of power in which 
one unit preserves or increases its resources of power without establishing 
either a negative or a generalized or a balanced reciprocity. 
The establishment of one or another of these reciprocities will depend 
upon considerations of the means and sources of power, on environmental energy 
resources arrived at by the operating units in their adaptational network. 
These types of reciprocities should be considered as representative of terminal 
situations in a continuum. Actual situations will approximate more or less 
the ultimate forms here signaled. The forms of reciprocity might be exercised 
both between operating units of the same power domains and/or the same level 
of articulation, as well as between operating units of different domains and/or 
levels of articulation. In any case the quantification of this model of power 
reciprocity should provide an insight into the assymentrical power networks 
within the sociocultural organization and its resulting effects of social 
tensions, conflict, submission and rebellion. 
CHAPTER I I 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY 
The Dominican Republic and Its Agricultural Environment 
Economic Environment 
The Dominican Republic is an industrial complex society as defined in 
the introductory chapter. But contrary to the United States, Japan, and some 
European countries, its complexity derives not from a secondary or tertiary 
technoeconomic organization, but from its agricultural production in the midst 
of a world wide market system. Like any other Caribbean country, agricultural 
production constitutes the core energy resources of the Dominican Republic's 
international environment. The national economic has followed a dependency 
path in relation to industrial and capitalist countries: The Dominicans export 
agrarian products in exchange for manufactured goods and financial capital. 
El modelo de desarrollo historico del pais ha seguido el marco de 
desarrollo clasico de los paises de America Latina, o sea, una 
economia volcada hacia fuera, exportadora de materias primas 
agricolas tradicionales e importadora de bienes de consumo y de 
capital. Asi, el pais ha crecido bajo la influencia y comando 
de los centrol lideres del desarrollo economico en el contexto 
mundial. Este desarrollo se ha basado, en la Republica Domini-
cana, en los cultivos de cana de azucar, cafe, cacao y tabaco, 
bajo una agricultura extensiva con la incorporacion de mano de 
obra y tierras que constituian los factores abundantes del pais. 
(Secretaria Tecnica de la Presidencia 1968:109) 
The strategic importance of agricultural production in the import-
export balance of the Republic becomes self-evident in the export revenues 
obtained through such products as sugar, coffee, tobacco, and cocoa. In the 
year 1970, for instance, these four leading export crops represented 84.2% of 
the total national export; in 1960 they represented 86.3% of the national 
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revenues, and in 1950, 89.7% (cf. Table 1) 
TABLE 1 
EXPORT VALUE OF THE LEADING DOMINICAN PRODUCTS 
~ 1950 1960 1964 1966 1968 1969 1970 1971 
rotal exports: 86.9 157.4 179.4 138.o 163.5 184. 1 213.2 --
Total imports: 43.0 90.3 202.4 166.9 196.8 210.4 266.8 --
PRODUCTS: 
sugar and its 
40.7 92.3 96.0 79.8 91.8 98.9 115.9 145.6 sub-products 
coffee 12.3 22.6 30.5 20.9 17.9 21.2 28.9 23.9 
cocoa 17.3 19.6 16. 1 11. 2 13.8 20. 1 19.6 13. 2 
tobacco 4.7 6.7 14.7 6.6 11. 3 12.7 14.3 20.8 
bauxite -- 8.o 8.9 10.3 12.6 14.6 15. 1 16.0 
beef 1.9 2.5 -- .2 4.4 4.2 3.4 3.0 
fruits and 
vegetables 2.2 .8 6.9 2.3 4. 1 5. 1 6. 1 8.4 
others 
,. 7.8 8. 1 6.3 6.7 7,9 7,5 9.7 11. 7 
Values in millions of RD$. 
Source: Banco del Desarrollo 1972. 
The position of the agricultural sector within the national economy 
can best be understood by sub-dividing the gross national product according to 
contributing economic sectors. The leading sub-sectors of the national econ-
omy, besides agriculture itself, include mining, industry, construction, gov-
ernment and commerce. In connection with each sector's output should also 
be considered their labor input. In this way, the output capacity of each 
sector--an economic variable--will best be understood in relation to the vol-
ume of labor consumptbn they generate--a socioeconomic variable. The strategic 
importance of the labor market relies upon its integrative force of different 
i. 
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ating units within the technoeconomic subsystem, and even the social struc-
oper 
of the Republic. In this perspective, unemployment constitutes a disorgan-ture 
tzation variable; above all, once isolated communities and subsistence economies 
disappear. 
TABLE 2 
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY ECONOMIC SECTORS 
ECONOMIC SECTOR: 1950 1954 1958 1962 
~ 
agriculture and livestock 29.6 28.5 26. 1 25.8 
mining, industry, and con-
struction 18.4 20.7 22.0 21.6 
co11111erce 18.3 19.0 18.6 18.0 
government 8.8 7.9 10.2 12.4 
transport, communications 
and electricity 4. 5 5.0 5.8 6.0 
dwelling ownership 7.6 7. 1 6.6 6.3 
other services 12.8 11. 8 10.7 9.9 
Prices according to 1962 values. Figures in percents. 
Source: Aleman 1970:4. 
TABLE 3 
EMPLOYMENT VOLUME GENERATED BY EACH ECONOMIC SECTOR 
ECONOMIC SECTOR:: 1962 % 1964 % 1966 
manufacturing industry 62. 1 (7) 71.9 (8) 71.3 
sugar industry 32.6 (3) 40.3 (4) 40.8 
construct ion 23.7 (3) 34.0 (4) 28.0 
agri cul tu re and 1 ivestock 440.2 (52) 464.0 ( 51) 474.4 
mining 1.4 (-) 1.5 (-) 1.6 
Other services 216. 1 (26) 249.5 (28) 260.0 
.. 
unemployment 66.5 (8) 40.6 (6) 89.4 
Figures in thousands of persons 
1966 1968 
24.9 23.3 
22.0 23. 1 
16.4 17.5 
12.7 11. 5 
7.6 8.6 
6.8 7.0 
9.6 10.0 
% 1968 % 
(7) 74.6 (7) 
(4) 42.0 (4) 
(3) 35.2 (3) 
(49) 484.0 (46) 
(-) 2.0 (-) 
(27) 279. 5 (27 ) 
(9) 120.6(12) 
Source: Aleman 1970:5; cf.Secretariado Tecnicc de la Presidencia 1970, 
Tab 1 es 28 and 30 
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Characteristically of underdeveloped societies, agricultural conditions 
In the Dominican Republic are poor. Productivity levels are low, for instance, 
in 1968, 46% of the national labor force in the agricultural sector accounted 
for 23.3% of the gross national product, meanwhile 14% of the labor force in 
Industrial tasks--construction, sugar and manufacturing industries--was respon-
sible for 23. 1% of the GNP. Predictions for 1974 referring to these two sectors 
call for 53.8% of the national labor, accounting for 23% of the GNP while 16.6% 
of the industrial national labor produces 20.8% of the GNP. There will be a 7% 
increase in agricultural labor while a slight decrease in productivity is ex-
pected. 
Still another characteristic element of the Dominican agricultural sec-
tor is its low annual average income. This situation is worsened by the decrease 
and in some areas virtual disappearance of a subsistence economy. In 1968, for 
instance, the national average income per laboring person was that of RD$1, 134.3 
(one peso=one US dollar), but agricultural laborers only received $497.5 (cf. 
Secretariado Tecnico de la Presidencia 1968: table 28). 
This low income earning power decreases the peasant's saving abilities, 
puts him at the mercy of middlemen and money loaners, affects any technological 
improvement and investment in their plots, as well as personal and communal 
education and health facilities. But, above all, it contributes to the shrink-
ing of the national industrial market because 60% of the national population 
is rural according to preliminary 1970 census data, and do not provide a market 
for domestic production. 
This income inequality is not per se unjust or an impediment to socio-
economic development. Differences in operating unit's abilities and responsi-
bilities can explain and justify income differences in specific cases. But in 
the Dominican Republic, like in other Latin American countries, the income 
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dfstribution is a problem growing out of the unequal access _of the rural pop-
t sources of power, and their failure to understand the means of this uJation ° 
power. The explanation of their income handicap, as well as their socioeconomic 
pas it ion in the national environment, 1 ies mainly in their lack of control over 
1 d technological know-how and financial resources amid a market system. Those an , 
who hold land, technology and financial capital, especially since few employment 
opp0rtunities exist outside agriculture, control the keys to power and even to 
existence. In addition, they attempt to provide access to these for rural laborers. 
Geographical Areas 
The national territory can be sub-divided into four major agricultural 
regions {see map). They are: {i) the Cibao, occupying the north and central por-
tion of the Republic; {ii) the Southwest, embracing from Bani in the south to San 
Juan de la Maguana and west to the Haitian border; (iii) Santo Domingo region in 
the central south, including the National District, and from San Cristobal to the 
border of San Pedro de Macoris; {iv) the East, containing from San Pedro de Macoris 
and the eastern frontier of Samana to El Seibo and Higuey. 
From the agricultural perspective, the Cibao is the most important region 
of minifundist production. This region has an approximate 70% of the tobacco 
production, and also other agricultural products such as cocoa, coffee, rice 
and bananas. The Cibao region includes 52% of the 4,011,589 total Dominican 
population, and 54% of the 2,407,652 national rural population, according to 
preliminary data from the 1970 census. 78% of the Cibao population is rural and 
only 22% urban, which differs significantly with the 40% national urban popula-
tion. Its territory is 19, 146 km2 , or 39.5% of the national territory. 
Cibao's Landholding System 
According to the ownership or to the use status of the peasant running 
the farm, it is possible for the Dominican landholding system to 
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ifferentiated into: (i) private owned land; (ii) rented land, including the b• d 
1 sharecropping system (aparceria or colonato) in which rent is paid by pOPu ar 
half or one third of the crop's sale benefits; (iii) of the State (del Estado) 
either 
land which although belonging to the State is being used by a private party 
1nY 
h<>ut adequate legal right for this; (iv) occupied land, farms which are being wft 
Jegally used by the occupants because of improvements (mejorias) made by them 
on the farms; (v) parcelerias, land obtained through the land reform program 
of the national government through the official Dominican Agrarian Institute; 
(vf) and any other landholding form not included in the preceding classification. 
The Cibao landholding system is one of private ownership and share-
cropping. The exact figures for sharecroppers are not available since they 
are grouped with the more formal procedure of renting. Nonetheless, especially, 
the figures for minifundists and even for middle farms of 80 to 160 tareas (63.9% 
of the rented farms in the 80 to 800 tareas category in Table 4) will probably 
refer almost exclusively to sharecropping. First, because peasants do not 
usually have enough cash to pay the annual rent at the beginning of the con-
t~ct as legally required, nor do they have enough financial resources to 
guarantee a bank loan. Second, because they do not 1 ike getting involved with 
legal papers, signatures and lawyers; all these elements are required for the 
signing of rent contracts. 
TOTAL 
9,678 
5,293 
3,258 
258 
TABLE 4 
LANDHOLD I NG SYSTEM IN THE CI BAO·; 1971 
PRIVATE % RENTED % 
13,030(66.2) 
2 ' 860 ( 54. 0) 
2' 196 ( 6 7. 5) 
206(79.8) 
4,816(24.4) 
1,679(31.7) 
813(25.9) 
33(12.7) 
LAND % 
REFORM 
180 (0. 9) 
331(6.2) 
27(0.6) 
2(0.8) 
Source: data elaborated from Secretariado Tecnico 
1972. Number of censed farms 28,487. 
de 
STATE % OCCU 0 ·% 
OWNED PIED 
344(0.7) 353(1.8) 
108 ( 1 . 0) 38(0.7) 
70(2.2) 24(0.3) 
3(1.2) 3 ( 1. 2) 
la Presidencia 
OTHERS 
955(5.2) 
277(6.4) 
128(3.5) 
11(4.3) 
I 
I 
:1 
i 
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The subsistence and economic value of a farm depends on a number of 
Interrelated variables. Among them are, the yielding capacity of the soil, 
rop's productivity, the stability of crop prices in the market, the tech-the c 
nological refinement of the peasant's labor, and the size of the plot. To 
these economic variables a sociological factor could be added, the standard of 
living of the community which will determine the 11cultural necessities 11 to 
which the peasant is exposed. Thus a definition of what is a minifundio and 
what is a latifundio has to integrate these variables in it in order to evade 
arbitrariness. Nevertheless, and for preliminary purposes, a distinction 
between these two landholding systems, minifundios and latifundios, can be 
obtained by emphasizing the size variable. 
In this case, a minifundio will refer to a farm extending from 1 to 80 
tareas of land; on the other hand, a latifundio refers to any farm having more 
than 800 tareas. (One acre=0.4047 hectares=6.44 tareas. One hectare of land= 
15.901703 tareas. One tarea=628.8634 m2.) Accepting these definitions, the 
Cibao region is predominantly divided into two structural organizations (see 
table 5): 84% of its farms are minifundist holdings occupying only 26.6% of 
Its territory, while 1.5% of its farms are latifundios in control of over 34.6% 
of the region. Of the minifundios, 62.6% of them are conucos (from I to 32 ta-
reas) in which a mere subsistence level is sustained through their agricultural 
operations. 
FARM AREA: 
( tareas) 
l-32 
32-80 
Bo-aoo 
Boo and more 
Source: 
TABLE 5 
FARM EXTENSION IN THE CIBAO REGION, 1971 
%FARMS 
62.6 
21.4 
14. 5 
I. 5 
%TAREAS 
11. 8 
14.8 
38.6 
34.6 
data elaborated from Secretariado Tecnico de la Presidencia, 
1972. The number of censed farms was 28,980 with a total 
area surface of 164, 0569 tareas. 
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Hinffundist Plots 
The landholding system of the Cibao region has traditionally been one of 
minifundios. These conucos and parcelas (32 to 80 tareas) were freely used accord-
ing to the producer's needs during colonial times and the politically unstable 
years of the nineteenth century; when the plots were not privately divided, a 
shifting agriculture took place in the region amid little demographic pressure 
and available terrain. Even with present day latifundios there is not a region 
wide plantation system in the Cibao, and probably never was even during colonial 
times. Instead, minifundist households or family agricultural enterprises pre-
dominate in the area with their cash crop production. The decisions of the 
household have the main, although not exclusive, objective of satisfying con-
sumption wants of the unit and not, as in a business enterprise, of capital 
investment and maximization of profits. 
Minifundist peasants normally work their own conucos and parcelas with 
the assistance of non-remunerated family members and perhaps of some neighbor-
ing day laborers {echa dias or peones), {cf. Table 8). Household and market 
crops divide their plots; and according to table 8, 74.8% of them make their 
living out of their plots, and only 13% have to complement the revenues from 
their plots with wage labor in a nearby farm or as sharecroppers. Irrigation 
facilities are scarce and intensive technological agriculture is almost non-
existent among them (Table 6). Additional income is obtained in some cases 
working in neighboring farms as wage laborers at crop's time or by taking a 
conuco under an aparceria arrangement. Although middle and large landholding 
farms depend on wage labor--45. 1% and 77.0% (cf. Table 7)--they accounted 
only for approximately 34% of the agrarian labor force in 1960. 
There are not available statistics on the number of landless agricul-
tural workers who have to earn their living day laboring. Nonetheless, their 
number is presumed to be high and their presence puts further strains in the 
overcrowded agrarian labor market tcf. Table 7), and upon family ties. In 
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terms of income, landless wage workers as a group tend to be worse off than 
ducing peasants on minifundios, although there are different types of day pro 
laborers and different terms of employment; mainly because of greater insecur-
ity of employment and lack of homegrown subsistence foods. Besides minifundist 
peasants can always complement their income by working as wage laborers. 
TABLE 6 
TECHNICAL FORCE USED IN THE CIBAO REGION, 1971 
ARM AREA # FARMS MECHANIC ANIMAL BOTH NONE 
(tareas) 
FARMS % # FARMS % # FARMS % FARMS % 
1-32 18,481 961 (5. 1) 7 ' 812 ( 42 . 3) 529 (4. 0) 9, 179 (49.6) 
2-80 4, 705 524 ( 11. 1) 2,447 (52.0) 336 (7.2) 1,398 (29.7) 
0-800 2,816 372 (13.2) 1,344 (47.9) 382 (13.5) 718 (25.4) 
00 and more 198 48 (24.3) 59 (29.8) 60 (30. 3) 31 (15.6) 
ource: rom Secretar1ado Tecnico de la Presidencia 
censed farms 26,200. 
TABLE 7 
AGRARIAN LABOR FORCE ACCORDING TO PLACE OF WORK IN THE CIBAO, 1971 
ARM AREA TOTAL FAM I LY MEMBERS FAMILY ME MBERS WAGE LABOR 
(tareas) ONLY ABOVE A LL 
FARMS 0 FARMS % # FARMS % 
1-32 18,481 13,217 71. 5 3,754 20.3 1,510 8.2 
2-80 5,290 2,654 50. 1 1 ,081 20.4 1, 555 29.5 
0-800 2,916 939 32.2 663 22.7 1 '314 45. 1 
00 and more 198 18 9.9 26 13. 1 154 n .o 
Source: data elaborated from Secretariado Tecnico de la Presidencia 
1972. Information was available for 26,885 farms. 
TABLE 8 
MEANS OF ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE OF PEASANTS IN THE CIBAO, 1971 
FARM AREA TOTAL HIS OWN NON-AGRICUL- AGRARIAN NOT (tareas) FARM % TURAL ACTIVITY % WAGE LABOR % WORKING % 
1-32 18,481 13,832 (74.8) 1, 660 (8.9) 2,369 (13.0) 620 (3. 3) 
2-80 1, 790 1 ,219 (68. 1) 209 ( 11 . 1) 245 (13.6) 117 (7.2) 
0-800 2,916 2,428 (83.3) 80 (3. 0) 266 (8.9) 142 (4. 8) 
00 and more 198 129 (64.7) 6 (3. 0) 44 (22.6) 19 (9. 7) 
Source: data elaborated from Secretariado Tecnico de la Pres1denc1a 
1972. Information available for 23,385 f arms. 
I 
I 
•fundist and Agrarian Entrepreneurs Lat1 
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Privately owned minifundios have to compete for land, crop's market 
financial and technological assistance, with a traditional land elite prices, 
and a newly arising agrarian entrepreneur. Structurally more significant, the 
latifundios are characteristically ill managed and their productivity levels are 
relatively lower than that of the minifundios (cf. Tables 17 and 19). The tra-
ditional landed elite is not able to improve their agricultural establishment 
not only because of cultural values and lack of technical abilities, but also 
because of their ill run operations which provide them with a respectable stan-
dard of living. Normally they command the political and economic power available 
in the peasant's environment; but, interestingly enough, they do not have liquid 
assets to invest. 
Este relative estancamiento de la produccion esta directamente ligado 
a la concentracion de la propiedad agric0la. El grupo de grandes 
propietarios que tienen el control de una gran proporcion de la tierra, 
deja sin explotar una parte muy importante de sus propiedades. Las 
rentas de la tierra que este grupo obtiene son tan grandes, que la 
ef iciencia en su uso es un factor mas que secundario, especialmente 
si se considera que no existe siquiera un impueston proporcional al 
valor de la tierra. (Secretariado Tecnico de la Presidencia 1968:20; 
cf. Aleman 1970:15-16). 
The only alternative to this large landholding social organization-system 
comes from small but progressive and newly arising agricultural entrepreneurs 
producing for a market in order to maximize profits. They are still more the 
exception than the rule. Although statistical data on them is non-existent 
they seem to be operating efficient farms not for a household economy or the main-
tenance of a traditional way of life, but for economic motives of money profit. 
Frequently entrepreneurs' farms range from 300 to 800 tareas; but this 
·figure is a private field estimate. They provide labor opportunities to wage 
Workers and run colonatos (sharecropping arrangements) within their farms 
Without the characteristic patron-client relations observable between traditional 
Peasants and landed elites and their respective sharecroppers. 
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By modern standards the Cibao producers on minifundist plots utilize 
land at low levels of management and production. But they are forced to their 
do 50 by circumstances. They do not have easy access to better irrigated fields 
eroded lands; nor to credit, machinery, improved seeds and fertilizers. and Jess 
d they are excluded from the markets of these inputs through the lack of sesi es, 
adequate sources and means of power which reside in the hands of the landed 
elite and other operating units. On the other hand, the big farm enterprises 
of the Cibao are generally poorly managed to such a degree that, within the 
limits of their labor and capital resources, smaller agricultural units are 
quite efficient in the exploitation of their land resources (cf. Aleman 1968: 
211; 1970:15). 
If this be the case, it can be concluded of the Cibao region, that pro-
duction per tarea on large properties is generally inferior to that of smaller 
plots; whereas the value of production per worker is, on the average, less than 
on smaller farms. Higher average productivity of land on the smaller enterprises 
Is the result of more intensive land use. This intensity of land exploitation 
outweighs all disadvantages in terms of poorer soils and lack of capital and 
technological resources by minifundist peasants; but nevertheless, it is not 
able to solve the crucial point: ati agrarian population incapable of controlling 
its energy resources because of a 11forceful 11 latifundist landholding system. 
Historical Perspective 
The early beginnings of tobacco culture by white settlers in colonial 
America took place in the following areas on the dates indicated: Santo Domingo 
1531, Cuba 1580, Brazil 1600, Virginia, U.S.A. 1612, and Maryland, U.S.A. 1631. 
The tobacco grown soon furnished one of the chief products in demand in Europe 
as a commodity of exchange for the manufactured articles required by the colo-
nists. 
. Tobacco Boom: 1780-1880 
The 
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The roots of the tobacco boom during the XIX century in the Dominican 
· blic are associated with an October 12, 1763 Ordenanza which created a tobacco 
Repu 
ry in the colony. This factory should 
11promover y acaparar la cuota de tabaco facto 
'gno a Santo Domingo, tabaco del Cibao, y sobre todo en la jurisdiccion que se as1 
de Santiago yen todas las demas que puedan producir abundantes cosechas de buenos 
tabacos para el mayor adelantamiento de la construccion de cigarros que se deben 
labrar en las Real es Fabricas de Sev il la 11 (cited in Sanchez Valverde 1971 :66). 
Coming out from the shadow of the tobacco from Cuba, Dominican tobacco 
started successfully to compete with the former in Spain because of its quality. 
Yield figures from those years indicate an increasing trend in production which 
did not recede until the ending of the next century. For instance, in 1773 
the production was of 3,131 qq. (quintals of 50 kilos) and the next year it 
increased to 6000 qq. Immediately agricultural activity augmented by the con-
struction of roads to markets and ports; the best known construction of the time 
was the preparation of the Camu and Yuna rivers for tobacco transportation from 
the Cibao region to the Santo Domingo port in the south. Economic activity 
Increased, above all, in the city of Santiago and its rural communities (parajes) 
of Gurabo, Egido, Buenavista, Licey, Moca, Limonal, Jacagua, Guazuma;.l, Quinigua, 
and others (cf. Sanchez Valverde 1971:48 and 67). Before the end of the century 
tobacco production had spread from Santiago to La Vega and Cotui. 
If production figures can be ·used to indicate a social organization and 
the structural arrangements of a population, then a tobacco sub-culture can be 
inferred from the following. In 1800, Pedron reported that in Santiago and 
la Vega there were not great tobacco plantations accounting for the high output 
Of his commodity; nevertheless, the production increased and ranged from 12,000 
to 14,ooo pesos because of the high number of small producers (1955:171). During 
the years of 1800 to 1845, the colony experienced some of its most turbulent 
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economic, social and ideological years. Two Haitian invasions and 
two years of Boyer's occupation, one French government,· the period of 
twentY 
la Boba, and the wars of independence against Haitian occupation. However, ~na 
In 1821 Morillos wrote that although 
la agricultura habia decaido por las guerras y la emigracion. El 
escaso comercio se reducia al tabaco que se exportaba a traves de 
puerto Plata; unos pocos cueros, caobas, mieles y aguardientes. 
No habia nada de cafe, cacao,ni de algodon, ni del anil que se culti-
vaba en las pasadas estancias. La industria en esa epoca era nula 
(cited in del Montey Tejada 1890:275). 
And, furthermore, by 1845 the tobacco harvest increased to 30,000 qq. with a 
corresponding revenue of 46,000 pesos fuertes (foreign exchange currency) (cf. 
El oominicano newspaper, March 28, 1846; #14, p.54). 
This increase in production for which a large number of small producers 
was responsible occurred at a time in which agricultural production of the colony 
was near a stand still. Only the tobacco export, the cutting of mahogahy, and 
some selling of livestock to Haiti provided some revenue to Santo Domingo (cf. 
Pedron 1955:172; Lyonnet 1955:127 and 136). Furthermore, as Morillos indicated 
in his preceding cite, the tobacco production increased amid those same con-
ditions which had eliminated production of other crops like coffee, cotton and 
cocoa in traditional Dominican agricultural estates (estancias). As a matter 
of fact, analogous although more radical political and social conditions--
independence from France, and freedom of the slaves--in Haiti destroyed in those 
same years its colonial agricultural organization and the output of the former 
colony. 
The tobacco production boom did not only survive the unstable first half 
Of the XIX century but it continued its expansion after a relative decrease in 
output in 1844, through the tumultuous years of the First Republic, the succession 
of the nation to Spain, the War of Restoration in 1864, and the struggle for pow-
er between Santana and Baez and their followers up to the time of Luperon and 
! 
I 
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Antonio Lluberes (personal communication) estimated the tobacco 
t ed from the Dominican Republic in 1856 by the ports of Santo Domingo and expor 
Plata to be 2,034, 118 pounds. Meanwhile, in 1860 the export production puerto 
ranged from 60,000 to 80,000 qq. with an approximate value of 650,000 to 700,000 
pesos fuertes (cf. Alvarez 1955:97). And for 1888, Hoetnik cited the tobacco 
harvest in 175,636 qq. (cf. 1971: 117). 
Thereby, the commerce resulting from the tobacco export plus the selling 
of mahogany and some livestock still constituted the main source of revenue of 
the newly born Republic after 1854. As stated by a newspaper of the Republican 
period: 
Todo el que esta al corriente de la historia patria, no pondra en duda 
esta verdad; la Republica ha visto siempre satisfechas sus mas urgentes 
necesidades con los rendimientos de los derechos aduaneros, y estos han 
sido producidos en mayor cantidad con la exportacion del tabaco, y esa 
industria ha permitido que se han hecho para cubrir las cosechas enormes 
importaciones, ya de mercancias, a todas las demas industrias que en 
pequena escala se han mantenido en el pais (cited in Bono--1881--1964: 
195; cf. Bono 1964:199; Pedron--1800--1955:172-173). 
The expansion of the tobacco industry was associated and dependent upon 
international demand of the Cibao leaves since production was neither consumed 
nor processed in the colony. During the eighteenth century, the Dominican tobacco 
was mainly exported to Seville, Spain. Regardless of colonial export controls, 
producers from the vicinity of Santiago did customarily sell clandestinely their 
crop in the form of andullos to the French in Haiti to be processed as rape in 
their factories (cf.Sanchez Valverde 1971:63-68, 185-186). The historical 
record is not clear on when this Spaniard colonial monopoly was 1 iberalized; 
some signs in this direction appear in a 1778 Ordenanza by which 11se permitio 
que, cumplidas las cargas de surtir las reales fabricas, pudiesen vender los 
cosecheros los tobacos sobrantes en la colonia francesa (Haiti), pero aquellos 
'que por su baja ca1idad no son de recibo en las reales fabricas', tomando por 
Pago so 1 amente di nero o negros 11 (Rodriguez Demorizi in Sanchez Va 1 verde 1971 : 66) . 
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ems safe to maintain, however, that with the Haitian invasions of 1801 and It se 
1805 , plus the French government of General Ferrand in Santo Domingo, export 
tr ictions of the Spanish government were lifted up and hardly re-established res 
under the decadent period of Espana la Boba. In any case, when Boyer invaded 
Domingo in 1822, tobacco was already exported to Martinica, Ave de Gracia, 5antO 
saint Thomas and Curazao; all French, Dutch and Danish Caribbean colonies (cf. 
Hoya 1972:52). Later on in 1860, Alvarez noted that Dominican tobacco was 
exported to Puerto Rico, Saint Thomas and Curazao; in addition to these Caribbean 
customers, merchants from Hamburg and Bremen in Germany bought the Dominican 
leaf to manufacture cigars which they then sold as habanos (Cugan cigars of 
high quality) but with lower prices ( --1860-- 1955:97). 
The preceding export figures and commercial transactions are meaningless 
unless we realize that the tobacco boom was taking place in the midst of an 
economic vacuum, and most probably with little official guidance. Emigration, 
colonial political instability, and Boyer's occupation of the former Spanish 
colony and his abolition of slavery--all these circumstances reinforced an 
almost implicit ideal in the colony: a sedentary 1 ife characterized by the 
absence of any strenuous labor or socio-economic enterprise and based on a sub-
sistence economy plus a cultural valorization of social autonomy • 
... yen una palabra, infinidad de menudencias que, aunque parezcan 
despreciables, forman el fundamento de la verdadera fel icidad y 
prosperidad de los pueblos, la cual no consiste en producir mucho 
azucar y cafe a fuerza del sudor de millones de esclavos, sino en 
tener asequrada la subsistencia con su propio trabajo y vivir y 
buena policia civil y religiosa (Heredia y Mieses --1812-- 1955: 
168; cf. Moya 1972:62, 88-89; Bonnet 1955: 276-277). 
Whether or not this idyllic and non-industrious idealization of life 
became a social reality, cannot be proven from the historical record. Never-
theless, it seems that the striking experience of the Haitian domination (1822-
!844), following a colonial period characterized by apathy and lack of concern 
towards the cultural organization of Santo Domingo from the part of its Spanish 
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· disarticulated the incipient Dominican technoeconomic organization, inetropol is, 
•t socio-economic initiative, and the Dominican self-confidence to pro-
tiarmfng ' s 
nd develop an independent society. ject a Within this politica~ economic and 
• 1 environment the Republican projects of some elite trinitarios could not 5oc1a 
and did not find an echo in calm Republican periods among the rural and urban 
sectors of the nation. 
Describing the ruraJ and urban dwellers in the Dominican Republic after the 
Haitian occupation of Boyer which ended in 1844, Guridi characterizes them as 
lacking any interest and hope for the future; they seemed to be possessed of a 
deterministic approach to cultural 1 ife. ''En una cosa es muy poco alterada la 
mancomunidad que existe entre unos y otros campesinos y gentes de los pueblos, 
asi como entre la mayoria de los que habitan en las ciudades: a saber, en que 
carecen de toda clase de aspiraciones; nose apuran por el manana 11 (--1864: 
1955:411; cf. Soulastre --1809-- 1955:61). 
According to reports from the period on the nature of the Repub1ic 1 s 
social organization it should be concluded that there was not an agricultural 
technoeconomy functioning in the nation. Only the tobacco harvest had structural 
significance in the eastern side of the Island. Most probably, the informal 
social arrangements at the tobacco plots in respect to labor, which was family 
obtained and free, and in relation to commercial transactions, fundamentally 
organized outside of the political structure, permitted the functioning and 
expansion of the tobacco industry. For instance, in 1860 Campomanes reported to 
the Spanish government in Cuba: 
La agricultura puede decirse que no existe, pues a excepcion de unos 
sesenta mil quintales de tabaco que se recolecta en las provincias de 
Santiago y Concepcion y una corta cantidad de cafe de superior cal i-
dad en las del sur, que se exporta para el extranjero, no se cultiva 
ningun otro producto a pesar de la facil idad que se obtendrian todos 
con la mayor abundancia: no hago mencion del azucar porque escasamente 
se fabrica el necesario para el consumo de la Isla pero si la merecen 
los cueros al pelo y una cantidad considerable de cera que se exporta 
para Europa (--1860-- 1955:106-107). 
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Amid this cultural environment it should not be of surprise that the 
of power in the newly born Republic was transferred from the eastern 
center 
cattle ranches and the political centers of the capital in the southern city of 
Santo Domingo, to the tobacco Cibao region. Ther~ local merchants and exporters 
of tobacco not only integrated a new oligarchic center, but also were able to 
heavily finance the War of Restoration against Spain from 1863-1865. At the 
same time, and most important, a popular movement articulated by small indepen-
dent Cibao peasants took arms against Spain in the name of the nation; the cul-
tural identity of an independent country previously expressed by the Trinitarios 
was now materialized and fought for by countryside peasants and urban dwellers 
of no special intellecutal preparation or in control of huge economic interests. 
As ex-president Bosch has well understood: 
Esa sociedad (intedgrated by tobacco producers, merchants and exporters) 
iba a impulsar el desarrollo de la riqueza cibaena y la formacion de 
una pequena burguesia comercial que llegaria rapidamente al mivel alto 
de la pequena burguesia e iba a convertir al Cibao, por mucho tiempo, 
en la region dominante del pais en el campo economico, en el social y 
en el politico. Santiago fue la cabeza y el alma de la guerra Restaur-
acion porque casi un siglo antes habia comenzado a organizarse en sus 
campos la sociedad de los cosecheros de tabaco, y Puerto Plata se 
fortalecio de tal manera con la exportacion del tabaco que el centro 
de su aduana era de importancia vital para sostener un gobierno en el 
poder (1970:168; cf. Garcia 1969, vol. I I 1:395-500). 
Social and Structural Environment 
The tobacco industry in thenneteenth century.became identified with the 
Cibao region, just as the latifundist 1 s cattle ranches (hatos) to the East. Its 
political, economical and social importance was widely recognized. Contemporary 
Political writers speak of the Cibao 1 s "society of tobacco growers" (Bosch 1970: 
159-171), and of its affluent middle class in opposition to other region's rural 
Proletariats (Jimenez Grullon 1965:146-147). 
How was it possible that amid political and economic turmoil in the 
nineteenth century, the tobacco industry developed to such magnitudes as to 
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t a sub-culture in itself in the Cibao? No simple answer exists. But 
c;onstitu e 
b bly some of the industry's adaptive features contributed to this development. 
·pro a 
of these features are: the informal family labor organization sustaining 
some 
the tobacco harvest in contrast to complex plantation organizations; the favorable 
profits obtained without great extensions of land by the growers; the private non-
governmental initiative it originated; furthermore, the structure it developed to 
permit the flow of capital and tobacco from growers to international purchasing 
merchants, and viceversa. 
The tobacco harvest in the Cibao gave rise to a special type of agricul-
tural life and to a special kind of national peasantry. The tobacco society, in 
sharp contrast to the prevalent social organization of the hatos (cattle ranches) 
fn the East, did not employ great extension of land. In addition, the tobacco 
harvest is labor demanding and time consuming, a~d augmen~ed the personal rela-
tions of the grower and his economic networks while suppressing the idle life 
of the hatos with social and economic initiative and risk taking. On the other 
hand, in the tobacco's regions the~ is no great human agglomeration like in the 
sugar plantations. Besides, tobacco harvest does not require machinery, mills 
nor elaborate physical and chemical equipment; not even railway transport sys-
terns. In other words, at least in comparison with other cash-crops 1 ike sugar, 
tobacco was not a capitalistic venture dependent on great territorial and indus-
trial scope and the size of its long term investments. 
On the contrary, the cultivation of tobacco demands a yearly cycle of 
steady work by persons who are skilled and specialized in this activity. Tobacco 
plots being small and family labored, time consuming, and able to guarantee the 
economic needs of the family, probably developed a strong eco-system integrating 
land-family labor-cash crop. Only in this way the devotion and initiative of 
the tobacco grower to his field and his crop, his constant concern with weather I 
1 
and climatic conditions, the acceptance of the painstaking manual care the plant I 
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·res and the legendary responsibility and initiative of the Cibao peasant, 
re<tU I ' 
be explained. As Ortiz writes refering to the Cuban tobacco growers (1947:65), 
can 
Pe rsonal element always predominated in tobacco growing; there is a patriar-the 
•1ntimate quality about its free work. cha 1, 
This seems to have been possible because the tobacco harvest in the 
Cibao region developed two important characteristics. First an early appearance 
of small but privately owned plots of land to harvest; the only exception to 
these conucos was the presence of sharecropping land which can be traced back 
to the end of the XVIII century (cf. Lyonnet --1800-- 1955:131), and signals 
the existence of big landholders also in this region of the colony. Bono points 
out that, in sharp contrast to the rest of the Republic where common lands 
(terrenos comuneros and ejidos) and great private estates prevailed, and where 
shifting agriculture was practiced from one plot to the other season after sea-
son, in the Cibao the landholdings are divided (deslindados) and privately 
exploited thereby promoting private ownership and agricultural activity: 
Podemos muy bien decir que la propiedad, salvo la deslindada del Ci-
bao, no tiene leyes en la Republica, porque casi todos los terrenos 
son comuneros, y esta es una de las faltas mas trascendentales en 
legislacion. Mientras el propietario este convencido de que su pro-
piedad no es sagrada, en tanto que nose le garantice lo suyo contra 
usurpaciones, no habra agricultura, no puede contar ni aun con lo 
suyo y por consiguiente no cobra amoral trabajo (Bono --1857-- 1964: 
82; see Hoetnik 1971 :13-14, 17, 40). 
Furthermore, Alcibiades Alburquerque emphasizes the process by which the Cibao 
lands became divided among small producers: 
El relative incremento agricola en algunas regiones del Cibao durante 
los pasados anos (after the XVI I I century) y la densidad de su pobla-
cion crearon la necesidad de que cada familia campesina buscase espacio 
vital para cubrir sus propias necesidades. De esta manera se real izo 
una natural y espontanea reparticion de las tierras, y se fundaron las 
pequenas heredades y afincaron en ellas su bienestar. Esa adquisicion 
de los derechos sobre la tierra, como resultado de ese desarrollo agri-
cola, se efectuo sin graves interferencias, ni violentos desalojos. Cen-
tenares de familias pobladores de esas regiones, 1 imitadas en su pequena 
heredad siguen viviendo de generacion en generacion del cultivo en sus 
limitadas areas de terrenos asi adquiridas ... (1961 :30; see pp. 12-32, 
and especially p. 31). 
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h landholding system in the Cibao contrasted to that of the rest of the fhUS1 t e 
In the latter, even with the low price of land (six francos per fan-
ga--one fanega corresponds to 1293.84 square meters) at the beginning of the .e 
XIX century, because of rural poverty, great extensions of land were in the 
ds of a few landowners forcing the rest of the agricultural population to ~n 
either sharecrop or work for an agricultural wage (peones); in either case, 
rural dwellers went without a private plot of land (cf. Pedron 1955:171; Lyonnet 
1955:131, 135, 194-195). According to the Dominican historian Moya in his recent 
book (1972:111-115, 163) not even Boyer's agrarian reform in the occupied Santo 
Domingo W'as· able to break down the traditional control of big landowners over 
the land in the eastern and southern provinces. As a matter of fact, the Haitian 
occupation was not even able to instaurate a landholding system of private lands 
in the former Spanish colony where tierras comuneras and ejido lands had been 
the customary practice; proper exception of the Cibao region where small tobacco 
producers operated (cf. Moya 1972: 46, 57-58, 87-89). Not until the introduction 
of the sugar industry with its capitalist investments did the land acquire such 
high prices as to transform the traditional use of the tierras comuneras and 
cattle ranch land into a system of private landholdings in the eastern and 
southern provinces of the Republic .(cf. Hoetnik 1971: 29-30, 40). 
The tobacco plots under harvest had little labor land resources; never-
theless, the tobacco profits of these small family plots were able to provide 
for the economic needs of minifundist producers. In fact, the mere presence of 
tobacco in the plots was sufficient guarantee for financial assistance by local 
merchants and a secure source of economic improvement in the agrarian environ-
ment (cf. Bono 1963:193-194, 363). Randolph Kein (--1868-- 1968:29) estimated 
an average plot of tobacco in the Cibao around six acres of land (38.64 tareas). 
And back in 1800, Pedron reported that the high production of tobacco grew out 
of a high number of small producers in contrast to coffee plantations in Haiti. 
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These self-sufficient and resourceful growers, working amid a mixed 
and subsistence economy, were most probably the first representatives of 
market 
8 
national peasantry: they had their own plots, worked for a market, and their 
were not prof it maximization but the sustenance of a household organ-purposes 
fzation. In other words, the tobacco peasants did not view their position 
merely from an economic point of view, as if they were running a business enter-
prise for maximum profit with all inputs and outputs valued at market prices. 
Rather, the tobacco peasant saw himself as, and in fact was and still is, part 
of a familial household. This household affords him additional labor services 
which have no real market price. On the other hand, he must try to provide a 
subsistence from his plot for his household at all costs; he could not discharge 
fts labor even if its retention might become noneconomic. 
The second characteristic of the tobacco region was its free labor. 
Although there were African slaves in the zone (cf. note #247, in Sanchez 
Valverde 1971:186), nonetheless tobacco harvest did not require slave labor 
like the sugar industry did or even Haitian coffee plantations. 
Sin embargo, en las dos provincias de La Vega y Santiago, o sea en el 
Cibao, siempre se continua cultivando el tabaco en tales terminos que 
nunca bajo de ciencuenta mil quintales la exportacion de este articulo, 
el cual constituye el primer ramo de su movimiento comercial, yes 
causa de la riqueza comparativa de aquel hermoso departamento. Pero 
eso se debe a que alli nunca hubo tantos esclavos como en el sur de la 
antigua colonia: el trabajo libre producia las ventajas que le son 
inherentes; y, por lo tanto, cuando Boyer abol io la esclavitud, ya 
los hombres de la raza africana, los cuales no eran.muchos, habian 
adquirido los habitos y el estimulo de quienes saben que trabajan para 
su provecho (Guridi --1864-- 1955:410). 
Furthermore, even the socio-economic dependence of sharecroppers from big land-
holders was not comparable to that of slaves and wage laborers in cattle ranches 
and sugar estates. Their semi-independent status granted them more freedom 
Of operation than to the latter. Tobacco sharecroppers had the opportunity to 
discuss the price of their tobacco and their rents, to intervene in tobacco 
transactions. Besides they were in full charge of production activities and 
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d their own households independently from their landlords. As a 
administere 
r 
of fact, they seem to have even been able to save from their reduced 
matte 
f •ts and could obtain production credits from their landlords. In over-pro ' , 
all their status approximated that of small independent tobacco producers more 
the one of slaves and peones in other estates. than 
Most interesting in the cultural perspective, the tobacco production 
boom probably took place beyond official guidelines and advancement. True that 
the tobacco industry was regulated and at certain moments even controlled by 
colonial and national governments; confer, Actas de Sesiones General del 
Gobierno Restaurador: March 30, 1844, and July 7, 1857; Boletin Archive Gene-
ral de la Nacion #8, p. 420 and #9, p. 76; Aristy 1957vol.1:410; Bosch 1970: 
205; Coleccion de Leyes 1864:290 and 338; 1890:448. Nonetheless, the frequent 
reproaches of official inefficiency seem to indicate that the unstable govern-
ments of those years probably took advantage of the revenues of an industry which 
they had not promoted, but because of the socio-cultural variables previously 
alluded to, flourished; cf. Lyonnet 1955:126; Bono 1964:195-196, 198, 268-269. 
One of the most significant, and at the same time revealing, interventions 
of the national government with the operations of tobacco merchants, exporters, 
and producers, took place in the 1856-1857 tobacco season. When Baez took over 
the government in 1856 the national currency in the form of paper money was 
almost non-existent. Under these circumstances the value of the peso fuerte 
(the international exchange currency) decreased considerably forcing exporters 
to introduce great amounts of gold and silver currency in the country on account 
of the coming tobacco harvest. As a consequence, the national currency--the 
Dominican peso--became almost in disuse, especially in the Cibao. 
Cuando el presidente Baez ingreso al poder en 1856 circulaba el peso 
fuerte en la Republ ica a razon de 68 3/4 unidades, o Jo que es Jo 
mismo, valia la onza de oro $1. 100 nacionales; pero como no habia 
mucha abundancia de papel monenda, el oro acunado bajo de tal manera 
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vlsperas de la cosecha de tabaco, que las transacciones llegaron 
encelebrarse a cincuenta por uno. Como era consiguiente, los expor-
~adores del Cibao comenzaron a introducir plata y oro en tan grandes 
cantidades, que el comercio en general optaba por el pago de sus 
derechos en esas especies de preferencia a la moneda nacional (Garcia 
1968' VO 1 • I I I : 226) . 
At this time the Baez government supposedly in order to protect the 
national currency and the transactions of the peasants, ordered a monopoly of 
the tobacco export, and asked the Senate authorization to put into circulation 
six million nominal Dominican pesos in paper money. Of this amount two million 
pesos would be employed to substitute former deteriorated paper money under use, 
and four million only during the tobacco season to alleviate the strenuous sit-
uation of the scarce national currency during the tobacco season and its conse-
quent transactions. After the season the four million nominal pesos would be 
reca 11 ed. 
(Baez) dispone la creacion de un proyecto para la monopolizacion del 
negocio del tabaco, el cual incluia un abierto despojo de comerciantes 
y agricultores. Es por esto, que el mismo tiene como fin aumentar la 
cantidad de moneda nacional circulante por el tiempo de la cosecha de 
tabaco unicamente, para lo cual solicito del Senado autorizacion para 
la emision de seis millones de pesos de los cuales teoricamente dos 
millones se destinarian a sustituir el papel moneda deteriorado y 
cuatro millones se pondrian en circulacion para rescatarlo tan pronto 
desapareciera la necesidad de moneda fraccionaria creada por el aumento 
de las operaciones de compra y venta de tabaco (Marrero Aristi 1957, 
vol. I :410). 
Actually, Jose Gabriel Garcia (1968 vol. 111:226-227) indicates that the 
control of the tobacco business was only a political stratagem of the Baez gov-
ernment against tobacco merchants whom the president thought dissatisfied with 
his political power. In addition, it was a strategy to transfer the profits of 
this lucrative enterprise to his own followers. The emission of nominal paper 
money became an ill monetary pol icy. To the already gold and silver currency 
introduced by tobacco exporters in view of the shortage of national currency, the 
90vernment put into circulation in May, 1857 not four but eighteen million 
b'l 
-L.letes (paper money). The devaluatio.n of the national currency followed from 
this over-surplus of nonsupported currency--from an estimated 60 to 70 Dominican 
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pesos P
er peso fuerte; in other words, an ounce of gold was paid at $1.43 national 
. pesos. The value of exported tobacco descended in terms of international curren-
cy (pesos fuertes), and merchants and producers found themselves virtually ruined 
amid payments in national currency and low prices. Meanwhile, President Baez and 
his followers, including the Spanish, French and British consuls, received the 
gold and silver currency introduced by the exporters earlier {cf. Marrero Aristy 
1957: VO 1 . I : 411) • 
••. ampliada y extendida discrecionalmente por el senado consultor, 
en 2 de mayo de 1857 la facultad de emitir papel moneda acordada 
antes al gobierno, este en vez de cuatro hizo confeccionar diez 
y ocho millones de billetes, que repartidos para su venta entre 
diferentes comisiones encargadas de ofrecerlos al publ ico al precio 
fijo de 1. 100 unidades por una onza, acabaron de precipitar la 
bancarrota, pues que se vieron inundados del funestro agente todos 
los mercados, con grave perjuicio del gremio agricultor, que era 
al que se fingia proteger al impedir el estanco periodico con que 
traficaban los agiotistas, porque habiendo principiado a vender 
por papel su cosecha de tabaco, cuando el cambio estaba a cincuenta 
por uno, vino a deshacerse de ese papel cuando ya circulaba a mas 
de 68 3/4, esperimentando la perdida consiguiente a la fluctuacion 
del ruinoso agiotage, que por otra parte fue productivo a los 
partidiarios del gobierno, beneficiados en el reparto que se hizo 
y que la opinion publ ica califico de bautismo (Garcia 1968,vol. I I I: 
227). 
It was not until 1859, that the tobacco production was partially reestab-
lished in the Santiago and La Vega provinces, with a harvest of 60,000 qq. which 
accounted, in additon to some coffee, for the national export of that year. Mean-
while, Baez had enriched himself while paralyzing the tobacco production in the 
Cibao, and occasioning the popular revolt of 1857 as a reaction of his tobacco 
and monetary policies which resulted in the short lived Moca constitution of 1858. 
Because of the export nature of the tobacco commodity, the development 
of its industry is heavily dependent upon international markets. Without good 
field prices, financial subsidies to exporters coming from international merchants, 
and the demands of manufacturer buyers, the tobacco boom would have been stopped. 
Thus the tobacco production was virtually contingent upon the international 
lllarket; especially since the tobacco national market was small, and rural 
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· b•tants constituting the greater percentage of the population c~uld very 
tnha ' 
Produce their own andullo tobacco without need of a national tobacco industry. well 
This contingency of the tobacco commodity upon international customers is best 
eXPressed in the common remark of Cibao peasants: ei taibaco noi se come (tobacco 
can't be eaten). 
After the official lifting of the tobacco monopoly in 1864 (Coleccion de 
1864:290), Lluberes (personal communication) estimates that 15 export houses Ley es 
--only two of them run by Spaniards, the rest by Germans, Dutch, Danes and English-
men--started operating in Puerta Plata. That market conditions had improved in 
relation to the conditions existing during the Baez government and even during 
the re-colonization of the Republic after Santana ceded it in 1861 to the Spanish 
government, can be inferred not cnly by the increase in production and the number 
of operating export companies in the Republic, but also from the high export 
taxes with which the tobacco was being levied. According to a July 1847 export 
Jaw, tobacco leaves paid 50.00 pesos fuertes per quintal, while mahogany only 
paid 5.00 pesos fuertes per thousand feet. In 1853 and then in 1858, the 1847 
law was revised, but while other commodity's taxes were augmented, tobacco was 
not surpassed by any (cf. Coleccion de Leyes 1847:#1:424; 1853:#2:490). 
The social organization between the peasant producers and the export 
houses in the second half of the XIX century had two main characteristics: (i) 
It is strikingly similar in its structure to the present one existing between 
producers and buyers of criollo tobacco; and (ii) it was composed of multiple 
networks of operating units. In 1895, Bono noted that this social organization 
Included members of al 1 social classes in the Cibao because the tobacco "va 
del agricultor al corredor, del corredor al pequeno comerciante, de este al 
~portador, de este al comisionista, qui en lo vende al fabricante11 (1964:380). 
The capital to finance and purchase the tobacco harvest was guaranteed 
by international merchants from Germany, Holland, England and the Danish free 
of Saint Thomas. They bought the tobacco to supply requirements from 
ean manufacturers and in-between their purchasing and selling operations f uroP 
produce a commission profit of their own. As a matter of fact, the historical 
record is not sufficiently clear on whether or not some of these merchants 
{£2!!!erciantes or comisionistas)were at the same time tobacco manufacturers 
(!!!.nufactureros or fabricantes); available evidence seems to support that they 
were not with the sole exception of some German merchants who are reported to 
elaborate (elaboraban) their own purchased tobacco (cf. Alvarez 1955:97). The 
export houses operating in the Dominican Republic were either dependent repre-
sentatives or semi-independent associates of the European merchants; the latter 
were in control both of the capital to purchase and pack the tobacco through 
their local export organizations, and of the international manufacturers market. 
Most of the local export houses were staffed and run by foreigners and 
~dwell established political and economical influence in national politics 
(cf. Hoetnik 1971:121). Once the capital was transferred by the international 
merchant houses to their organizations in the Dominican Republic, or at least 
was secured, the operations of the export merchants started. They had local 
merchants, most of them living in the cities, who moved to the countryside near 
the tobacco peasants. These local merchants by themselves, or usually with the 
help of middlemen (corredores) and small local business establishments, advanced 
money among neighboring peasants and friends to finance their tobacco harvests 
and help in any other need the growers might have. Through this strategy local 
lllerchants guaranteed clients who will sell their crops to them. 
Loque proporcionaba el capital (era) la certidumbre en el capitalista 
de que habia una riqueza comercial sobrante en los conucos de facil venta 
Y queen cuatro o seis meses estaria a su disposicion ... Habido el avance 
en San Thomas, lnglaterra, Alemania u otra parte, cade comerciante al por 
menor, por si o por corredores y sucursales se establece cerca de los 
agricultores a hacer un servicio parecido al de Courcelle Seneuil de los 
Bancos Escoceses. Da dinero, lenceria, quicalleria, u otros valores al 
labrador, mediante un agio consentido y este aplica este dinero y demas 
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b'etos a sus necesidades personales y a las de sus cultivos con mas ~ ~enos juicio, mas o menos fortuna (Bono --1881-- 1964:196-197). 
This advancement of money encouraged the circulation of money for small business 
Because of the absence of any financial security of the peasant other purposes. 
h is crop, and the informal character of the transactions, high interests than 
adJ'oined to the advancements with harmful consequences for peasants and were 
small merchants. 
Ninguno de los contratos toma seguridades para evitar o castigar la 
mala fe reciproca, no hay titulos hipotecarios ni quirografarios, 
todo se reduce a cuentas corrientes al descubierto, muy mal llevadas 
por el comerciante que ni siquiera doble ni copia da al agricultor. 
Esta falta de seguridades mutuas, ponen la operacion avance al tabaco 
en la categoria de los prestamos a la gruesa, hacen por lo menos muy 
subido el interes de los valores avanzados que al fin son su ruina y 
la del pequeno comerciante ... A pesar de sus muchos defectos el 
avance da un empuje extraordinario al cultivo del tabaco y a las 
demas industrias que concurren a su extraccion ... el (avance) es 
quien ha interesado a la clase mas ilustrada que hoy preside a su 
apartado, seleccion y enfardelaje (Bono 1964:197). 
The local tobacco merchant, or sometimes his middleman, buys the tobacco 
from the peasants who transport it to the former 1s warehouse. There it is 
Inspected by the local merchant himself, and loosened and classified by women. 
Formerly the peasant classified the tobacco in his own plot before selling and 
delivering it to the warehouse. But peasant's harmful commercial practices 
forced the export houses to transfer these obligations to their dependent ware-
houses thus further sub-dividing tobacco labors on them. Under the risk of 
losing European markets, because of frequently received rotten tobacco, the 
operations of classification were left in charge of urban workers under the direct 
responsibility of the local merchant. 
Reflecting upon the new practice of inspecting and selecting the tobacco 
in the warehouses, and justifying the new division of labor between peasants and 
the Warehouse laborers, and within the latter itself, Bono noted: 
El comerciante veterano hoy compra el tabaco en tongadas y bajo su 
inspeccion inmediata, jornaleros urbanos casi todos mujeres proceden 
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8 las clasificacionnes como en taller profesional regulado. Esta 
nueva combinacion ... esta empleando grupos antes ociosos por falta 
de demanda de trabajo apropiado a sus aptitudes y que se ofrecen 
por salaries baratos; ha ensanchado el tiempo del agricultor que lo 
aprovecha en otros trabajos; emplea mano de obras mas obedientes, 
mas inteligentes, inspeccion severa de personas conocedoras de los 
gustos o exigencia del consumidor europeo, de los desperdicios de 
las taras, de los de embalaje, de las fermentaciones o curas que 
la rama necesita despues de las de troje ordinaria, de los falsos 
gastos, de la susceptivilidad de las hojas, etc. (--1881--1964:198). 
It seems probable to infer, although there is no conclusive proof from 
the historical record, that once the tobacco was classified, cured, and packed 
tn the warehouses, the export firms took over once more directly. Arrangements 
to transport the tobacco to the ports (Puerto Plata or Santo Domingo) and for 
later shipment abroaq were made; market possibilities and tobacco prices were 
discussed and agreed upon with their international firms and with European 
manufacturers; pending business with the tobacco merchants solved, and relations 
with the capitalist international firms preserved. 
In all, Bono estimated for the 1882 tobacco season the figure of 150,000 
persons directly involved in the tobacco industry (1964:269). This tobacco 
population seems inflated since in 1871 Hoetnik (1971:20) cited the total pop-
ulation of the Republic ranging between 150,000 and 207,000 inhabitants. Never-
theless, it can safely be said that the labor population of the tobacco industry 
was high. It included the main operating units of the industry: (i) agricultural 
and warehouse peones (wage laborers); (ii) peasants and middlemen; (iii) big 
landowners (very rare mention of them is made on the historical record); (iv) 
local tobacco merchants; (v) export merchants of the export houses. And beyond 
the national geographic limits, the international merchants monopolized both 
capital and market thus selling their locally purchased tobacco to buying 
European manufacturers. 
The effective transformation that the tobacco industry brought about in 
the Cibao region can be seen above all in its own peasantry. Contrasting the 
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·nhabitants with those from the South, Guridi noted in 1884 that the latter 
CfbaO I 
· ·ndications of economic misery, labor apathy, and laziness. Meanwhile, gave 1 
. peasants enjoyed an over all economic wel-1-:-being with even signs of luxury Cf baO 
and material comfort. 
Pero por el sur, es decir en las jurisdicciones de Santo Domingo y 
Azua, pues la provincia del Seybo fue siempre mas ganadera que 
agricola, acontecio todo lo contrario. En vez del movimiento, 
lujo y hasta comodidades de los campos del Cibao, apatia, holgazaneria, 
miseria y casi desnudes: en vez de la limpieza y el orden de los 
conucos y alrededores de las casas de viviendas que se observa en 
aquellos --desarreglo, montes de arbustos y yerbas silvestres, asi 
como una curiosa variedad de bejucos entrelazados en los platanales, 
cafetos y demas arboles utiles (1955:410). 
Apparently, the striking exception to the relatively prosperous and 
active tobacco peasantry were the agricultural and urban wage laborers working 
for big landowners and in the tobacco warehouses. Without their own conucos to 
crop, they were only one step away from animal life, and in total dependence 
on their masters and employers. Their injurbus poverty contrasted with the 
well being of big landowners and of export and local merchants. Keyn graphically 
described the poverty of some of these rural wage laborers in relation to the 
affluency of one export merchant, don Jose M. Glass, of Santiago (cf. 1968:29-30). 
As a consequence of the affluency of the tobacco industry, regional 
differences grew in the nation. Santiago and other Cibao cities like Puerto 
Plata and La Vega, on the one hand, challenged the social, political, and economic 
prerogatives of Santo Domingo, the capital, and the southern region of the Repub-
lic. The preponderance of the Cibao region became outspoken and virtually un-
challenged until the boom of the sugar industry at the end of the nineteenth 
century which coincided with the decline of the tobacco industry (cf. Hoetnik 
1971, for the gradual transference to the sugar economy). 
Already in 1812, Heredia y Mieses referred to the striking poverty of 
the capital city (1966:165). And in 1871, Hazard observed the tragic economic 
impass of Santo Domingo in which "no hand of progress" was observable thus leaving 
! I 
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•t 1 in similar conditions to the ones prevailing there during colonial 
the caP' a 
times (cf. Hoetnik 1968:31). It was during the Constitutent Congress of Moca 
In 1g57, that Bono proposed the federal system of government for the Republic. 
Although there was no differences of religion nor of language or laws, the 
t Were different he argued·, it is not that the Cibao does not want to lnteres s 
cooperate with the southern provinces, but that in this way emulation and compe-
tence will be fostered (1857--1964:105-113). By 1860, the Cibao supported by 
Its tobacco industry was referred to as the most productive province in the 
Republic and the only one with a commerce enjoying the privileges of international 
credit; these circumstances "despertaron en los habitantes del Cibao la idea de 
separacion y el deseo de constituirse bajo un sistema federal ... y se establecio 
la diferencia entre dominicanos y cibaenos (Alvarez 1860:16 and 20). 
Tobacco Dec 1 i ne 
Approximately 100 years after its origin, the tobacco industry declined. 
In 1879, Luperon attributed the decline in tobacco production --from an estimated 
125,000 to 35,000 qq. -- to crop failure because of excessive rain. But in 1882, 
President Heureaux seemed to discredit this opinion and to agree with other 
observers by blaming the producers for the critical situation of the tobacco 
crop in international markets. He commented in a private letter: 11 ••• le dire 
que el tabaco dominicano hubiera conservado su fama y supeditado al brasilero 
Y colombiano si les cultivadores del Cibao hubiesen side mas celosos de su 
pervenir 11 (cited in Hoetnik 1971 :27). Paradoxically, tobacco's national social 
and economic advantage turned to be its greatest international hinderance: the 
complex network of units involved in its harvest and care. 
One of the greatest and most difficult problems of tobacco producers 
is to maintain an unchanging standard in the quality of their product. The 
constant variety of flavor and aroma of the tobacco leaves guarantees the buyer 
I' 
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manufacturer its blending. The standard quality of the tobacco relies upon 
variables of the natural environment (soil, rain, and weather) as well as the 
'ral environment in such activities as selecting, curing, and packing the 
soc 
tobacco. But the social organization of the tobacco industry in the nineteenth 
century augmented considerably the number of independent hands caring for the 
tobacco. This technoeconomic feature is probably associated with two dependent 
variables. 
First, the fact that the tobacco production came from small plots and 
not from tobacco plantations like in Virginia, U.S.A. The coordination of these 
plots became more strenuous and complex by the mere disarticulated force of the 
great number of units to be integrated in the national distributive organization. 
Second, the absence of great capital investments in processing equipment 
by the tobacco manufacturers like in the case of the sugar industry. The Cibao 
exported tobacco as raw material to be processed in European countries. Thereby 
the presence of huge capital investments on a long term base were not necessary. 
They would have implied the elimination of small producers and their subsequent 
substitution by large tobacco estates which could guarantee both the necessary 
supply of the commodity and the protection of the investments to capitalist 
organizations. In addition, it would have also signified the elimination of all 
independent units in the distributive system of the tobacco industry. In any 
case, the complex procedure of internal marketing continued and opened up oppor-
tunities for fraud and price speculation which finally ran Dominican tobacco out 
of European markets~ 
The national operations of the tobacco industry were insightfully classi-
fied by Bono as socially and economically 1 ~emocratic11 in nature because of the 
large labor force required for its harvesting and processing, and the profits 
it provided to all those involved in the industry's operation. At the same 
time, the national government in 1889 recognized that besides the economic 
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beneficial in the tobacco harvest, the harvest and marketing of this factors so 
11c;rea verdaderos ciudadanos libres por sus costumbres y educacion, porque 
crop 
Cosechero es propietario y aun sus empleados subalternos conservan el prin-c;ada 
c;fpio de ciudadano en el genero de ocupacion que tienen en la elaboracion de dicho 
fruto" (cited in Hoetnik 1971 :27-28). Meanwhile, the cocoa ( and to a certain 
eXtent the coffee) was characterized.by Bono as oligarchic since it required few 
laborers and great extension of land and capital to provide adequate profits to 
the producer (cf. 1895 --1964:363). Recently, the Dominican sugar industry has 
been classified by Hoetnik as 11 imperialist 11 because of its great extensions of 
land, the proletarization of labor, and the dependence on huge foreign capital 
Investments (1971:119). 
Nevertheless, it was this labor democracy which seems to have brought 
the tobacco decline. Not only by the careless labor of the producing peasants, 
but above all by the treatment tobacco leaves received during classification, 
curing, and packing by warehouse laborers, local merchants and export merchants. 
As previously mentioned, European merchants and manufacturers lost their confi-
dence in the Dominican tobacco and discontinued their transactions with the 
export houses. Export and prices went down, and peasans started planting their 
plots with cocoa, coffee and other crops. Tobacco supremacy lost ground to 
these booming products, and in a few years to the ominpotent sugar industry in 
the south. 
Los selectores, empacadores, enseronadores y exportadores de tabaco 
abusaron de la paciencia de nuestros marchantes alemanes, y estos al 
fin cansados de nuestra malicia, se negaron a reconocerle al tabaco 
cibaeno las sobresalientes cual idades que la naturaleza, ayudada del 
esmero, le habian dado (Bono --1895-- 1964:361; cf. 197-198, 269, 279, 
380). 
In this perspective, the decline of the tobacco industry coincided but 
~as not caused by the beginnings of the sugar industry whose development took 
Place in the southern and eastern provinces after 1870; especially around the 
: I 
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of Santo Domingo and San Pedro de Macoris. For instance, Hoetnik (1971: 
cities 
22_23 ) reports that from 1875 to 1882 thirty sugar estates (haciendas de canas) 
rted operations in the Dominican Republic. Twenty seven of the thirty estates sta 
were located between Azua and San Pedro de Macoris in the south coast of the 
country, while only three of them, the smallest according to the writer, operated 
in Puerto Plata. The capital investments came from Cuban families (i.e., Ros) 
emigrating from the neighboring Island because of the independence war being 
fought there, and from Italian (i.e., Vicini), German (i.e., Bass, Smidt, Hacht-
mann), and English (i.e., Read, Fowle, Hatton, Stocks) firms. These investors 
were not those formerly running the tobacco export houses (i.e., Roth, Waltading, 
Zeller, Bothet, Dubocq, Breffit, Stubbe art!Jandes), nor were they investing in 
the same zones or the same amount of capital (cf. Hoetnik 1971 :32). 
On the contrary, while sugar production increased in the south and eastern 
region of the country, in the Cibao itself production was diversified with the 
presence of coffee and cocoa. With the decline and fluctuation of tobacco prices, 
peasants came to consider the sole dependence upon this crop as an excessive risk. 
The advice of Luis Castillo overran the social cons~~rations of Bono about tobacco 
harvest 1 s democratic nature: 
Ya lo hemos dicho. Siembrese tabaco pero siembrese mas cacao, mas 
cafe, y vease el tabaco no como fruto de principal importancia, ni 
de primera necesidad para el desarrollo del comercio, sino como una 
pequena arteria que contribuye al sostenimiento de la agricultural, 
que contribuya al sostenimiento de los agricultores que laboran en 
pequena escala (Castillo 1895, in Bono 1964:402). 
But neither the loss of confidence in international markets in relation 
to the Dominican tobacco, nor the diversification of agricultural production in 
the Cibao erradicated the tobacco production. Still in 1890, it was considered 
the "principal cormoodity11 of the Dominican agriculture. For that reason the 
national government invested $30,000.00 for the establishment of model farms 
for the harvest of both tobacco and cotton. (Col leccion de Leyes 1890:448). I 
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the previous year, the government approved a project to Farensbach by means 
still 
h lleste se comprometia a fundar dincas o granjas modelos en cuatro o mas of whic 
a experimentar con nuevas semillas de tabaco ya dar instruccion sobre 1ugares, 
estos experimentos. Farensbach recibiria 75 centavos por cada quintal exportado; 
ndo el precio subiera a 15 pesos por quintal, gracias a las actividades de 
cua . 
Farensbach, el gobierno levantaria un derecho adicional que seria entregado a 
Farensbach11 (cf. Hoetnik 1971:27). And in 1894, President Heureaux trying to 
further protect the quality and the European markets of the Dominican tobacco, 
approved a decree in which both technical and agricultural guidelines were 
i f legislated upon peasants and warehouses, (Coleccion de Leyes 1894:281). I After the temporary loss of its European markets in the late 1870's and 
early 1880's, the tobacco now with official help was able to recuperate its 
markets. For instance, from 1878 to 1879, the tobacco exported descended from 
120,000 to only 35,000 qq., (cf. Camacho y Tejada 1971:21). But by 1886 once 
again the export figures are up to a record high of 175,636 qq. Seed uniformity, 
and standard classification and processing, probably were the main reasons for 
this revitalization of the industry. Nevertheless, the sugar era had begun and 
the tobacco boom became stabilized; meanwhile, the Cibao divided its lands 
among tobacco, cocoa, coffee and other agricultural products. 
I. 
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CHAPTER I II 
PRODUCTION AND EXPORT OF DOMINICAN TOBACCO 
Ecological Base 
Natural Environment 
The tobacco habitat is highly dependent upon ecological factors such as 
temperatures, rains, soils, and plagues. In fact, these variables are more deter-
minants of its flavor, perfume and combustion than handling methods and fertilizer 
treatments. The tobacco plant is not only sensitive but also conservative: it 
adapts to temperatures neither too hot nor too cold; to soils neither too sandy 
nor too clayish; it needs water, but not too much nor too little. 
The Dominican tobacco commerce both for the national and the international 
~rket is derived from Nicotina tabacum. Its market value depends essentially on 
its variety, and on the quality and texture of its leaves. These elements deter-
mine the flavor, and the combustion of the tobacco leaves, and thereby its market 
value as well. 
In the Dominican Republic, the main tobacco harvested whether for national 
consumption (9.49% of the national production for 1971), or for export, is of the 
dark air cured class. The former includes tabaco de olor (smell tobacco) with 
its most important sub-varieties, Chago Diaz and Quin Diaz; in addition in the 
last three years the harvest of Burley tobacco has increased for national consump-
tion not without political turmoil. On the other hand, the export tobacco 
embraces two varieties, the traditional tabaco criollo (creole tobacco), and 
starting in 1962, tabaco piloto cubano (Cuban seed tobacco). The former includes 
a number of sub-varieties such as Amarillo parado, Punta de lanza, and Amarillo 
Planchado. 
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It is pertinent to notice at this point, that the present study is based 
export tobacco production and its manufacture exclusively; in other words, 
·on the 
t he production and packing of criollo and Cuban tobacco. The volume of the 
.,1th 
t industry is evident when looking into the statistics. In 1970, for instance, 
.xPor 
·nternational market received 86.26% of the 446,370 qq. of tobacco harvested 
the I 
In the Dominican Republic. Of the total national production the amount exported 
was: 329,781 qq. of criollo tobacco (73.88%); and 45,632 qq. of Cuban tobacco (10.22%}. 
Of the remaining 70,957 qq. of the tobacco harvested during that season corresponding 
to olor tobacco, only 2. 16% was also exported and the rest consumed in the national 
market. 
Production and Export of Criollo and Cuban Varieites of Tobacco: The Formal Aspects 
This sub-section includes a detailed consideration of agricultural and 
market factors of both Cuban and Criollo tobacco. In this way a clearer picture 
will appear hopefully of the social organization resulting from the flow of the 
tobacco from the fields to the international market. Interestingly enough, this 
process is known as cuidados culturales (cultural cares} in the Dominican Republic, 
for they embrace all those activities which the tobacco receives from man in its 
productive and market stages. 
(I): Cuban Tobacco: 
The Cuban seed was introduced in the Dominican Republic in 1962 with the 
help of planters and processors from ~uba who transplanted its relatively com-
plex technology to the neighboring Republic after Castro took over in Cuba. The 
interest of the Dominican national government and of the at the time subsidied 
Fetab Inc. Cooperatives, was to capture the Cuban tobacco market lost by the 
Cuban government in the United States. 
In 1970, the production of approximately 350 Cuban seed harvesters, 
ascended to 45,632 qq. (1 quintal= 50 kilos= 100 pounds} in an estimated 
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tareas (in 1963, the production was only 3,500 qq. --0.27% of.the national 
, 12 
,, production-~ in 890 tareas of land, cf. table 12). Thus, the estimated 
tobacco 
· d s 1 5 qq. for tarea of land. Dominican planters have absorbed the elab-ylel wa . 
technology of planting and preparing this tobacco due to the benefits on 
orate 
of the high prices which are paid for this tobacco. However, the market 
account 
restricted because of the high quality and prices which the Cuban tobacco Is very 
receives; this constitutes a limiting factor to its production. The principal 
exportations are made to the United States, where buyers cannot get the tobacco 
from Cuba, and to the Canary Islands which processes and re-exports it to the 
United States. 
Production: 
Although the planting and harvest cycle is less than the one of criollo 
tobacco, peasants have to work harder with Cuban tobacco. Seed beds should be 
watered from the second half of September to the last days of October in order 
to make transplantation from the first days of November to the middle of December. 
Planting is made in rows at an average distance of 32 inches between the rows by 
11 inches between the plants, which permits a population of 2700 plants for each 
tarea and will secure under ideal conditions a production of two quintals for 
each tarea of 1 and. 
When planting, first application of fertilizer is made, determining the 
quantity and the formula a; per soil type. Twenty days after planting, weeding 
takes place and then another dose of fertilizer is applied. Immediately, aporque 
(hilling) follows, meaning to clot the plant's trunk, applying irrigation. Forty 
days after planting the tobacco, unbottoning is made and a week after that pick-
ing out suckers, starting crop 55 days after planting. 
Harvest: 
Harvest starts with the two first leaves, the lower ones, which consti-
tutes the class denominated Jibre pie. A week after that harvest continues with 
I 
11,1 
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the next two leaves dominated uno y medio. Then, each week, the central leaves 
Cut out until finishing with the last two leaves in the top called coronas. are 
The field price of Cuban tobacco remains the same during the tobacco 
season. usually it is directly stipulated between the producing peasant and 
buying export houses in the form of a contract; the agreement also specified 
technical and financial assistance. While some companies pay the same price 
for all classes of leaves, others prefer to pay a different price for each 
class of 1.eaf. The rationale behind this is one of selection according to 
different types and yielding capacity of the harvest they buy; the export house 
will sell the tobacco classified at different prices and its profits will depend 
on this. 
Curing and Bulking: 
After the crop, the tobacco is tied up with strings (sartas) in leaves 
which are hung up in the curing house, remaining there during 45 days, after 
which the leaves are expected to be completely dried. When tobacco is completely 
dried it is taken down and bulks (trojas) are prepared. It remains there for 40 
days more of cure, or fermentation. Further tobacco is classified and packed in 
hampers and transported to warehouses where it will be the object of the processes 
of selection, curing, stripping, drying and packing. 
Production Costs: 
Cuban tobacco harvesting costs and prof its per tarea vary from community 
to community and depend on whether the tobacco is harvested in dry or irrigated 
fields. The ·robacco Institute and the Agricultural Bank have estimated for the 
1973 season, the following average costs and profits per 1area in the Cibao towns 
of Villa Gonzalez, Navarrete, El lngenio, and La Canela; While Cuban tobacco 
cost for an irrigated tarea of land from preparation of the land until packing 
ls estimated to be $50.00 and the net prof it of $24. 25,~~ in the same zone profit 
estimates decreased considerably for non irrigated fields: production per tarea 
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fs l.5 qq; expenses per tarea $41.21; average sale price $40.00 per qq., and pro-
fits per tarea $16.73. A sensible loss of $7.52 per tarea (cf. Institute del 
yabaCO 1972 b:67). 
TABLE 9 
FINANCIAL COST PER TAREA OF IRRIGATED CUBAN TOBACCO 
,_ ACTIVITY COST 
....-
1 Land preparation $ 3.00 
2 Seed bed costs or seed buying . 2.30 
3 Planting 3.00 
4 First watering 2.00 
5 Purchase of combustibles 1. 75 
6 75 pounds of fertilizer ($4.00/qq.) 3.38 
7 10 pounds of pesticide ($16.00/qq.) 1.60 
8 Use of cultivadora 0.50 
9 Hilling 3.00 
10 Second watering 1. 50 
11 Unbuttoning 0.30 
12 Three suckerings ($0.40/each) 1.20 
13 Purchase of 150 strings ($1. 00 per 100 strings) 1. 50 
14 Third watering 1. 50 
15 Recollection of 150 strings 6.00 
16 Tying up 180 strings ($0.25) 3,75 
lZ ReQairs of curina house 2.00 
sub totals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $40;00. 
18 Repol los 
cleaning of repollos $ 1. 50 
pesticides and its applications 0.25 
purchase of 50 strings 0.50 
harvestingz !fing U~z hanging u~ 2.75 
sub totals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 5.00 
19 Peasant contribution--five pesticide applications $ 0. 10 
pulling out of seeds and watering ~ o. 20 
transplanting of 300 small plants 0.20 
two fertilizer applications 0.20 
two suckerings o.3o 
-repollo's expenses 2.50 
1.50 hanging up, b l:J_l~!--~..'!IP_~!"_i _ _!:l.9_ --·---·-------
sub totals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 5.00 
Summary: 
total production in quintals 1. 70 qq. 
average sale price per qq. 45.00 
total production in RD$ 76,50 
expenses per tarea 50.00 
loan interests (8% for seven months) 2.25 
-.Profits 24.25 
. 
. --Source. Tobacco Institute 1972 b:69 • 
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The cost of the curing house for Cuban tobacco is the single most expen-
investment facing the producers. 
5 fve 
A curing house of 42 x 36 feet ranges in 
'ce from $200.00 in Cotui, La Vega, and Dajabon to $571.50 in Bonao. pr• As a 
matter of fact, it is most relevant to analyse the economic pressure of this and 
other producing costs upon the producers. Although no statistics are available, 
there is sufficient evidence to sustain that the great majority of Cuban tobacco 
producers are not minifundist peasants, but middle, entrepreneur, and latifundist 
landholders. The lack of production credits among minifundist peasants and the 
following variables seem to explain this significant phenomenon. The variables 
are: (i) the high cost of a Cuban tobacco curing house (an average criollo tobacco 
shading house (rancho) does not normally exceed $100.00; (ii) the higher cost of 
production per tarea of Cuban tobacco when compared with criollo tobacco (cf. 
tables 9 and 14); (iii) the lack of irrigated land among minifundist peasants 
shrinks the expected profits from a tarea of non-irrigated Cuban tobacco below 
that of a non-irrigated tarea of criollo tobacco; (iv) the additional time and 
labor that the Cuban tobacco requires during harvest and curing time relative 
to that of the criollo tobacco; (v) finally, the fact that criollo tobacco is 
traditional in the Cibao region and also requires less labor expertise and crop 
risk than the Cuban tobacco. 
Precessing: 
The processing of tobacco piloto cubano is a very delicate and costly 
operation. It requires much technology and supervision and abundant employment 
of labor. It starts with reception in warehouse in hampers previously selected 
by classes, under the supervision of buyer's technicians. In this phase class 
and quality are examined and then tobacco is received paying to the grower as 
agreed on the contract previously signed. At this moment the operation of loosen-
ing starts; the inferior types are taken out of the strings and taken to the 
bulks in leaves and each group in its class, where the process of fermentation 
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starts. 
Loosening and pre-selection is another operation by which the upper 
es--libre pie, uno y medio, centro,· corona-- are taken out of the cerones tYP 
d are removed from the strings. Specialized workers make a sub-classifica-an 
tion of each type according to the size of the leaves, to its measure from 7 
to 9 inches, from 9 to 12 inches, or more than 13 inches. Leaves with less 
than 7 inches, which usually are few, or those which are ruined or spotted, 
fall within the classification of colas and placed in bulk just as the capadura 
(suckers) and the sandleaves (first leaves), according to class and in leaves, 
to be fermented. 
Fermentation of all classes is done in bulk well identified bearing cards 
where it is indicated the zone where the tobacco comes from, the class and also 
periodically is written on it the temperature of the bulk. The trojas are turned 
over whenever tobacco temperatures increase (coge fiebre). This process lasts 
for approximately 40 days, after which tobacco is ready for selection. Previous-
ly, tobacco had been wet because of the field moisture; by the bulking process 
the moisture evaporates by the heat resulting from the leaves grouped together. 
Selection process is very laborious and classification is made for leaves 
and classes. When classified, women workers strip the tobacco leaves through a 
series of delicate manual operations. At the end of this process, the tobacco 
is dried and then packed for port shipment. Normally, the packs ~acas) go by 
trucks either to Puerto Plata in the r.orth coast, if the shipment is for Europe, 
or to Santo Domingo in the south, if the shipment is for the United States. 
With this bulking process, the tobacco suffers a shrinkage (merma) in 
weight of approximately 10% and another 20% with stripping. After packing 
shrinkage is a minimum, if it is exposed to a good process of fermentation. The 
reduction in weight is taken care of in the selling prices. 
Handling process costs are high. From a number of interviews it can be 
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estimated to be oscillating between 45 to 50% of the green tobacco cost. Other 
raise the total expenses to an 80% of tobacco's final cost; among them, 
costs 
field price and transportation are important. 
price Structure: 
For sales purposes Cuban tobacco is classified usually into two types 
which are sold to different markets: centros and capaduras. Within the category 
of centro the following sub-types are sold separately: 
(i} Bandas: the leaf divided in two bands starting from the stem, without strip-
ping. It is generally a long leaf with thin veins and good texture. It is prin-
cipally exported to Canary where it is stripped and used as binder for cigars. 
(ii) Colas, leaves with less than seven inches or ruined or spotted, used as 
cut-tobacco for cigars or cigarettes. It is sold to Canary and the United States; 
in some cases to local markets. 
(iii) SHS, this is the cut-tobacco which is taken out from stripping of good 
quality as it comes from a very cured tobacco, and is sold for cigars or cigar-
ettes manufacturing to Canary of the United States. 
(iv) The long-fillers (largos), which is the long leaf, well cured and of the 
best quality; like previous ones, it is sold in the United States and the Canary 
Is 1 ands. 
Centros generally constitute 70% out of the total Cuban tobacco production. 
Its average sale price for a quintal of 100 pounds ranges between $100.00 to 
$122.50. The type reaching the highest price is the long-filler which is sold at 
a price that goes from $130.00 to $160.00 for a quintal of 100 pounds. Long-
fil lers constitute approximately 75% of the centres. The colas embrace 20% and the 
other sub-types 5% of the centres. The lowest prices are paid for the colas which 
are quoted at prices under $44.00 for a quintal of 100 pounds. 
The centres constitute 70% of the tobacco production, the rest is named 
capadura. Capadura tobacco is used as cut-tobacco, for cigars or cigarettes and 
! 
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' don the Canary Island principally, reaching average quotations from t30.00 
· f s place v 
· · oo per quintal of 100 pounds. Capadura is convenient for manufacturers who 
tO $45. 
have to make the stripping. 
The advantage of capadura is that as the stern is 
Jfttle it has a good yield when stripped by machine, depending on the machine, and 
ft introduces a 75% of ready filler. It is aromatic tobacco very good to give 
ftavor to cigars blended with other types of filler (centros). 
Financing: 
Most Cuban seed harvesters receive financing from some processor companies, 
which guarantee a fixed price by contract, even before the planting of the tobacco. 
Others receive financing from the Agricultural Bank through the Tobacco Institute, 
or from commercial banking generally with the guarantee of the buyer companies. 
Loan interest ranges between 8~ and 9 % annually according to the finan-
cial source. Financing is generally made under the supervision of qualified 
agronomists and based on the estimates of the crop's value; they vary from 50 to 75% 
of the crop's value. 
It is safe to maintain that all Cuban seed growers are receiving financial 
assistance in some way or another. This situation contrasts with the one prevail-
Ing among criollo tobacco growers, among whom financial assistance is practically 
unknown because of lack of guarantees for the loans. Also differing from what is 
usual with criollo's tobacco practices, middlemen and local packers are non-exis-
tent between the producer and the export companies dealing eith Cuban tobacco. 
TABLE 10 
PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF FINANCE FOR CUBAN SEED PRODU 
ORGANIZATION 
Agriculture Bank 
Secretary of Agriculture 
COPATA (private processing company) 
# OF GROWERS 
62 
99 
108 
TOTALS 269 
Source: Casals Victoria 1972: 14. 
CERS, 1970 
TA REAS 
6,490 
3, 168 
9,831 
19,489 
' . 
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TABLE 11 
SHARE OF EXPORT COMPANIES IN CUBAN SEED EXPORTS (ESTIMATES) 1970 (;'•) 
COMPANY QUINTALS % US$ % 
fETAB 6,661 (33.6) 615' 786 (38.o) QUI SQUEYA 1 ,487 (7.5) 152,326 (9.4) 
4,283 (21. 6) 350,026 (~1.6) p, T.M .• 463 (2.2) 24,307 ( 1. 5) Leon J 1menez 
E.T. Tropicales 2,875 (14.5) 145,844 (9. 0) 
COP OTA 2,082 ( 10. 5) 242,453 (14.9) 
Hobeeka 615 (3.2) 98,850 (6. I) 
Han ipul adora de Tabaco 1,388 (7.0) 56,717 (3. 5) 
TOTAL 19,827 ( 100. 0) 1,620,489 ( 100.0) 
(*Note: At the time of the field work (1972) the situation had changed consider-
ably. Copata seems to be the leading buyer company while a number of these export 
houses like D.T.M. have gone out of business.) 
Source: Roques 1972: 12 
Market Situation: 
The principal problem for the exportaion of tobacco piloto cubano is that 
long fillers are used in the manufacturing of expensive cigars which are sold to 
consumers at prices from $0.50 to $1.00. Hence, its principal market is the 
United States, where the high income and the symbol of success or prestige that 
those cigars represent is very esteemed within certain high income groups. 
In Europe, the principal buyers are in the Canary Islands, where because 
of the low cost of labor, tobacco is manufactured and re-exported in cigars to 
the United States. England and Switzerland are practically the only two European 
·markets for Dominican long-filler, but they buy it from Cuba. Opinion runs that 
on a matter of quality and prices the Dominican long filler could compete with 
the Cuban one in those markets. But it initially faces two difficulties: (i) 
manufacturers do not stop good commercial relations already established; (ii) 
besides, they do not like to change suppliers because of the risk of receiving 
different flavor tobacco affecting their blend. Blending is a matter of vital 
importance to the manufacturers to whom the export companies through their 
international firms sell their tobacco. The manufacturer is contingent upon 
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l ient•s desire for their tobacco flavor blends in order to maintain and the c 
Ct a market for their final products. prote 
(II): Criollo Tobacco: 
Criollo tobacco represents a number of social contrasts with the Cuban 
tobacco. First, contrary to Cuban seed tobacco only a decade old in the Cibao 
·region, tobacco criollo is identified with the Cibao region as far back as early 
XIX century, if not earlier (cf. Camacho y Tejada 1971:2). Second, while the 
Cuban seed tobacco is the work of an estimated 350 producers, most of them middle 
or big landholders --34, 125 tareas were harvested in 1970 which gives an approx.i-
mately minimum average of 97.5 tareas per producer-- criollo tobacco is the mini-
fundist peasant's cash crop; among other reasons, because (a) it may be cultivated 
profitably on small plots; (b) it does not ;equire technological expertise nor 
does it require as large a labor force as the Cuban tobacco harvest; (c) family 
labor may virtually supply all thelabor needs of a conuco or a parcela; (d) small 
plots may yield a relatively high return {cf. table 31). 
This variety of tobacco, like the Cuban variety, is usually called dark 
tobacco (tabaco negro) because of its dark leaves. Its vegetative cycle normally 
runs from 60 to 65 days after planting in contrast to the shorter cycle for Cuban 
tobacco (50 to 55 days after planting). The leaves on becoming dried present a 
dark brown color with poorer texture and different aroma than the Cuban leaves. 
Its lesser quality will produce for it a European market, mainly Spain, and will 
have to compete with Philippine, Colombian, and Brazilian dark tobacco in those 
markets. 
In recent years the criollo tobacco production dropped from 433,751 qq. 
(95.813·· of the national production) in 1963 to 329,781 qq. (73.88%) in 1970; 
and in surface dedicated to its harvest from 315,710 tareas (96.50%) in 1963 to 
240,034 rareas (74.40%) in 1970. This drop is explainable in relation to the 
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•fjcation of production because of the beginning and expansion.of the Cuban divers• 
d tobacco in 1963, and the increase of the national market and therby the boom see 
of the olor tobacco production (cf. tables 12 and 13). 
TABLE 12 
TAREAS HARVESTED ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT TOBACCO VARIETIES: 1963-1970 
VEAR TOTAL CRIOLLO % DE OLOR % CUBAN % 
-
1963 327' 145 315,710 (96.50) 10,545 (3. 22) 890 (0. 27) 
1964 23,593 221,474 (93. 87) 9,208 (3.90) 5,251 (2.22) 
1965 246,795 220,240 (89. 24) 16' 159 (6.54) 10,396 (4.21) 
1966 292,788 255,963 (87 .42) 22,208 (7.58) 14,617 (4.99) 
1967 298,766 241,919 (80. 97) 33,714 (11.28) 23' 133 (7.74) 
1968 237,062 173,411 (73.15) 37,302 (15.73) 26,349 (11.11) 
1969 306,484 230,862 (75.32) 44,417 ( 14.49) 31'205 (10.18) 
1970 322,614 240,034 (74.40) 48.455 (15.01) 34. 125 (10.57) Source: elaborated from unpublished cata of the lobacco institute. 
TABLE 13 
NATIONAL PRODUCTION ACCORDING TO TOBACCO'S VARIETIES: 1963-1970 
YEAR TOTAL CRIOLLO % DE OLOR % CUBAN % 
1963 452,693 433,751 (95.81) 15,422 (3.41) 3,500 (0. 77) 
1964 326,438 304,282 (93.21) 13,484 (4. 13) 8,672 (2.65) 
1965 341 ,467 302,586 (88.61) 23,663 (6.92) 15,218 (4.45) I 
1966 405, 103 351,666 (86.80) 32,522 (8.02) 20,915 (5. 16) 
1967 413,371 332,250 (80. 37) 49,371 ( 11. 94) 31 '750 (7.68) 
1968 328,000 238,248 (72.63) 54,624 (16.65) 35' 128 (10. 70) 
I 1969 424,053 317' 180 (74.79) 65,044 (15.33) 41 ,829 (9. 86) 
_!270 446,370 329,781 (73.88) 70.957 (15.89) 45,632 (10.22) [11 Source: elaborated trom unpubl rshea cata ot the lobacco rnsi::ri::ute. I (in quintals of 50 kilos). 
I I, I 1 I: 
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The decreasing trend of criollo 1 s production will probably stop in coming 
seasons. 
As a matter of fact, in recent years, demand of criollo tobacco from 
Pean buyers Euro 
--especially Spaniards-- has increased. Accordingly, the Tobacco 
institute proposes for the 1972-1973 tobacco season (cf. 1972 b:4 and 7) an in-
. se in the dark tobacco production of 100,000 qq. in reation to the 1971-1972 
crea 
production; of this increase, at least 80,000 qq. correspond to criollo tobacco. 
This yielding increase is expected to be accomplished through the addition of 
50 ,ooo tareas to the ha~vest of these two varieties of tobacco, mostly fallow land. 
Following preliminary estimates of the lnstitute•s director, the 1971-1972 season, 
ending in August 1972 yielded 420,000 qq. of criollo tobacco (cf. El Sol newspaper, 
September 7, 1972, pag. 1) with a revenue of $31 million dollars including Cuban 
tobacco export revenues. The number of tareas dedicated to criollo crop through 
the same season was approximately 236,530 tareas of land. 
Production: 
As Cuban seed beds, criollo 1 s seed beds are prepared at the beginning of 
the rainy season, usually the end of September or the first week of October. 
Watering, shade, covering, and fertilizing care of the seed runs from 35 to 40 
days until the plant is from 4 to 5 inches in height in the seed bed. 
Planting starts at peasant's discretion in November and generally each 
seed bed provides plants for eight tareas. While a worker in one day uproots 
and waters new born plants (posturas) from the seed beds for an average of three 
to five tareas of land, another worker harvests one tarea in 4/5 of a working 
day. Planting is made in rows at an average distance of 39 inches between the 
rows by 20 inches between the plants, thus a tarea will include 25 rows with 
48 plants each or 1200 plants. The average yield is ~ qq. per tarea, but in some 
tobacco zones even 3 qq. per tarea have been reported. 
After planting, aporque (hilling) is made and the soil is immediately 
\rlatered; it normally takes a worker one day for the hi 11 ing of one tarea. If 
--w.:---- ----------. 
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-fertilizer is available, the first application is also made at this time. Irrigat-
ed tobacco harvesting requires two applications of fertilizer but on dry condi-
tions (secano) one application suffices; on any conditions, one worker applies 
fertilizer to ten tareas in ore working day. Fourteen to twenty days after 
planting, weeding (deshierbe) labor starts. The first weeding of one tarea will 
take approximately 1 1/5 working day to a worker. The second weeding, following 
four or five weeks later and according to field conditions, only one day. 
Around the fifth week after planting the tobacco unbottoning (desbotone) 
starts and is shortly followed by one of the two picl:ings out of suckers (deshi-
j!). A worker unbottons 11! tareas of criollo tobacco in one; but he deshija 
only 7! tareas in one day. Fifty to sixty days after planting the tobacco crop 
starts. 
Harvest 
Harvest starts with the lowest leaves of the plant denominated barresuelo 
(floor sweeper). Normally two weeks after the barresuelo, harvest continues with-
out leaves selection as in the case of Cuban tobacco. Repollos (second born 
leaves) are the last leaves harvested. While barresuelo leaves will receive the 
lowest prices, the rest of the crop, without making distinction of leaves, receiv-
es the same price from the warehouses; proper-exception of the repollos which 
receive prices as low as those of the barresuelo leaves. 
Some agronomists estimate that 10% of the plants harvested become unpro-
ductive. Thus, a tarea of criollo tobacco has 1,080 productive plants at crop 
time; each plant having 22 leaves with a total of 23,760 leaves. If each string 
includes 150 to 165 leaves, then a tarea of tobacco crioJJo produces 145 strings 
(Cuban tobacco produces with irrigated fields 230 sartas; if the land is dry only 
175 sartas). It is also estimated that three peasants collect 175 strings a 
day at harvest time. 
Curing and Bulking 
After the crop, the tobacco is tied up with strings by women working on 
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the floor of a nearby shading house (rancho). Each string is 6 to 8 feet long 
with an average of 50 rings holding from 150 to 165 leaves of tobacco recently 
taken from the field. Each sarta is then hung up by men in the shading house 
ceiling, thus permitting the leaves to dry out while naturally aired for at least 
three weeks. The shading house, owned by the peasants and located in their own 
plots, are like huts without walls and wide open. The men hanging up the tobacco 
strings are normally the same that have harvested it earlier in the day. 
When the tobacco is completely dried it is taken down and trojas (bulks) 
are prepared. The bulking process, taking place under the shadow of the ranchos, 
lasts for about 40 days producing a little cure, or fermentation to the leaves. 
When a price is accorded with a middleman --who has normally been checking the 
harvest and lending money to the peasant-- the tobacco is packed in hampers; 
very rarely, does the peasant classify his own tobacco in order to sell it at 
different prices. 
The middleman transports the tobacco to the warehouse subsidizing his 
operations during the tobacco season. In the warehouse, or in the local packer, 
the tobacco will be selected, cured, cleaned, dried and packed for export shipment. 
Productton Costs: 
Crio11o tobacco production costs and profits per tarea vary from community 
to community and depends on whether the tobacco is harvested in dry or irrigated 
fields. But while it is safe to affirm that Cuban tobacco is most frequently 
irrigated, criollo tobacco is not. Table 14 includes the estimates of costs and 
profits from the Tobacco Institute and the Agricultural Bank for the 1972-1973 
tobacco season; it refers to a dry tarea of land harvested with criollo tobacco 
in the towns of El lngenio, Villa Gonzalez, Navarrete, La Canela, Tamboril, Licey, 
Moc a 
' 
Guazuman, and La Torre. 
The criollo's shading house normally ranges around the 14 x 12 field yards 
(.Y._aras conuqueras ; 1 vara conuquera = 2.5077 m). Its capacity might cover 12 
i 
l1 
I 
I 
I 
1 •. 1 ) ~ 
' 
~ 
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ea s of tobacco and its presence is essential for after crop operations like tar 
bulking, air curing (la colgada), hampering, and sun protection of the tobacco. 
TABLE 14 
o.-LABOR COST 
i..--
1 Land preparation $ 1. 50 
2 purchase of 1,380 seeds 1.38 
3 Harvest of 1, 200 sma 11 plants 2.00 
4 50 pounds of fertilizers ($4.50/qq) 2.25 
5 5 pounds of pesticide ($16.00/qq) 0.80 
6 Two weedings 4.50 
7 Unbuttoning 0.20 
8 Two suckerings 0.25 
9 Purchase of 75 strings 0.75 JO Recollection of 75 strings of tobacco 3.00 
11 Tying up of 75 strings 1. 12 12 Shading House repairs 2.00 
sub-to ta I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $19.75 
13 Repol los 
pesticide and its application $ 0.25 harvesting, tying up, hanging up 2.50 purchase of 50 strings 0.50 
sub-tot a 1. $ 3.25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
14 Peasant's contribution 
pulling out and watering the small plants $ 0.25 transplanting 180 sma 11 plants 0.20 fertilizer application o. 15 pesticide application 0.30 suckerings 0.20 hampering o. 15 
repo 1los 1 s expenses 2.75 
sub-total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 4.00 
Summary: 
Total p reduction in quintals 2.00 Average sale price per qq. (':':) $23.00 Total production in RD$ 46.00 Expenses per tarea 27.00 Loan i nterst (-'-'·) l\l'o 1.62 Profits 17. 38 .......__ 
(*) During the 1971-1972 tobacco season the average sale price per quintal was 
higher: $26.00/qq. 
(;';;':)Most peasants receive loans without financial interest from middlemen. 
Source: Tobacco Institute 1972 b:58 and 59. 
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processing: 
The processing of criollo tobacco is not as laborious nor as expensive 
t hat of Cuban tobacco. Although a delicate operation, it does not require as 
much technology --as the presence of independent local packers selling packed 
tobacco to export houses proves; nevertheless, it does require abundant labor, 
but not specialized. 
Middlemen, at their own risk, bring the tobacco to the warehouses or, 
in some cases, to the local packers. At this time the hampers are weighed (norw 
mally each hamper weighs one quintal with 60 kilos, but only 50 kilos are paid; 
the weight difference is attributed to the hamper itself plus dirt, moisture and 
stems of the tobacco) under the supervision of the warehouse owner or his equiva-
lent. Supervision is tight for dryness of the leaves, and rotten tobacco. The 
operation of loosening the leaves from the strings is taken care of by women. 
Sometimes a pre-selection is made at this point between different types of leaves 
according to their length and texture. 
Loosened and/or pre-selected tobacco goes into huge bulks. Fermentation 
is done in these bulks just as in the case of Cuban tobacco by turning the bulks 
over whenever tobacco temperatures increase. This process of forming the trojas 
and turning them over, lasts approximately 40 days or three turns. At the end, 
the tobacco ~ supposedly dry and ready for selection. 
The selection process is laborious and requires tobacco expertise. During 
the field work some clasificadores (classifiers) in two different warehouses, 
emphasized that they could distinguish 17 types of criollo tobacco leaves; another 
one said he could go up to 21 classifications. But normally, five or at most 
seven types of leaves are selected. Once classified, the tobacco is dried and 
packed for shipment through Puerto Plata (90 miles from Santiago to the north-
east); all export shipment costs are taken care of by the manufacturers just as 
in the case of the Cuban tobacco. 
90 
With the bulking process the criollo tobacco shrinks almost 12% of its 
field weight. If well treated in the warehouse, shrinkage during shipment overseas 
ts expected to be minimal. Handling process costs are not as high as those of 
Cuban tobacco. They can be estimated to fluctuate around 10% of the tobacco cost 
to the export companies. 
Price Structure: 
Sale practices of the export houses vary from one to the other, and nor-
mally strict secret prevails in their business transactions with manufacturing 
. 
buyers. Nonetheless, more frequently than not, the criollo plant with its 22 
leaves is classified as producing three categories of leaves: barresuelo or 
lowest leaf (6% of the plant's leaves); centre or center leaves including the 
rest of the leaves (94%); and repollo or leaves born after the first harvest 
(normally 75 pounds of repollo leaves are harvested per tarea ). 
Most of the criollo leaves are used as cut-tobacco and as tripas (entrails) 
in cigarettes. They have become well known for their mild flavor resulting from 
soil exhaustion; the customary mal-practice of harvesting without fertilizers 
affects the presence of nitrogen in the soil which in turn affects the presence 
of nicotine in the leaf. This mild flavor makes criollo tobacco highly requested 
by European manufacturers for their blendings and tobacco mixing. 
The central leaves are further classified for commercial purposes into 
sub-types 1, 2 and 3 depending on their length, texture, combustibility, elasticity, 
and aroma. Criollo's number 4 and number 5 sub-types come from barresuelo and 
repol lo leaves, plus some central leaves of lesser quality. Yield average 
estimates vary significantly from one zone to the other. Normal returns prob-
ably are: 5°/o of #1, 30% of #2, 30% of #3, 25% of #4, and 10% of #5, per quintal 
of tobacco. In some cases a simpler division is employed by distinguishing only 
three sub-types of leaves; in this case the average yield per quintal will be: 
lO% of #1, 50% of #2, and 40% of #3. Furthermore, in other instances criol lo 
''• 
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is classified in four sub-types thereby yielding agerages ~hich tobacco 
might be expected to be: 10% of #1, 25% of #8. 25% of'#4; and 40% of #5. 
The type reaching the highest prices in all cases is #1, which in 1972 
normally was quoted from $100.00 to $110.00 per 100 kilos; under special 
circumstances it has gone as high as $125.00. Sub-types #2 and 3 are normally on 
the average of $90.00 to $100.00 for 100 kilos; finally, sub-types #4 and 5 
fluctuate around $80.00 for 100 kilos. 
Commercially, the selling price has to cover the tobacco costs and leave 
a profit margin. A conservative estimate of tobacco's cost to the export 
house and to the local packers is presented in Table 15. 
TABLE 15 
ESTIMATE OF TOBACCO'S COST TO EXPORT COMPANIES AND TO LOCAL PACKERS 
LABOR 
Tobacco cost in the field 
Primary labors 
Shipment to warehouses 
Middleman's commission 
Shrinkage in warehouse 
Handling process 
Administrative expenses 
Shrinkage after packing 
Financial expenses 
Selling and shipping expenses 
EXPORT HOUSE 
60.0% 
2.5 
1. 0 
2.5 
9.0 
10.0 
3.0 
1. 0 
9.0 
2.0 
(figures represent per cent of final cost) 
LOCAL PACKER 
60.0% 
2.5 
1. 0 
2.s~·~ 
9.0 
4.o 
1. 0 
9.0 
(q Local packer's dependence upon middlemen is not as common as with export houses. 
Financing: 
Most financial help for the growing of criollo tobacco comes from unoffi-
cial and informal sources, mainly corredores (middlemen). They provide mini-
fundist producers and sharecroppers from small landholders with advanced money 
on their crop for any use they decide pertinent, no matter whether it is a 
personal, family, or production use. Rarely does a middleman grant advanced 
money above 10 to 15% of the estimated value of a peasant's crop. Thus, they do 
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t sufficiently cover production costs or other household expenses of the no 
peasants. 
Another financial source for peasants is the Agricultural Bank, the 
Agriculture Department through its supervised credits, and the Office of Community 
Development. All of these are official organs channeling their production credits 
mainly through the Tobacco Institute. For reasons such as bureaucratic procedures, 
ti~e delays in payment, and value perceptions on the side of the peasants, the 
efficacy of these programs is limited. 
Market Situation: 
The criollo tobacco crop is mainly exported to European manufacturers. 
The principal problems facing the export of this tobacco are: (i) its price 
increase; the Dominican tobacco has augmented its cost from 1963 to 1970 35.2% 
while in the United States its costs have gone up 26.2%, in Europe 45.7%, and in 
Africa 30.5% (cf. Casals Victoria et. al., 1972:31-32). This upward trend in 
its average cost is best exemplified by looking into one of its affecting variables, 
the tobacco cost in the field. While in 1962 the average sale price per quintal 
paid to the producer by the export houses through the middlemen was $13.00, in 
1972 it is $26.00 per quintal; in other words a 100.0% increase in only ten 
years. If this upward trend continues Philippine, Brazilian, and Colombian dark 
tobaccos might displace Dominican tobacco from European markets. 
(ii) The criollo export, as well as the Cuban tobacco export, is concen-
trated in two main markets, Canary Islands --with 42.35% of 1971 total tobacco 
export and 40.91% of the tobacco revenue-- and Spain --with 20.69% of the 
export and 16.99% of the revenue. Especially the Canary Islands manufacturers 
are known to be unstable buyers for they move from the tobacco of one country to 
that of another depending on low prices. 
The most important requirement demanded by European manufacturers from 
local export houses of criollo tobacco are: low content of nicotine in the 
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Ves· homogenous processi~g and packing of the leaves in order to obtain stan-Jea • 
dard quality and te~ture; low or even the absence of pesticide clorhine; low 
degree of moiture; and standard prices. 
TABLE 16 
TOBACCO LEAVES EXPORTED IN 1971 
COUNTRY KILOS % VALUE % AVERAGE PRICE PAID 
PER 50 KILOS RD$ 
United States 2,392,550 9.31 253,739 12.53 53.03 
Jamaica 91 ,424 0.35 92,304 o.45 50.48 
Puerto Rico 3,023,739 11.76 2,395,875 11.83 39.62 
Uruguay 32,945 o. 12 31 '731 o. 15 48. 16 
W. Germany 543,932 2. 11 404,013 1.99 37. 14 
Belgium 2,779,894 10.81 2,622,474 12.95 47. 16 
Denmark 359 --- 339 --- 47 .21 
Spain 5,317,789 20.69 3,439,078 16.99 32.34 
Canary Islands 10,883,895 42.35 8,280,356 40.91 38.04 
Holland 109,680 o.42 83,776 o.41 38. 19 
England 1'738 --- 1 ,416 --- 40.74 
Portugal 5,000 0.01 3-,600 0.01 36.00 
North Africa 501 '793 1. 95 338,500 1.67 33.73 
' Equatorial Africa 12,000 o.4 8,880 0.04 37.38 
TOTAL 25,696,747 100 20,239,733 100 39.38 
(includes Cuban and Criollo tobacco) 
Source: unpublished data from the Tobacco Institute. 
CHAPTER IV 
PRODUCTION LEVEL OF ARTICULATION 
Operating Units 
During the last decade the tobacco industry in the Dominican Republic 
has increased its export revenues from 14.7 million pesos (1 peso= 1 dollar), 
to 31.0 million pesos in 1972. At the same time, more than 70% of the national 
tobacco production is still being cultivated in the Cibao region. Thus, there 
fs a special interest in the study of this crop's production, mani~ulation, and 
packing since it is one of the three high ranking export commodities of the 
rountry. The data for the analysis comes from the Cibao region where histori-
cally its production has been concentrated. 
Any classification of rural operating units established upon the division 
and holding of land is arbitrary for it overlooks three basic aspects of agricul-
tural operations: (i) the ferti 1 ity and topography of the land; (ii) its abi 1 ity 
to produce the chief cash and credit crop; (iii) and the presence of any landless 
unit like day laborers. Nevertheless, the study of a crop production, not in a 
community but on a regional basis justifies such classification. 
Following the results of the 1971 census for 4, 168 tobacco farms in the 
Esperanza, Villa Gonzalez, Bisono and Santiago municipalities, the most important 
operating units involved in the harvest of tobacco in the Cibao region seem to be: 
(i) Minifundist conugueros: operating units in privately owned plots ranging 
from one to 32 tareas of land. 
(ii) Minifundist parceleros: operating units in privately owned plots from 32 
to 80 tareas of land. 
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(Jii) Peasant middle owners and agricultural entrepreneurs: their landholdings 
e from 80 to 800 tareas of land; the difference between them residing above ran9 
811 in business interests. 
(iv) Latifundists: operating units in possession of more than 800 tareas regard-
less of their entrepreneur interests. 
(v) Colonos: operating units sharecropping nomially small plots under infomial 
rent contracts. 
TABLE 17 
LAND DIVISION OF 4,168 TOBACCO FARMS IN THE CIBAO REGION, ,971 
FARM AREA # OF % # OF % AVERAGE SIZE % TOBACCO 
(tareas) FARMS TAREAS OF FARMS PRODUCTION 
( tareas) 
1-32 2,716 (65. 16) 37,417 (9. 70) 14 34.0 
32-80 799 (19. 16) 39, 155 (10. 15) 49 25.0 
80-800 577 (13.84) 131,416 (34. 08) 228 30.0 
800 and more 76 (1.82) 177,520 (46.04) 2,336 11. 0 
TOTAL 4, 168 ( 1oo.00) 385,508 (100.00) 92.5 100.0 
Source: Secretariado Tecnico ae la Presidencia 1 72: 9 rou g p IV ' p • 1 • 
TABLE 18 
LAND HOLDING OF 4,168 TOBACCO FARMS IN THE CIBAO REGION, 1971 
FARM AREA TOTAL PRIVATE % RENTED % OTHER FORMS % (tareas) FARMS 
1-32 2,716 1, 136 (41.82) 925 (34.05) 665 (24.48) 
32-80 799 327 (40.92) 246 (30. 78) 226 (28.28) 
80-800 577 411 (71.23) 92 (15.94) 74 (12.82) Boo and more 76 66 (86.84) 5 (6. 57) 5 (6. 57) 
TOTAL 4, 168 1, 930 (46.30) 1'268 (30.42 970 (23.27) 
Source: Secretariado Tecnico de la Presidencia 1972: group IV, p. 9a. 
Obviously, the classification presented above is arbitrary. Others have 
been proposed. For example, the categories proposed by the Partido Socialista 
Popular (PSP) considers owners of 0 to 75 tareas as a poor peasantry; from 75 to 
300 tareas as members of a middle class peasantry; from 300 to 1000 tareas members 
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bourgeois peasantry; and those owning more than 1000 tareas as 1atifundists 
of a 
. (cf. El Nacional de Ahora newspaper, March 15, 1972; p. 7). The main difference 
these classifications is based upon the cultural variables employed in between 
the classification of operating units; for instance, the peasant's own distinc-
tion between a conuco and a parcela. In addition, a difference between a middle 
class peasantry and agricultural entrepreneurs (the P.S.P. 's bourgeois peasantry} 
is recognized. But although the difference between them is probably connected 
with the 300 to 350 tareas division mark, there is no available data to argue 
satisfactorily in this direction. Furthermore, it seems that the difference is 
not so much associated with landholding division as with cultural values: land 
exploitation with a purpose of profit maximization as opposed to a family sub-
sistence enterprise. 
Minifundist Peasants 
Land as a Core Energy Resource 
The plots of minifundist tobacco producers account for the highest per-
centage of the tobacco harvest in the Cibao; especially of criollo tobacco. If 
the figures from Table 19 are representative of tobacco farms in the Cibao region, 
minifundist plots represent 84% of the tobacco farms and control only 20% of the 
area harvested. Fallow and pasture land accounts for 66.44% of the land considered 
in the census, but non-agricultural land among minifundist peasants only represents 
22.433 of their controlled surface. Tobacco harvested on small plots represents 59% 
of the national tobacco production, which indicates an intensive land use in sharp 
contrast with latifundios with only 11% of the tobacco production. Latifundios 
control 46% of the land surface, and account for 2% of the number of farms. 
Minifundist peasants' main core energy resource is the land. Without 
either a plot or sufficient land to harvest they find themselves forced into 
being a dependent unit either as sharecroppers or as day laborers; especially 
97 
i e they operate amid a cash market economy and are contingent upon the crop's 5 nc 
• lds and the extension of the plot for their income. When production returns y1e 
·are not enough, because of scarce labor land and/or poor technical means of 
d t ·on the peasant has to subsidize his income by resorting to middlemen, pro UC I ' 
to usurers, and to other operating units in control of financial resources. This 
ends any opportunity he had of maximizing profits. 
TABLE 19 
LAND USE OF 4, 168 TOBACCO FARMS IN THE CIBAO REGION, 1971 
FARM AREA TOTAL AREA AGRICULTURAL % TOBACCO % OF AGRI- THER % OF AGRI 
(tareas) LAND UNDER USE LAND CULTURAL CROPS CULTURAL 
LAND LAND 
t-32 37,417 31,818 85.03 17,817 55.99 14,001 44.00 
32-80 39' 155 27 ,579 70.43 12,973 47.03 14,606 52.96 
80-800 131,416 3 7' 162 28.27 15,850 42.05 21,312 57.34 
800 and more 177,520 32,834 18.49 5,625 17. 13 27,209 82.86 
TOTAL 385,508 33.56 52,265 40. 13 77' 128 59.60 
Source: Secretari a o Tecnico de la Presidencia 
The most common way to obtain a plot among minifundist peasants is by 
inheritance. Formally, all recognized (legitimos) children inherit equally and 
no distinctions are drawn between boys and girls. In actuality, however, the 
picture is more complex. How much each child inherits seems to be a function of 
the particular family situation as well as of the cultural ideal. Equal division 
of land, is frequently not effected. Furthermore, in some cases the land remains 
undivided and is either granted to a common trust (una sucesion) or to the oldest 
male son once he has received an arbitrio from his father to take care of family 
affairs. In any case, custom calls for the land to be divided among the sur-
viving member of the family. And it is widely recognized that the division of land 
among inheritors is the single most significant source of family conflict among 
minifundist peasants. 
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Another important means in obtaining a plot of land is to pu~chase it. 
Selling of land is usually done by peasants moving to urban places or emi-rhe 
grating to New York; by older peasants unable to work the land or in need of 
even by urban settlers willing to guarantee some cash from their land cash; or 
tn sight of peasant's illegal occupation of land or the 1972 government's 
agrarian code. Because of demographic pressure, and the fact that minifundist 
peasants under normal conditions do not sell their family labored plots, the 
price of land has increased considerably in the last decade. For instance, in 
pontezuela,don Gregorio's mother bought in 1962 35 tareas for RD$600.00; today 
he is selling his eight inherited tareas at $375.00 per tarea. From zone to 
zone the price of land varies, but in any case the region wide value of land is 
increasing from $5.00 to $8.00 per tarea of land in the 1940's to $250.00 to 
$500.00 today. The price increase of land contributes to the inaccessibility 
of purchased land to small subsistence peasants. 
The government land reform program and the peasant's illegal occupation 
of privately owned fallow land offers another opportunity of land acquisition. 
Slash and burn agriculture (hacer tumbas) on state owned land is also practiced 
in the Central Hills, especially in the parajes of San Jose de las Matas and 
Janico. This practice continues because the government does not consider its 
lands illegally occupied as long as the peasant does not reside in the plot after 
one season or more. If he does, the Army is expected to intervene and force him 
off the land (desalojo). Another reason that this practice continues is that 
the quality and erosion of the hill land does not pe•rmit stable settlements on it. 
Even with these alternatives to acquire land and work plots of land, sharecropping 
remains the most common option open to peasants unable to control sufficient 
labor land. 
Significantly, the control and ownership of a plot (not the mere access 
to the land) is one of the most inner cultural values of the tobacco peasantry, 
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all peasants. 115 minifundist parceleros from Pontezuela, Jacagua, 
1 Licey al Hedio and Jose de· las Matas were asked if they would prefer 
·Guazuma ' 
h r the ownership of 40 tareas of land, a steady wage earning $2.50 per day elt e 
c1otng agricultural work, or having a steady urban employment doing 11anything11 
~lguier cosa). The responses were as follows: 77 opted for the first 
·alternative, 9 for the second, 24 for the third; five of the peasants were unable 
to make up their minds although all of these discounted the second option. 
The minimum average extension of a plot desired by peasants to sustain 
their families and fulfill their cultural aspirations, varies considerably from 
one zone to another. In all, probably 75 tareas is the average ideal extension 
.0f a tobacco plot. 91 minifundists of the peasant's group previously mentioned, 
estimated that a parce 1 a of 50 ta reas is 11 good11 enough for them when harvested 
with tobacco as the main crop, while 75 tareas was "very good" for them. Mean-
while, 12 of the remaining 24 considered 40 tareas of tobacco "good for the main-
tenance of the family''. Two presidents of export firms; and five officials of 
the Tobacco lnsitute and of the Dominican Agrarian Institute estimated 75 to 100 
tareas of tobacco will be the minimum landholding required for an 11average" 
(undefined) peasant life. 
Harvest Strategies 
Minifundist plots are harvested thoroughly. In doing this there are a 
nllllber of strategies followed by tobacco peasants. They either seed their plots 
exclusively with tobacco or divide the land by sowing a portion of their tareas 
With tobacco and plant the remaining land in secondary crops. In the second 
Option, tobacco is either intermixed with the secondary crop or isolated from 
it. The choice of having a second crop in the plot is the most common: the 
tobacco plant is contingent upon many natural environmental variables thus making 
its exclusive harvesting too risky. The other crops not only counter balance the 
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. 
• k involved in the tobacco harvest, but also supplement a subsistence household 
r1s 
economy. Among the most important of these secondary crops are corn, pineapples, 
·ce tomatoes, yuca, bananas, coffee, cocoa, and coconuts. It goes without say-
r I ' 
ing that amid a market system, minifundist tobacco peasants are not economically 
self-sufficient. Tobacco production not only provides a source of income, however, 
but it also reinforces the traditional peasant ideal of obtaining goods for direct 
consumption from the land. 
TABLE 20 
MINIFUNDIST LAND USE IN 3,515 PLOTS IN THE CIBAO, 1971 
FARM AREA 
(tareas) 
1-32 
32..:80 
TOTAL 
Source: 
TOBACCO BY ITSELF % INTER-
LAND (tareas) Ml1XED 
(tareas) J • - .... I (tareas) 
17,817 12,006 (67.38) 5' 811 
12 ,973 9' 181 (70. 77) 3,792 
30,790 21 '187 (68.61) 9,603 
---data elaborated from Secretar i ado 
1972: group IV, p. 3. 
% THER CROPS 
(ta reas) 
(32.61 14, 001 
(29.22 14,606 
(31.18 28,607 
Tecnico de la Presidencia 
Secondary crops are selected for harvest according to three main criteria: 
First, their growth cycle, and the time and labor investments in the crop must be 
considered. During the tobacco harvest it is almost impossible for a family 
working a tobacco plot to dispense time and labor care to any other. crop. Secondly, 
the supplementary home diet value is important since some of these crops are not 
market but family oriented. Thirdly, the market price is considered in order to 
supplement tobacco's cash returns. 
Although these tobacco farms consider it their main cash crop, there are 
other producers for whom tobacco is the secondary crop. A few tareas of criollo 
tobacco used as a secondary crop are very frequent in Cibao's farms to improve 
income returns. The tobacco harvest, a temporary crop, has the advantage of 
Providing cash only three months after seed beds are made. This money is secured 
through middlemen advancements, the selling of barresuelo leaves, or the 
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economic practice of venta a la flor (early sell). Tobacco is also a harmful 
. d credit crop especially in the country side store houses (pulperias). This 
goo 
is normally most helpful for household expenses and payments of store house 
"'°neY 
between seasons of other permanent or temporary principal crops. Further-debts 
tobacco's profits per tarea is among the highest of minifundist crops, and its 
"'°re, 
ha rvest is a secure source of community credit. sole 
During fieldwork in Cutupu and Rio Verde Abajo in La Vega province, the 
21 banana conuqueros and parceleros interviewed justified the presence of a few 
tareas of tobacco in their farms as necessary to solve their lios (debts) in the 
store houses. For them tobacco represented both instant credit and easy cash. 
As long as the tobacco price remains above $20.00/qq. they considered its har-
vest a good investment. As an informant said: 11e i ta i bako e 1 a co i se i cha de noj o-
tro lo infelice. Ella maita lo lio, sobrei too ahora que pagan ei ceiron pei 
encima de lo' veinte peisos ••• " 
Labor Organization in the Plots 
While tobacco peasants economically rely upon their plots for subsitence, 
the key to their production arrangements lies in its low cost of labor. This is 
especially true since .they labor on their own land. Normally the father admin-
isters the economic resources of the family and the work is performed by the 
nuclear family as an economic unit. No cash payment is made to any of the family 
workers. The object of this family enterprise is subsislence and not individual enrich-
mentor profit maximization. The tobacco minifundist does not value all inputs and 
outputs in his plot in relation to market prices. Rather he sees himself as a 
Part of a nuclear family household for which he must provide subsitence at all 
cost. 
On some occasions the labor arrangement varies from the above. The 
nuclear family is used as a labor pool to take care of the harvest while the 
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out to echar dias (day labor) on a nearby larger farm or sharecrop father goes 
8 
plot with the assistance of a few day laborers .. Under these circimstances 
the father will probably supervise labor in the family plot and work extra hours 
on it. If the nuclear family is not large enough or the youngsters are not of 
working age, agricultural laborers on a daily basis are hired. 
TABLE 21 
PEASANT ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE IN 3,515 TOBACCO FARMS IN THE CIBAO, 1971 
FARM AREA TOTAL HIS OWN 
(tareas) FARMS FARM 
% NON-AGRI- % 
CULTURAL 
ACTIVITIES 
OTHER % 
FARMS 
NOT % 
WORKING 
1-32 2,716 1,960 (72.16) 383 (14.10) 328 ( 12. 09) 45 ( 1. 65) 
32-80 799 695 (86.98) 51 ( 6. 38) 47 (5.88) 5 (0.62) 
TOTAL 3,515 2,655 (75.83) 434 (12.34) 375 ( 10. 66) 50 ( 1 • 42) 
from ecretar 1 a o Tecn1co de la Presidencia 
p. 1 Ob. 
TABLE 22 
LABOR FORCE EMPLOYED IN 3,515 TOBACCO FARMS IN THE CIBAO REGION, 1971 
FARM AREA TOTAL ONLY % ABOVE ALL % WAGE % 
(tareas) FARMS KIN KIN LABORERS 
MEMBERS MEMBERS 
1-32 2,716 1,584 (58.32) 816 (30. 04) 316 (11.63) 
32-80 799 366 (45.80) 253 (31. 66) 180 (22.52) 
TOTAL 3,515 1,950 (55.47) 1,069 (30.41) 496 (14.11) 
Source: rom Secretar 1 a o Tecnico de la Presidencia 
p. 11 a. 
Estimates vary but it seems safe to maintain that a family of seven (five 
men, the male children's ages ranging from 8 to 18 years of age, and two women) 
can labor from ten to fifteen tareas of criollo tobacco. Family labor is not 
Compensated by wages regardless of how time consuming it becomes. Agricultural 
laborers are employed either because available family labor is scarce or during 
transplanting and harvest time when labor requirements increase. Day laborers 
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• average payments of $1.50 per day plus breakfast and lunch ($1.00). But 
receive . 
labor wages vary from zone to zone. For instance, in San Jose de las Matas 
'daY 
d J nico actual payment goes down to $1.00 per.day plus the food, while in Villa an a 
lez and El lngenio daily wages are $2.50 plus breakfast and lunch. In some Gonza 
Instances, agricultural labor takes the form of an etagio: a price is estimated 
for a specific job regardless of time requirements. In this fashion the owner 
of the plot compels the employee to do the work in a restricted time period instead 
of stretching it out with the hope of augmenting his daily pay. Usually etagios 
are arranged with one laborer who is then responsible to employ any extra help he 
requires and pay day laborers from the etagio money. 
In addition to the labor of the nuclear family and the payment of day 
laborers, there are two other sources of labor available to tobacco minifundist 
peasants. The first one springs out of the peasant• s 'Inner-adapt ional network' 
and results in a labor pool integrated by immediate kin, in-laws, and compadres. 
The second source of labor is commonly referred to as juntas. 
The inner-adaptational network is a closely knit and well structured 
social network through which the individual peasant secures control over. hi·s 
environment and multiplies his adaptational resources and thus his chances of 
success. While in the case of other operating units to be analyzed later on this 
is not true, in the case of the minifundist peasants their social networks seem 
to be limited virtually exclusively to this inner-adaptational network. The 
members of this intensive and effective group integrate a wider adaptational 
network in the peasant's own environment beyond the labor services they provide. 
The members of the inner-adaptational network are normally distinguised by 
peasants by referring to their kin members --above all brother and father's brother's 
sons-- as mi familia which a restricted generational implication contrasting to 
his own nuclear family. In addition to his own family, his in-laws --above all 
sister's husband~- are referred to as parientes and are considered to be the 
t Persons to the family itself. closes 
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. 
Finally, the dyadic relationship of 
. adres (godfathers) established mainly through baptism may either be symmetri-
cOITIP 
1 or assymetrical depending on the status of both members. The assymetrical ca 
St itution of compadrazgo or fictive ties are characterized as a patron-client con 
relationship. In the case under study, a labor pool integrated by the inner-adap-
tational network of the minifundist peasant, the symmetrical compadre is more 
likely to cooperate in tobacco harvest labors. In some cases, the peasant might also 
consider as a member of this inner-adaptational network an amigo (a friend), in 
contrast to a conocido (a known peroon upon a superficial and sporadic basis). 
Friends are normally those non-kin persons who were born in the peasant's own 
corrrnunity, or whose presence has been taken into consideration through a person 
to person relationship from way back in time. For this reason they are normally 
also considered members of the inner-adaptational network. In fact, most friends 
are frequently selected to be symmetrical godfathers. 
Members of a peasant's inner-adaptational network are expected to freely 
and spontaneously cooperate among themselves under an ideal pattern of generalized 
reciprocity. Within this circle of the peasant's adaptational network a flow of 
favors and services strengthens the unit; these might range from the granting of 
their labor, or their advice, to financial and community support when needed. Most 
of these favor exchanges will not be obtained if it were not through this adapta-
tional mechanism. In fact, this fbw of services integrates not only a defensive 
mechanism but it also grants a sense of security in the peasant himself since he 
knows that when he might require any service from the members of his inner-adapta-
tional network it will be granted to him. This cooper~tion within the network 
ts reinforced both by environmental pressures as well as by regional tradition. 
The inner-adaptational network becomes more significant and demanding with 
geographical proximity. 
The consequence of this mutual dependence for services and favors within 
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inner-adaptational network is an attitude of both confidence and respect grow-
thei r highly personal relations. This confidence is in both the 
they will receive from other members when needed, as well as in the other 
essistance 
n himself; the respect embodied in the social relations existing in the net-perso 
fonnalizes their exchanges and preserves the authority of the members. 
Paradoxically, relations in the inner-adaptational group do not call for a 
union of economic interests; i.e., common ownership of plots, crops, or other forms 
of capital. It is commonly agreed upon that one's first responsibilities are to 
his own family ("la fami 1 ia es la sangre y la sangre pesa mas que el agua"). This 
Individualistic pattern seems to prevail under normal daily conditions. Thus, 
every peasant knows that he is supported and protected by the members of his inner-
adaptational network; but daily responsibilities rely upon him and he is expected 
to handle them with the cooperation of his nuclear family without constant appeal 
to his adaptational network. 
The second source of labor assistance are the "juntas". Peasants attempt 
to use nuclear family labor on their lands whenever possible. But sometimes in 
tasks which require labor beyond the capacity cf both his nuclear family and his 
lnner-adaptational network labor pools,they attempt to obtain labor primarily 
through "juntas": a cooperative labor balanced exchange sysem. Historically the 
system was associated with a scarcity of labor related to a sparse population, but 
today it seems to be a product of the inability of some peasants to lay out cash 
for wage labor. The "juntas" are not paid in cash; a certain amount of labor on 
one man's field is exchanged for a given equivalent amount of labor on another 
junta member's field. The worker's food is provided by the owner of the field. 
This junta practice seems to be rapidly decreasing under the more profit-
able practice of wage labor employment. For instance, during the time of field-
Work only six tobacco juntas were reported altogether in the towns of Gurabo, 
El lngenio and Villa Gonzalez. Nevertheless, with the appearance of peasant's 
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Oc iaciones" {associations) and cooperative, and the Tobacco Institute advance-
''.:,:---
rnent of community labored seed beds, labor juntas arrangements are present but 
onlY in an analogous form. Instead of members laboring in other plots or even 
Jn the seed beds, they usually pay a day labo(re- to do the labor he was expected 
to have contributed. 
Minifundist peasants have to compete with day laborers to employ them-
selves as agricultural workers or to harvest a plot under the sharecropping arrange-
ment. The day laborers are a group of landless workers forced to sustain them~ 
selves and their families through wage laboring on a daily base. They approximate 
Mintz's description of a "rural proletarian" (1953-1954). They make a living by 
selling their labor and live in callejones (rural roads connecting different plots). 
Their houses are normally owned by a nearby landowner; although in some cases it 
might be theirs. Frequently each callejon has seven or eight houses together each 
one occupying less than one tarea of land. In every "cal lejon" a family of three 
or four brothers, their in-laws, and perhaps one or two friends establish residence. 
Survey data from 35 day laborers from Pontezuela, El Rubio, and Rio Piedras Abajo 
Indicates that their two main aspirations are: to own a plot of land and/or to have 
a permanent employment in an urban settlement. 
Technology 
Minifundist peasants make scarce utilization of technological means to 
produce tobacco in their plots. Nineteenth century practices are intermixed with 
fertilizer and pesticide use. Efforts from the agronomists of the Tobacco Institute 
and from private export houses are gradually improving conditions. These are dir-
ected toward seed beds construction and care, the use of pesticides and fertilizers 
and care of leaves with respect to humidity. The crop yield increases and thas 
the increased profits which these practices represent are stimulating the abandon-
ment of both malpractices (like drying the tobacco leaves outside the tobacco 
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and under the sun) and superstitious customs. An example of the 
· the presence of a crucifix at each end of the plot to force insects 
· . r was 
.11tte 
1 Ues from the soi 1. As a peasant from Tambori 1 said: "If with ferti 1 izer ,pd p ag 
1 yield increases, I will make it drink that rum". the p 1ant s 
TABLE 23 
TECHNOLOGICAL PRACTICES IN 3,515 TOBACCO FARMS IN THE Cf BAO, 1971 
TOTAL MECHANIC % ANIMAL % BOTH % NONE 
FARMS FORCE FORCE 
2, 716 456 (16. 78) 1, 177 (43.33) 270 ( 9.94) 813 
799 228 (28.53) 302 (37. 79) 141 ( 17 .46) 128 
3,515 684 ( 19.45) 1,479 (42.07) 411 ( 11. 69) 941 
Source: I ata elaborated from Secretariado Tecnico de la Presidencia 
1972: group IV, p. 12. 
A Mfnifundist Annual Income: An Estimate 
One of the most arduous problems during field work was to estimate the 
·present day income of a minifundist peasant. While it is difficult to obtain 
adequate aggregate statistics on the amounts of different crops produced, the 
output and revenue of one such parcela unit may serve as an illustration. 
Don Pedro G. lives in the municipio of Moca with a nuclear family of 
seven; five of these are twelve years or ol:ler and none is married yet. His 
~rcela comprises 40 tareas and it is valued at RD$14,450.00; of this amount, 
$450.00 represents the value of the house and $14,000.00 the surrounding land. 
% 
(29.93) 
(16.02) 
(26. 77) 
The farm is in debt with the Agriculture Bank and interest payments may run between 
$50.00 and $150.00 per tobacco season. The parcela produced in 23 tareas 49 qq. 
of criollo tobacco which he sold to a compadre middleman for $28.00/qq.; in ten 
tareas he harvested 24 thousand bananas (two thousand monthly) and later sold 
them for $14.00 per thousand; and some other minor crops 1 ike yuca and batatas • 
. If labor costs are not considered, profits on the sale of the tobacco comes to 
$843.oo, on the sale of the bananas approximately $226.00 and from the minor 
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S an estimated $150.00. Don Pedro's parcela cash income is then roughly croP 
$l,o19.00 a year once interest payments are paid. 
During the month of August, don Pedro spent in the nearby store house 
$64.63. This bill includes such items as rice, beans, spaghetti, salt, cheese, 
oil, bread, sugar, and onions; but excluded meat, chicken and eggs, for which 
record was not able to be kept from a nearby country meat shop. If this 
monthly bill is representative of the year around food expenses at the pul-
eria, then $775.56 for a household of eight persons per year can be estimated. 
This leaves roughly $243.44 --$20.28 per month-- to take care of all other 
needs of the nuclear family throughout the year. 
Obviously, if don Pedro's income is representative of other small tobacco 
producers, it shows that the cash resources of minifundist peasants are very 
scarce. Occasional illness, or even expenditures on rum, cock fights and lottery 
tickets will reduce them even more. Harvest income drains itself into the re-
payment of seasonal debts acquired with the pulperia and other commercial units 
of his environment. With their present day control and access to land, tobacco 
peasants can only hope to maintain a subsistence economy. Meanwhile, entrepreneur-
ship is realistically out of their reach and they become contingent upon any unit 
in control of financial resources. On the other hand, there is no surplus from 
which to buy products of handicraft or of domestic industries; ironically, the 
growth of the latter is contingent upon an expanding internal market mainly 
represented by these peasants who are the great majority of the rural population. 
Financial Resources: Cash and Production Credits 
A critical aspect of tobacco peasant operations is their lack of capi-
resources, and thus their limited access to credit. Amid a market system, 
is not enough for peasants to control some tareas of land. They also need 
have access to a second core energy resource: production credit and financial 
Ii 
I 
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capita 1. In other words, the ownership of land, although a cultural value, is 
self-sufficient source of power for m~ifundist peasants. 
not a 
To offer a most evident example of their contingency upon production 
credits and financial resources, two market strategies might be considered. 
criollo market prices normally start for 11barresuelo11 leaves at $10.00 to $14.00/qq 
Jn late January and early February. As the season advances until the end of 
August, market prices rise sometimes as high as $28.00 and $30.00/qq. At the 
very end of the season they decline once more to an average $24.00/qq. Custom 
calls for tobacco sales to take place once it has been bulked by the producer in 
his tobacco shading house ("rancho") and before it is hampered. The transactions 
are expected to be negotiated according to the public market prices at that time. 
In view of this, the peasant's strategy calls for holding the tobacco crop to 
sell at higher prices before the end of the season. 
In many cases, minifundist peasants find themselves in hard need of cash. 
They might be either pressured by a small store owner to pay their seasonal debts, 
or by the sickness of a kin member, or by similar other circumstances. In this 
situation the peasant has to sell his crop earlier in the season at lower prices 
than would be obtained from a sale at a later date. Another practice known as 
"venta a la flor 11 (flower or early sale) may take place. By this the peasant 
'i 
sells two or three quintals of his tobacco while the plant is still in the field. I 
The price is set by the current market price. The middlemen pay him and will 
receive the tobacco ater when it is harvested and cured by the peasant. Thus, 
if the producer sells two quintals of tobacco at $10.00/qq early in February, 
by the time he delivers the tobacco to the middlemen the market price will 
Probably range from $24.00 to $28.00/qq. This early sale represented a minimum 
net loss of $28.00 to the peasant. And the middlemen profited by a 130% interest 
on the money advanced for less than five months. 
As previously said, available field data indicates that production 
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credit is the single greatest need of minifundist peasants in additbn to greater 
tand control. Our data also supports the assumption that the distribution of 
accumulated financial resources is considerably more unequal than the mere 
distribution of land resources and income. Furthermore, fixed and operating 
capital, in additon to land, is practically entirely in the hands of other units 
which exclude the minifundist peasants. The most common sources of cash and 
production credits to peasants in their urban environment are: fi) various 
forms of loans and financial credits; {ii) and the popular community "san" which 
will not be considred here because of its urban character and irregular employ-
ment among peasants to afford harvest and household expenses. 
lnner-Adaptational Network Loans: 
The most informal credit practice among minifundist peasants is the 
interest free financial help coming from a member of his inner-adaptational 
network. In financial pools, older brothers and assymetrical compadres are 
normally expected to cooperate promptly. While relations with a brother or a 
peasant's relatives are more open and egalitarian, exchanges with assymetrical 
compadres are usually of the patron-client nature. It is not unusual to hear, 
when in private, prominent figures in the rural communities complaining that 
they are looked upon as compadres (assymetrical in this case). This is because 
the flow of services and facbrs attached to that fictive kin relationship is 
also assymetrical. 
Undoubtedly, not only does the peasant receive gratification from these 
assymetrical compadre relationships {either in cash, loans, employment and la-
bor recommendations, protection from community law enforcement and the like) 
but the compadre also grants favors. The latter maintains the needed peasant 
as his client for whatever reason he might desire, and normally the peasant 
represents a guarantee to his compadre's social, political, and economic 
community status. For instance, 19 of 25 sharecroppers interviewed in Villa 
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Za lez and Pontezuela who could benefit from the newly passed agricultural Gon 
laW #289, maintained that they will not occupy nor buy the land from their 
landed elite compadres even when legally possible. Their common argument 
being 11 how could I do that to my godfather who has taken care of me for so 
many years now ... ?11 ; "after all". one of them reasoned, "hasn't Mr. D. given 
me the food for my children all these years?" Two of the remaining six doubted 
on how to proceed while only four sharecroppers were planning to buy the land 
as provided by the law. It is only fair to observe that the sacredness of the 
assymetrical compadre ties does not seem to hold for the children of the inter-
viewed share~roppers --probably because of the emergence of new adaptational 
alternatives-- especially when it is at the expense of adaptational advantages. 
Non-Commercial Credit: Store House 11Trueques 11 and Food Credits: 
A form equivalent to cash acquisition among tobacco minifundists is 
the 11 trueque11 {exchange) of the kind with a store house owner. Through this 
strategy, the peasant exchanges some tobacco strings {sartas) for food, rum, 
or any other res ired good. The sarta 1 s price is usually lower than market 
price. This provides a profit to the 11pulpero11 who frequently resells the 
tobacco when market price increases thereby obtaining a further profit margin. 
In still other cases, the peasant is paid according to the market price but 
the sartas are weighed in the pulperia 1 s balance --which uses an American 
scale by which one pound = 16 ounces-- while the peasant weighs his tobacco 
as any other unit operating in the tobacco business in a French scale --in 
which one pound = 18 ounces. Thus, the 1sarta 1 show an artificial weight 
decrease when sold to the pulpero which works to the merchant's advantage since 
middlemen will buy the tobacco from him using a French scale. The 11trueque11 
Practice has encouraged peasants to take 1 sartas 1 from nearby tobacco curing 
houses at night hours. This has forced middle and big tobacco producers to 
employ night watchmen in their tobacco 'ranchos {shading houses). 
FARM AREA 
(tareas) 
1-32 
32-80 
TOTAL 
TABLE 24 
ALTERNATIVE RESOURCES EMPLOYED BY 230 CIBAO TOBACCO MINIFUNDISTS DURING THE 1971-1972 SEASON 
TOTAL # OF INNER ADAPTA- % STORE HOUSE % USURERS % PRODUCERS % BANK % MIDDLE- % 
GROWERS TIONAL NETWORK NON-COMMER- JRGANIZA- PROD UC- MEN 
LOANS CIAL CREDIT TIONS TION 
CRDITS 
---·---- -
-
115 91 (79.13) 104 (90.43) 18 (15.65 27 (15.65) 10 ( 8.69) 103 (89.56) 
115 88 (76.52) 106 (92.17) 15 (13.04 49 ( 13. 04) 39 (33.91 98 (85.21) 
- ----------
230 179 (77. 82) 210 (91.30) 33 ( 14. 34 76 (14.34) 49 (21.30 201 (87.39) 
-------------·--------·--------·---- ------ -·----·--·------·----- - ------- ---- ----
(Note: These minifundist producers were verbally asked to identify the financial alternatives actually 
employed by them during the tobacco season regardless of the amount received and the number of times 
they resorted to the same source. Every alternative was separately recorded. The figures in the table 
represent the number of peasants which resorted to the various sources of finance. Although some middle-
men are also members of the peasants inner-adaptational network, they were distinguished according to the 
role for which the money was granted. The figures in parenthesis refer to percents of peasants in each 
category). 
Peasant's geographical origin is: Guazumal (22), Jacagua (25), Gurabo (33), Pontezuela (44), Cutupu (16), 
San Jose de las Matas (35), Licey al Medio (12), Tamboril (12), and Moca (26). 
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peasants normally find a source of credit for household food consumption 
In the store houses near their plots. Peasant-store owner relations are complex 
each must pursue an interest hostile to the other. The store owner must 
since 
often extend credit to a peasant merely to tide him over until harvest time. 
If he stops credit, the peasant will simply switch his patronage to another 
J?!:!lperia and the entire amount he owed might be irrevocably lost. On the other 
hand, the peasant debtor knows that if he does not pay a little on account from 
time to time, he can lo longerb.Jy there, and his bad reputation will spread to 
nearby stores. In this fashion, minifundist peasants and store owners maintain 
a season long relationship intermixed with credits and small reimbursements. 
For instance, available information for a pulperia in La Vereda, Rio Verde 
(La Vega), indicates that it had at the moment of fieldwork the sum of RD$1P51.38 
in the customer's debit side, meanwhile, its total fixed and operating capital 
was RD$3,411.65. 
Frequently peasant seasonal debts are repaid to the store owner with 
tobacco instead of cash money. At the moment of harvest pulperos receive tobacco 
from the peasant debtors to repay their individual debts (lios). For this rea-
son, and because of previously mentioned "trueque" practices, store owners 
normally work as 11comines" (second middlemen) to tobacco middlemen. They either 
receive half the middlemen's commission ($1.00/qq.) or instead of a division 
of the purchasing commission they realize the profit margin growing out of the 
price differences between the one paid to the peasant and the one obtained 
from the middlemen when transferring the tobacco to him. 
The study of commercial practices of 20 store houses randomly selected 
from rural communities in Gurabo, San Jose de las Matas, Jacagua, Tamboril, 
Moca, and Cutupu, showed that 18 of them practiced the 11 trueque11 exchange, 
and all of them accepted tobacco for the repayment of seasonal debts. Evidence 
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is also available that at lea~ 14 of these store houses served as comines (second 
middlemen) to middlemen. 
Prestamistas (usurers): 
One of the mo~ unfavorable options available to minifundist peasants 
in order to obtain cash is the appeal to a usurer or prestamista. Their money 
is normally loaned with a 15 to 20% monthly interest rate; as an informant jokingly 
said, al modico 20. In some cases, local usurers depend upon city loan houses 
thus operating as middlemen themselves, but in other instances, they just borrow 
money from them at a 3% monthly rate. Most frequently usurers start lending 
some cash which comes from the selling of inherited land, or from the operations 
of some commercial enterprise. With the passing of the years they consolidate 
and expand their clientele and capital. 
The operations of two of these usurers studied in the town of Villa 
Gonzalez, and of another one from San Jose de las Matas, showed each prestamista 
--two of them being women-- having lower middlemen usurers working for them thus 
establishing a more complex network between them and the peasants and share-
croppers clientele in the community. Another case from Gurabo, indicated a 
middle food store owner lending money on a weekly basis. 
There is sufficient evidence to maintain that in the last decade, at 
least some middle and big landowners have also started lending money to mini-
fundist peasants, although with lower monthly interest than those of the tra-
ditional usurers (5 to 10%?). Since they are in possession of better financial 
resources than m1nifundist producers, they augment the range of their rural 
environmental control through this strategy. In one of the reported cases, a 
landowner of 210 tareas in the proximities of Moca is said to have sold 120 
tareas of his farm in order to procure sufficient liquid capital to get him 
into the lending business as a more secure source of profits than agriculture. 
Regardless of whether these cases are representative or not, the fact seems 
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to be that in the absence of financial credits minifundist peasants are vulner-
able not only to the high rates of interest of traditional usurers but also 
to the financial control of middle and big land owners. 
peasant Organizations: 
During the last years peasants have organized either by themselves or 
with outside help a number of tobacco growers associations (asociaciones), and 
they have created a number of savings and loans cooperatives. The main purpose 
of these organizations is to enable and improve peasant's production, financial and 
~rketing potentialities through structural arrangements of cooperation and plann-
Ing. some of the tobacco associations, in contrast to the cooperatives, are more 
Informal in nature and locally oriented. In fact, they show characteristics of 
spontaneous origin and organization. Their composition, as is probably also 
true of local cooperatives, is integrated by members of the peasant's inner-
adaptational network. 
From a total of 11 peasant local organizations visited and studied, the 
composition of two of these tobacco associations in La Vega province was anal-
yzed in more detail. The first had 17 members, the other 24. Both had started 
operations by local initiative in 1969 and 1970. Presently, in 1972, they were 
receiving some limited advice from the community services of the privately owned 
Santa Maria Radio in the Santo C~rro, and from agronomists from the Tobacco 
Institute, in matters ranging from credit record keeping to construction of 
tobacco seed beds. Their minimum objectives were to cooperate in labors of 
tobacco crop; provide some limited credit assistance to members by enforcing 
some saving practices; and to market their own tobacco (and other crops) without 
the interference of middlemen. At the moment of the fieldwork the first goal was 
being accomplished. The other two, lacking the necessary capital assets and 
thus financial resources, were not being realized. 
Member composition of the two associations seemed representative of other 
local organizations because of the formal integration they accomplished 
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with the peasant's inner-adaptational network. For instance~ the composition 
of the firs association studied was, taking the informant as ego: four brothers 
of ego, his father, two brothers-in-law, and three symmetrical and one assymet-
rical compadres of ego. The remaining five members were neighbors of ego and 
all but one were related through compadre and relative ties with some of 
ego's brothers. 
These small peasant's organizations, although still small both in scale 
and in number, seem to have a fair chance of breaking present day financial 
control of prestamistas, middlemen, and other units over them. If these mini-
fundist peasants accomplish the mastering of formal group association tech-
niques; if they are able to over-run the influence of local economic and political 
bosses; finally, if non-peasant concerns, like those of political nature from the 
national government and of the army, do not block the operations of these groups; 
then, these socio-economic organizations will widen individual peasants• social 
range of operations and their available credit resources, thus improving the 
financial standing of peasant members. 
Furthermore, if they accomplish the local marketing (from the peasant 
group to the tobacco criollo warehouse) of the member's harvested tobacco, they 
will probably obtain better prices by increasing thar bargaining power through 
the volume of the harvest. The control of the marketing operations by these 
organizations, instead of present day middlemen, will further increase their 
profits with the possible transfer of the latter's purchasing commission to the 
producer organizations. 
Were this to happen, export houses could then institute a new purchasing 
Policy. Instead of depending upon middlemen to guarantee them the necessary 
supply of criollo tobacco, exporters could transact directly with the producer 
organizations. This could be done through a contract stipulating first that 
Previously advanced money delivered to producers by means of middlemen, will 
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noW be granted to the producer organizations. In return, they might agree to 
sell their tobacco to the patronizing export house fixing prices according to 
market conditions after the harvest is ended. This procedure would not only 
rationalize purchasing operations, but it probably would eliminate middlemen 
marketing practices at least in some tobacco zones; contribute to the organiza-
tion or producing sector, and also guarantee exporters their share of harvested 
tobacco in advance. 
In any case, the Tobacco Institute has called upon the Agriculture Bank 
(Bagricola) to grant tobacco production credits to small grower's associations 
starting with the 1972-1973 season. This will break an old policy by means of 
which production credits were not extended to non-legally recognized peasant 
organizations. This financial support, if effective, will increase association 
members capacity in obtaining credit from their own organization and thus 
accomplishing one of their most urgent functional needs. On the other hand, 
this practice will augment the range of credit services from official organiza-
tions to minifundist peasants which today seem almost non-existent. 
Bank Production Credits: 
The most formal source of production credit available to tobacco minifundist 
producers is that of the Agricultural Bank and of the Agriculture Department; both 
credits are channeled through the official Tobacco Institute with an annual inter-
est rate of 8% normally, it becomes 10% once administrative expenses are included. 
These credits cover all production costs as presented in tables 15 and 20; under 
special contracts the construction of tobacco curing houses. Besides they pro-
vide for technical assistance guaranteed by the agronomists of the Tobacco Insti-
tute. 
The credit program of the Agriculture Department known as supervised 
credit, favors those peasants who in previous seasons have failed to comply with 
credit reimbursement requirements of the Agriculture Bank. When this happens 
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d the peasant applies for a new credit his case is sent to the Agriculture an 
Department where his petition is studied by officials of both the Department 
d the Tobacco Institute. an 
Another source of official credit available to the peasant is that of 
the community Development Office (O.D.C.). Their credits are channeled in 
coordination with the Tobacco Institute, but the range of these credits is 
normally wider since it embraces community programs as well. According to some 
informants, this source of credit is the one most politically oriented among 
the three official organizations providing production credit to peasants. 
The process of obtaining a loan from the Agriculture Bank is complex 
and time consuming. The Bank requires a number of documents, the most signifi-
cant of all being the land ownership certificate, and a contract of technical 
assistance between the peasant and the Tobacco Institute. The former require-
ment automatically excludes all sharecroppers and many small peasants without 
proper land documents, from credit eligibility. But because the land is the 
creditor's best guarantee, this requirement is not overlooked; even when there 
is no sign on the part of the Bank or any other official organization of being 
interested in expropriating small plots. Other requirements embrace the signa-
ture of the local mayor (alcalde pedaneo} if the land occupied by the peasant 
is owned by the State. A two years' lease is required if the land is rented; 
but if the loan is for the construction of a tobacco curing house then the 
lease must be for a minimum of four years. Peasants older than 60 years of age 
have to accompany their signature with that of a close kin member who will 
guarantee the credit in case of illness or death of the elder man. In additbn 
to these documents and requirements, the Bank demands that the peasant be free 
of debts, and that he has never evaded or failed to reimburse previous credits. 
Once the peasant has complied with these necessary requirements he becomes 
involved in a highly bureaucratic procedure which starts by visiting the Tobacco 
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t itute and the Agriculture Bank, or any of their local branches. From the ins 
. ning of the credit application form to the first disbursement, an average 
s•9 
of 35 to 45 days elapse. In contrast to the procedure to obtain an Agricultural 
sank credit, the Agricultural Department supervised credit requires only from 
20 to 25 days for its approbation. The Secretary requires that the peasant be 
the owner of the land and be able to reimburse the credit. In order to determine 
his solvency an official of the credit department of the Secretary will visit 
his plot and estimate his land and other equipment values. 
All official credits are based on the Tobacco Institute production cost 
estimates per tarea. But for each specific peasant these estimates are re-elabor-
ated between the peasant and the Agricultural Bank credit experts. The Bank's 
experts normally try to reduce the approved credit release below the amount 
corresponding to the Tobacco lnstitute's estimates. According to various lnsti-
tute officials their estimates try to provide a margin between the harvest 
expenses per tarea of tobacco and the approved credit disbursement for any 
occasional need the peasant might have during the season. The ratbnale behind 
this is that if this money is not guaranteed to the peasant for household expenses 
he will have to go to a middleman or to a usurer to secure his money. In either 
case, the reimbursement of the production credit to the financial source will be 
endangered and the economic independence of the peasant handicapped. 
In order to control credit expenditures, money disbursements are made 
according to specific labors as the season advances. Each disbursement has to 
be signed both by the peasant and the regional agronomist of the Tobacco lnsti-
tute. The latter checks into the money employment and the specific financial 
needs of the peasant's crop at each time of the harvest; if necessary, he can 
lONer the actual disbursements below the amount approved by the Agricultural 
Bank credit expert. The requirement of his signature and his authority to 
determine the final figure of each credit disbursement has occasioned some abuses 
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Pressures on the part of the agronomists according to some peasant informants . . ~
The most difficult task in relation to bank production credits is the 
procurement of its reimbursement. Formerly this task was taken care of by the 
Agriculture Bank itself; but presently it has been transferred to the Tobacco 
institute which in this way monopolizes credit operations furthermore. Most 
of the small peasants are economically insolvent and they prefer to pay deb~s 
to a nearby store owner or to a middleman for instance, before taking care of 
their more formal debts from outside their own communities. For this reason, 
according to some officials of the Tobacco Institute, even when the approved 
credit for the 1971-1972 tobacco season was RD$2,571,482.07, only RD$1,551,988.02 
was actually spent. According to the informants, this was the only way they could 
control its employment and final reimbrsement. Presently, the Institute is claim-
ing an almost 100% credit reimbursement; in previous years it seems that the 
Agricultural Bank by itself could never get repayments for more than 60 to 70% 
of the money. 
The 1971-1972 official production credit financed, according to un-
published information from the Tobacco Institute, only 9.4% of the estimated 
25,000 tobacco growers of all varieties. In tobacco surface this amounted to 
28.5% of the 336,000 tareas under harvest. There are no estimates available to 
know how much of this finance went to minifundist, to middle or to big landowners. 
However, the fact that the 9.4% of the financed landowners had 28.5% of the 
tobacco land suggests that a high proportion of these tobacco growers are not 
minifundist but middle and big landowners. 
The Tobacco Institute credit proposals (cf. lntabaco 1972 b:7, and 48-
49) for the 1972-1973 tobacco season calls for a total disbursement of 
RD$3,4SO,OOO. Of this amount the Agricultural Bank is expected to contribute 
RD$3,000,000; the Agriculture Department with its progam of supervised credit 
With RD$250,000; and the Community Development Office would add RD$200,000. 
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iollo tobacco harvest would receive RD$1,600,000 of the approp"riated money; 
The er 
tobacco RD$450,000; and olor tobacco RD$900,000. Meanwhile for tobacco 
cuban 
house and mechanical equipment RD$500,000 would be employed. 
curing 
Interestingly enough, the approximate actual disbursement for this 
season has been once again lower than predicted by the official Tobacco tobacco 
institute. Until January 31, 1973 when official financing operations normally 
end 340,549 tareas of tobacco have been financed with RD$4,326,382. To this 
amount the Agricultural Bank actually contributed only RD$1,945,852.35; the 
Agriculture Department only RD$156,062; and the Community Development Office 
RD$198,076. The remaining credit came from the private Dominican Development 
Foundation --RD$40,468.48-- and not surprisingly from private export houses: 
RD$2,184,000 (cf. El Sol newspaper, Thursday, February 15, 1973; second section, 
p.1). Official credit output increased in respect to the previous tobacco 
season RD$748,632.33, although being RD$1, 149,379.65 short from the proposed 
goal. 
Peasants are still unaccustomed to and unsure of the benefits resulting 
from the employment of bank credits. A number of complaints and prejudices are 
frequently formulated againstthe official credit program. Some of these are: 
(i) the complex and impersonal bureaucratic procedures to be followed to 
guarantee the credit. ("it) The normal delays of money disbursements. (iii) 
Credit restrictions in money employment, especially for non-harvest uses. And 
(iv) fearfulness of not being able to pay the credit interest. As a matter of 
fact, minifundist peasants seemed most reluctant to use bank credit facilities 
primarily because of fear of losing their plots which is the only asset guarantee 
they have to cover the credit. 
Although a minority of minifundi~ peasants who are taking advantage of 
the official production credits seem to be pleased with this alternative, 44 of 
49 11conuqueros" and 11parceleros 11 of criol lo tobacco from Burende, Gurabo, Pontezuela 
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ua and Licey al Medio, when asked whther they will apply for their bank JaCU9 
Uperivised credit during the 1972-1973 season, answered affirmatively. or s 
Their main reason being that with the production credit they are able to evade 
the middlemen pressures thus selling their crop under the most favorable market 
conditions; besides, it helped to organize their economies. When asked whether or 
not they took some money from another source, 41 acknowledged they had done so, 
and 34 frankly admitted receiving the money from a middleman. Their explanation 
being that they needed the cash for household needs, including medicines and 
food and other pressing debts. 
Export Houses r M"oney .•. Middlemen Advancements: 
Undoubtedly, the most common and customary cash loans available to the 
criollo tobacco minifundist during the tobacco season is that coming from the 
private export houses through their warehouse middlemen. The operations and 
importance of the middlemen will be considered when analyzing the second level 
of articulation of the tobacco industry. At this point it suffices to mention 
that middlemen's 11dinero regado 11 (distributed money) has a number of advantages 
over any production credit in the eyes of the peasant. 
Some of the advantages are: first, that this money is provided for 
whatever purposes the peasant might consider convenient; it is not a production 
credit in a strct sense, but a money loan. Second, the money does not have to 
be reimbursed in cash nor does the peasant have to pay any interest for its 
use. Third, the money is home delivered and granted on a personal basis. 
Fourth, the middleman grants the money at the moment of request without weeks 
of delay and bureaucratic interference. Fifth, the only condition attached to 
the money is that the peasant will have to repay the advanced cash by offering 
the middleman preference over competing buyers to purchase his crop at public 
market prices when the transaction might take place. 
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Relations between peasants and middlemen are very complex in nature 
and structure since each one knows he is pursuing an interest which might become 
hostile to the other. First of all, they normally know each other on a personal 
ba;is. Minifundist peasants, if presented the alternative, will not sell tobacco 
to a strange middleman {personas or cualguiera); but to a member of, or at most 
to one related to, his inner-adaptational network. On the other hand, the middle-
man prefers to advance money and depends on for his clientele, peasants he knows 
as a result of a person to person relationship. But, secondly, they both are 
well aware that the other might try to take advantage of him thus converting 
a balance of reciprocity exchange into an unbalanced one. Significantly enough, 
during the adual tobacco transaction the inner-adaptational network ties, if 
existing between the buyer and the seller, do not prevent tension and the pursuit 
of individual interest at the expense of the other. Thus, this situation is 
analogous to the division of inherited land among kinsmen. 
For instance, the peasant knows that the middleman might try to be un-
fair in matters of price and/or weight. In the former strategem the middleman 
is able to take advantage of the peasant's ignorance .of the warehouse fixed 
purchasing price and its fluctuations. In the latter, by weighing the tobacco 
at the time of the sale in a fixed balance. 
On the other hand, the middleman has to keep vigilance on the moisture 
of the hampered tobacco, and the content of the hampers themselves; in some 
cases stones and dust will be included in them to augment the tobacco weight. 
In other cases, the minifundist peasant, especially if he is only a conocido 
(a social category standing between a friend and a stranger) or a "persona" 
(a stranger) to the middleman--might try to evade reimbursement of the advanced 
money (cruzarse) by not sel 1 ing his crop to hi>m. If this were to happen, the 
middleman will probably lose the advanced money and for sure the expected 
Purchase commission. Besides, he will have to reimburse the advanced money 
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export house warehouse from his own profits. tO the 
Regardless of actual tension and even conflicts growing out of these 
ctices, middleman and peasant are contingent upon each other under present pra 
day marketing arrangements. The small producer needs the advanced money and 
has to sell his tobacco to the warehouse. On the other hand, the middleman 
depends upon the peasant to obtain a clientele which will justify his commercial 
enterprise in front of the warehouse. Also, since his profits are formally 
conditioned by a purchase commission, he has to increase his clientele in order 
to augment the final volume of purchased tobacco. 
Up to the present time, minifundist peasants have not organized them-
selves significantly as to minimize the middleman's role. On the other hand, 
because of the high number of independent small tobacco producers, warehouses 
cannot deal with them directly and thus discourage peasants' presence on their 
premises. This they do by neither offering to advance the peasants money 
directly nor granting the middleman's purchasing commission to them if they 
sell their tobacco to the warehouse directly. Besides this policy, peasants 
themselves rarely like appearing in front of an export firm warehouse. Among 
other reasons, they do not want to risk the rejection of their tobacco at the 
inspection gate of the warehouse, nor can they affort the transportation costs 
from the plot to the warehouse, or to lose income returns because of therormal 
tobacco weight shrinkage (merma) resulting from the time elapse between the 
moment the tobacco is purchased by the middleman and when it is weighed and 
received by the warehouse. These risks the peasant will leave for the middle-
man to take, thus conforming himself with the sale of his crop in his own 
tobacco shading house. 
Other Independent Production Units 
Besides conuqueros and parceleros peasants there are three other 
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d endent operating units in the production level of the tobacco lndustry. Jn ep 
TheY are: middle owner peasants, latifundists, and a newly arising agricultural 
tobacco entrepreneur. In an over all generalization, the most significant 
diffence between their adaptational network and that of minifundist peasants 
are: (i) the size and the agricultural exploitation of their farms; (ii) the' 
tabor social organization in their farms; (iii) and their sources of production 
credit and f iAancial assistance. 
Landholdings: 
According to table 23, the number of enumerated tobacco farms with more 
than 80 tareas is only 653 (15.66%) of 4, 168 farms, but they control 80% of the 
tobacco surface. The average size of a latifundist farm is 2,336 tareas in 
sharp contrast to a conuco averaging 14 tareas and a parcela with 49 tareas. 
However, the agricultural exploitation of their estates is not as intensive 
as that of mhifundist plots. While the middle and entrepreneur group comprises 
131,416 tareas of land, only 37, 162 (28.27%) are presently harvested: 15,850 
tareas with tobacco (67.44% by itself, and 32.55% intermixed with other crops), 
while 21,312 tareas are harvested with secondary crops. On the other hand, 
the landed elite has 177,520 tareas of land with only 32,834 (18.49%) tareas 
under harvest: 5,625 tareas with tobacco (96.03% by itself and 3.96% inter-
mixed with secondary crops), and 27,209 tareas of tobacco (cf. Secretariado 
Tecnico de la Presidencia 1972: group IV). 
Not surprisingly, the conucos with only 10% of the land in the census, 
produce 34% of the tobacco harvest, while parcelas with another 10% of the 
area add 25% to the national tobacco production. In all, minifundist tobacco 
production accounts for 59% of the national harvest, compared with 11% from 
J!tifundios, and 30% from middle owner peasants and tobacco entrepreneurs. 
This intensity of land use is, in fact, so much greater on the small plots 
that it outweighs all thar disadvantages in terms of poorer soils and lack of 
hnical and financial resources. tee 
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The low level of agricultural exploitation and of productivity, specifi-
callY in the landed elite's estates, is usually explained in the association 
with three variables. Although some of these are highly questionable, they are: 
(i) technological means of production (cf. table 25') which do not significantly 
vary from the one employed by minifundist producers (cf. table2})). (ii) Harvester 
income contingency upon land yieldings which is not so high among large land-
holders as in the case of n:iinifundist peasants (cf. tables '21and26:). (iii) 
The presence of pasture land in big estates with its characteristic eco-system 
of extensive land use: the minimum yearly average ratio between criollo, cattle and 
pasture land is 10-20 tareas for every cow. Frequently the cattle are rotated 
from one potrero (pasture land portions) to another as the pangola (cattle grass) 
grows. A rough estimate indicates 150-250 cattle heads in the big estates. 
TABLE 25 
TECHNOLOGICAL PRACTICES IN 653 TOBACCO FARMS IN THE CIBAO, 1971 
l==========F=====::;===-=-=--=-======;==============;===============;=============i 
FARM AREA OTAL 
(tareas) ARMS 
80-800 577 
800 and mor 76 
MECHANIC % 
FORCE 
122 (21. 14) 
18 (23. 68) 
ANIMAL % 
FORCE 
198 (34. 31) 
23 (30.26) 
BOTH % 
126 (21.83) 
23 (30.26) 
NONE 
131 
12 
....._TO_TA_L_--c---'--"65-=-3 140 (21.43) 221 (33.84 149 22.81 14 
Source: cfata efaI>oraTecT--from Secretariado Tecniao de la Presidencia 
1972: group IV, p. 12a. 
TABLE 26 
ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE OF 653 TOBACCO FARMERS IN THE CABAO REGION, 1971 
% 
(22. 70) 
(15.78) 
21. 8 
FARM AREA 
(tareas) TOTAL FARMS 
HIS OWN 
FARM 
% NON-AGRICUL-
TURAL ACT IV ITV 
% OTHER 
FARMS 
% NOT ~ ! 
WORK I NG ,
1
11
1 
1,I 
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Whatever the explanatory value of these variables, low agricultural 
! dings and low levels of land exploitation also seem to be connected with yf e 
big land owners attitudes towards agricultural operations. For them agricul-
ture is often a sideline; as a matter of fact, to a large number of big estate 
·owners there seem to be few economic incentives to imporve traditional land 
uses and farm management methods. Traditional economic incentives--i.e., prices 
and credit--just do not work. Their impact also seems to be minimal since other 
factors governing farm management and production strategies are much more imper-
tant. The best guarantee for maintaining economic returns, which may be entirely 
adequate for the owners, is the mere control of large extensions of farm land. 
Total returns can remain quite substantial, even if the yields per tarea are 
low and declining, if large areas are under cultivation. Any management 
improvement which they introduce or any change in their scale of operations must 
not sap the basis of the traditional economic, social and even political relation-
ship prevailing between them and their sharecroppers and day laborers. New 
farming techniques are probably likely to be adopted only if they do not disturb 
in any fundamental manner the rural environment's social stratification and 
traditional labor relations. 
Among the factors which affect the growth of the agricultural sector in' 
general is capital investment. Although crucial, it seems to be one of the least 
known and explored. No adequate statistics are available on private investments 
on a regional or national scale. But according to our data, based on private 
interviews with 10 big landowners from Villa Gonzalez, La Canela and Jacagua, a 
good working hypothesis is that tobacco latifundios are starved of liquid 
capita 1 funds. 
Probably one of the reasons for agricultural stagnation is the lack of 
Private investments. Obviously, minifundist holders and most of the middle 
Peasant owners involved in a family enterprise earn incomes which preclude 
'I 
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·ngs and thus investments since their capital resources are low or non-existent. 
5av• 
Although the total fixed and working capital on the large estates is considerably 
larger, it does not seem necessarily adequate. This is primarily because of lati-
fundists' tendency to spend their profits on consumption goods or in other ways 
t related to tobacco or other crop's harvests. The few cases examined indicate no 
that the big landowners keep little of their income for investment in their prop-
erties, thus supporting this hypothesis. 
Few exceptions to this generalization may be found in the Villa Gonzalez 
municipality. Here the landed elite numbering from 8 to 12 maintain a business 
{negocio) like attitude towards their tobacco harvest. Efficient management, 
plus technological advancements, and even capital investment and financial under-
takings, contribute to higher yields and bulk tobacco operations. In addition, 
several of them control a number of criollo tobacco local packers thus augmenting 
their range of operations from the production to the packing sphere. Nevertheless, 
their control of great extensions of land plus the following factors have created 
a conflict situation in the zone. The factors are: the utilization of traditional 
labor arrangements and social forms of relationship (for instance, sharecropping 
and the compadrazgo networks) for their business enterprises; and their landholdings 
forcing the development of a rural proletariat contingent upon wage labor either 
in their fields or in their local packers. 
Labor Organization 
Sharecropping Arrangement: 
With the increase in landholding extensions, the most culturally signifi-
cant difference between minifundist plots and their counterparts is the frequent 
alteration in farm social organization. Minifundist peasants and most of the 
smaller middle owners--those whose farms range from 80 to 150 tareas--conduct a 
family enterprise. This, however, is not the case between tobacco latifundist 
,) 
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Ot her production units. and They can not work their own land on a tamily base, 
do they maintain a subsistence economy. On the other hand, this is the nor 
case with the sharecroppers in their fields. 
TABLE 27 
LABOR FORCE EMPLOYED IN 653 TOBACCO FARMS IN THE CIBAO REGION, 1971 
FARM AREA TOTAL # ONLY KIN % ABOVE ALL % WAGE 
(tareas) FARMS MEMBERS KIN MEMBERS LABOR 
so-Boo 577 156 (27.03) 161 (27. 90) 260 
800 and more 76 5 (6.57) 9 ( 11. 84) 62 
TOTAL 653 161 (24. 65) 170 (26.03) 322 
% 
(45.06) 
(81. 57) 
( 49. 31) 
Source: data e lao-orated froiii-s·ec:-r:e-tarTado-Tecnlco de la Presidencia 
1972: group IV, p.1 la. 
The most common labor organization among middle and big tobacco growers 
is the special form of land renting known as aparceria (sharecropping). Although 
this arrangement is practiced by all production units it is most frequently 
employed by middle and large land owners. Ironically sharecroppers, normally 
landless and minifundist peasants, are not able to afford the normal lease 
contracts of $10.00 to $20.00 annual average lease per tarea. Thus, ironically, 
they pay 50% of their crop sale to the landowner for the use of the land. 
Sharecroppers, known as colonos, or medianeros, or aparceros, normally 
find two main problems in obtaining the land under a normal lease contract. First 
of all, landowners prefer the aparceria system in contrast to the leasing of their 
land. This is primarily because it increases their profits even when it is more 
time consuming. Secondly, that the lease contracts have to be paid in full at 
the time of their signing; but the lack of financial resources of a normal 
sharecropper precludes his control of the total lease money at the beginning of 
the season. The contract, if accepted, is usually signed in the Agricultural 
Department and offers freedom to the lessee for harvesting whatever crop he 
considers best. 
,, 
11 
TABLE 28 
SHARECROPPING PRACTICE IN 294 TOBACCO FARMS IN THE CIBAO REGION DURING THE 1971-1972 SEASON 
FARM AREA TOTAL # SHARECROPPING IN OWNER'S LAND OWNER WORKING A PLOT AS SHARECROPPER 
(ta reas) FARMS YES % NO % YES % NO 
1-32 115 17 (14.78) 98 (85.21) 69 (60.00) 46 
32-80 115 36 (31.30) 79 (68. 69) 74 (64.34) 41 
80-800 55 48 (87. 27) 7 (12.72) 6 (10.90) 49 
800 and more 9 9 ( 100. 00) -- -- -- -- 9 
TOTAL 294 - 110 (37.41) 184 (62.58 149 (50.68 145 
(Note: 294 producers were verbally asked whether or not they had given some of their land 
under the sharecropping arrangement, and whether or not they themselves were working in 
another plot under this arrangement. The percent figures correspond to the number of 
producers in each category. The geographical origin of the minifundist producers is 
given at the bottom of table 24. That of the remaining middle producers in this table 
is: Villa Gonzalez (9), La Canela (7), El lngenio (6); Pontezuela (9), Licey al Medico 
(10), Jacagua (9), Meca (5). Finally, the ten big landholders come from Villa Gonzalez 
(4), El lngenio (2), Moca (1). 
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% 
(40.00) 
(35.65) 
(89.09) 
(100.00) 
(49.31) 
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To offer an example of the economic disadvantages of the sharecropping 
arrangements in comparison with land leasing, let us consider the case of a 35 
aparcero from Tamboril. Don Genaro harvested 27 tareas of criollo tobacco 
careas 
with a yield of 58 qq. Seven tareas of secondary crops --yuca and beans-- were 
Intermixed with the tobacco along with eight tareas of bananas having an annual 
yield of approximately 19,200 bananas. He sold the tobacco at $30.00/qq., and 
J4 thousand bananas at $18.00/the thousand (the remaining platanos were consumed 
In his household with the explicit authorization of the landowner). The secondary 
crops intermixed with the tobacco were given to him to supplement his household 
diet. Thus, his produce amounted to $1,740.00 and $2,500.00 respectively. Of 
the total $4,260.00, 50% was given to the landowner in compliance with share-
cropping stipulations. The remaining money --$2, 130.00 went to Don Genaro for 
payment of production costs and household annual expenses. If the land had been 
rented at $15.00 per tarea, then the lease would have been $525.00; a net differ-
ence of $1,995.00 with actual sharecrop payment. 
Aparceros of minifundist and smaller-middle tobacco landowners usually 
receive a plot of land varying in size from five to 30 tareas. Probably small 
landowners turn some of their already scarce tareas to the colono either because: 
(i) he is trying to help the aparcero by providing him with some land to work; 
(ii) the owner cannot afford the cost of harvest production bylimself; or (iii) 
he has a non-agricultural source of income in a nearby town or in a city; and 
(iv) still another possibility is that the landowner's old age impedes him from 
directly working the land. The first alternative is frequently verbalized among 
symmetrical compadres and kin members. Economic reasons working to the owner's 
advantage might also interfere in their decision of conceding sharecrop land 
besides social and traditional practices of generalized reciprocity. But 
evidence of this was not found during field work. 
,I 
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Sharecroppers from minifundist and smaller-middle owners ar~ normally 
members of the owner 1 s adaptational network. They receive the land either under 
a medias or an a tercias arrangement. In the former option, which is the most 
an-~...;:.:.;;.~-
widely practiced, the arrangement calls for a 50-50 division of the income 
returning from the sale of tobacco, but not of production costs. Out of his 
share, the aparcero pays all production costs except the construction and repair 
of the tobacco shading house. The second alternative, the a tercias arrangement 
is almost disappearing. It calls for two thirds of the income returning from 
the sale of tobacco to be given to the sharecropper who then will be responsi-
ble for all production costs. Of the 35 sharecroppers --30 a medias and 5 a 
tercias-- asked which alternative they preferred, all agreed that the a medias 
system is most beneficial for the worker. The extra one third share from the 
tobacco sale allocated in the a tercias arrangement does not cover the extra 
costs under the sharecropper's responsibility, thus further shrinking their 
already scarce profits. 
The sharecrop arrangement does not grant the aparcero the freedom to 
cultivate the crops he might desire. They are either told to plant all the 
land in tobacco, or are allowed to use some tareas for market or for household 
secondary crops. In the second alternative, they will be told whether the 
sharecropping arrangement applies to the income returning from all the crops 
or only to that of the tobacco production. Sharecroppers who also happen to 
be minifundist owners would 1 ike to harvest most of the tobacco in their own 
plots and the secondary crops in the sharecrcpped land. The rationale behind 
this is that tobacco is the best income resource they have and thus will not 
have to divide it if harvested in their own lands. This opportunity is not 
granted to them. 
There might be some variant arrangements in sharecropping deals. For 
instance, in Janice and San Jose de las Matas sometimes aparceros are given the 
133 
for a period ranging from two to three years and they are asked to retain 1and 
the 50% income share of the landowner. Meanwhile, they are expected to take 
e of all production costs and to replant the sharecropped land with pasture ~r 
grass (.e.angola) for future cattle raising. Some agronomist informants estimated 
that the value of the land duplicates with pasturage. On the other hand, labor 
requirements will decrease with cattle ranches thus forcing the peasants and 
sharecroppers out of the zone. 
Generally, sharecrop arrangements among all production units are basically 
the same. Only the high frequency of sharecropping among big landowners, and the 
division of some production costs will vary. Specifically, tobacco entrepreneurs, 
contrary to traditional practices, will try to maximize their profits through 
irrigation and the employment of pesticides, fertilizers, and better quality 
seeds. Thus, they usually divide the cost of these investments with the share-
cropper. The rationale being that in this way they guarantee the use of these 
ingredients by the sharecropper thus increasing their tobacco yields. 
According to our data, minifundist tobacco peasants seem to accept 
sharecropping because they need to supplement their own plot's income returns. 
A result of this income I iabil ity on their part is the attachment of strategic 
adaptational importance to the access of land, and the maintenance of face to 
face relationships with landowners. Inevitably, in the case of landless and 
minifundist peasants sharecropping for big landowners, this organization of 
labor compels individuals to become dependent on others in a hierarchical 
fashion. In this structural arrangement, patron-client relationships predom-
inate behind the highly personalistic labor and favor exchanges taking place 
between the units. From this arises a scale of structural networks by which 
agricultural units are differentiated. At the same time, sharecroppers become 
involved in labor transactions which cripple their financial resources with the 
Payment of a 50 % of the crop's return. 
TABLE 29 
SOCIAL ORIGIN OF 80 SHARECROPPERS OF TOBACCO LAND OWNERS IN THE CIBAO, 1971-1972 
FARM AREA TOTAL STATUS SHARECROPPER SOCIAL RELATIONS OF SHARECROPPER WITH LANDOWNER 
(ta reas) SHARE- Minifundist Other Member of owner's or of owner 1 s not Otner 
CROPPERS inner-adaptational foremen and previously 
network other farm share- acquainted 
croppers inner-
adaptational net. 
1-32 9 6 (66. 66) 3 (33.33) 9 (100.00) -- -- --
32-80 26 22 (84.61) 4 ( 15. 38) 21 (80.76) -- -- 5 (19.23) 
SUBTOTAL 35 28 (80.00) 7 (20.00) 30 (85.71) -- -- 5 (14.28) 
80-800 15 11 (73.33) 4 (26. 66) 7 (46.66) 6 (40.00) -- 2 (13.33) 
800 and more 30 24 (80.00) 6 (20.00) 14 (46.66) 15 (50.00) -- 1 (3.33) 
SUBTOTAL 
-:::_- -----
45 35 (77. 77) 10 (22.22) 21 (46.66) 21 ( 46. 66) --
(Note: The sharecroppers were verbally asked whether or not they owned privately some land besides 
the sharecropped one. In addition, whether or not they knew their landowners before starting their 
present day arrangements with them. If they answered affirmatively, they were further asked to 
identify the ties uniting them if any. 
3 
Minifundist sharecropers 1 geographical origin is : Tamboril (11), Pontezuela (4), San Jose de las 
Matos (9), Moca (11). The 45 sharecroppers from middle and big landowners belong to a group of seven 
farms· 5 from Jacagua and El lngenio, and two from Villa Gonzalez.) 
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Big Landowners Sharecropping Arrangements: 
sharecropping arrangements in large farms normally follow this pattern: 
the land is divided into independent colonias (colonies) with a sharecropper in 
charge of each one. Each colono receives from 30 to 100 plowed tareas plus the 
necessary tobacco shading houses. Frequently there is a colono who is also con-
sidered the farm's foreman encargado. His prerogatives run from recommending 
other aparceros to the landowner (el patron); to supervising other sharecropper's 
labor and harvest, to collecting debts for the landowner among the workers on the 
farm. For these extra labors he receives a monthly cash payment which might range 
from $75.00 to $150.00. 
The social origin of sharecroppers for large landowners seem to be the 
same as that from minifundist and smaller-middle owners. They are normally 
minifundist owners in need of extra income or landless laborers. The main 
difference between the tvo sharecroppers is that on some occasions those working 
for a big landowner are introduced to him by the foreman of the estate or by 
another sharecropper and do not have a closer relation with the owner at the 
·moment of starting to work. 
On his sharecropped land each colono is the equivalent of an owner. He 
contracts day laborers, buys the necessary food for them, determines their 
daily wages and administers the production money. The colono will usually 
employ as day laborers members of his inner-adaptational network plus members 
at large from the community. In addition, he will feel free to call upon his 
own nuclear family for free labor. In the midst of this operational freedom they 
Will be supervised by the landowner (or his foreman) in each phase of tobacco 
cultivation. 
Middlemen do not advance money to aparceros of big landowners, nor do 
they buy their crops from them. Instead, any advanced money they might r~quire 
either for production costs or for household needs, is weekly provided to them 
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t he landowner. The latter obtains the money from a bank in the form of a bY 
t ·on credit or, in fewer instances, from his own savings. He will re-produc 1 
distribute the money to his sharecroppers without any interest attached to it. 
ouring the tobacco season an individual record is kept of the money each colono 
takes in advance from his 50% share of the income of the tobacco sale. 
The money advanced for household needs --food, sickness, clothes--
normally ranges from $10.00 to $15.00 per week. This advancement is analogous 
to a weekly income under wage labor conditions in an urban environment; and in 
itself it is more than what the colono will make day laboring even if he were 
able to find work seven days a week at $1.50 per day for a whole season. For 
many sharecropper peasants the security of this weekly advancement -- which is 
optional-- will be the main motivation behind being a colono to a big landholder. 
As they usually say, even if there is no profit from this labor at the end of 
the harvest, at least they have subsisted one more year. Landowners are well 
aware of this fact. 
At harvest time, the landowner, or one of his nuclear family members, 
directly contacts an export house and proposes his farm harvest. Because of the 
bulk of tobacco being transacted, higher prices than those at the market are 
obtained, benefiting both the aparcero and the owner. The tobacco is then 
transported to the warehouses at the buyers• risk and expenses. During the 
transaction, the colono does not normally intervene nor does he receive the 
money from the sale immediately. 
Once the transaction has taken place, the sharecropper record is con-
suited for 1 iquidation. The advanced money and the crop's expenses are sub-
tracted from his 50% share of the income obtained from the sale of his tobacco. 
The remaining amount of money is given to him as the season's profit. When good 
Prices favor the sales, it is frequent for owners to offer an extra cash bonus 
(!egalo) to those colonos who ended the year with some profit on their record. 
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Not all colonos' records show profits at the end of the season. Those 
not able to cover the debts with their tobbaco sale share present a who were 
relative risk to big landowners. Because of the last figure in these colonos' 
record will be in the debit and not in the credit ~olumn, they are commonly 
referred to as cruzados (crossed over). If the colono does not reimburse the 
owed money, or if for two consecutive years he is in the debit column, he will 
probably be told to leave the farm and thus be replaced. In most cases, the 
debts are not recovered and have to be borne by the landowner. The main reason 
for this is that the colonos normally lack capital resources to reimburse or be 
forced to reimbuse the debt. In order to evade cruzados sharecroppers at 
liquidation time, landowners maintain a close supervision of each colono's 
harvest and control of their seasonal debt accounts. 
An Estimate of the Operations of a Sharecropper and His Big Landowner: 
In order to provide a clearer picture of big land owners' and aparceros' 
operations, an example from a big tobacco estate follows. A.E. is a sharecropper 
of don X who harvested more than 1,800 tareas of Cuban, criollo and olor tobacco 
during the 1971-1972 season with the assistance of 48 colonos. A.E., being a 
brother-in-law of one of don X's compadres who already was his colon~ was offered 
68 tareas of land with 3 shading houses of 14 varas conugueras each (1 conuco's 
yard= 2.5077 meters). To harvest this parcela he received the free assistance 
from his wife and three male children. In addition, he contracted day laborers. 
The arrangement with don X stipulated an a medias contract. From his share, A.E. 
will have to cover all production costs with the following exceptions: (i) the 
cost of land plowing and of the shading house repairs which will be covered by 
don X. (ii) The cost of fertilizer, water and soil poison, seed beds, and irri-
gation water, plus the food and wages for laborers during tobacco hampering 
labors (enceronada), and the hampers themselves (cerones). The payment of costs 
Will be divided between A.E. and don X in equal shares. 
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From September 11, 1971 to July 22, 1972, A.E. recedived RD$2,712.48 
don X for production costs and personal and household expenses; the latter from 
averaged $12.00 per week. The 68 tareas solely harvested with criollo and olor 
tobacco yielded: 46.48 qq. of criollo tobacco; and 87.98 qq. of olor tobacco. 
The olor tobacco was classified by don X thus yelding: 16.92 qq. tobacco. The 
olor tobacco was classified by don X thus yielding: 16.92 qq. of type FF; 10 qq. 
of type F; 18.71 qq. of type A; and 42.35 qq. of type P. 
In La Tabacalera factory, one of the two leading factories manufacturing 
tobacco for the national market, olor tobacco prices were: $65.00/qq. for type 
FF, $55.00/qq. for type F, $45.00/qq. for type A, and $30.00/qq. for type P. 
Meanwhile, lnetab, a criollo tobacco export company, was buying criollo tobacco 
at the market price of that time: $30.00/qq. 
Don X decided to offer these two companies the bulk of his criollo and 
olor crop --3,521 qq.-- but only if they improved purchasing prices. Final 
sale prices were agreed at $47.00/qq. of olor tobacco, and $33.00/qq. of criollo 
tobacco. The logic behind the one price for all olor tobacco types being that 
from previous yield tests in his own farm, don X knew that 55% of his olor 
harvest (1,380 qq.) was type P tobacco at that time only $30.00/qq.; and 45% 
of the remaining types. The sale·of the tobacco at these high prices repre-
sented only for don X an extra profit of $6,007.50. 
The sale of A.E. 1 s olor tobacco provided an income return of $4, 135.06; 
and that of criollo tobacco amounted to $1 ,533.84. But because he had already 
asked don X for $2,712.48 in advanced money for household expenses and pro-
duction costs, his profits for ten months of work were $121.97. Because he was 
granted a $50.00 liquidation bonus, his final profits were $171.97. 
Don X tobacco income estimates are: If the farm yielded 3,745 qq. of 
tobacco --2,510 qq.-- of olor, 1,011 qq. of criollo, and 224 qq. of Cuban 
tobacco-- the total sale would have been $160,000.00; thereby his 50% share 
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being $80,000. His expenses might be estimated as follows: . if he had a $50,000.00 
t ·on credit from the Agricultural Bank, the credit's interests might well produc ' 
have risen up to $2,270.00. His share of production costs may be estimated at 
$!8,000.00. Of this amount $4,000.00 would correspond to land preparation and 
another $4,000.00 might be estimated for shade house constructions and repairs; 
the remaining $10,000.00 of production expenses account for those specific 
costs which were agreed to be paid by both don X and his sharecroppers (such as 
fertilizer, hampers, irrigation water). Finally, if six of the 48 colonos 
ended the season cruzados, don 'i> losses could have been increased by an extra 
$1,500.00. In all don X's expenses amounted to $21,770.00, thus leaving him 
an estimated prof it of $58,230.00. 
Sharecropping ~mong Rig Landowners and Labor Alternatives: 
The sharecropping organization is preferred by landowners to any other 
labor organization such as the por adminstracion system which provides for every 
worker in his estate to be a wage laborer. Several other advantages in the 
aparceria organization are frequently mentioned. First, the sharecroppers find 
themselves in a person to person relationship with the owner. Secondly, the 
aparcero is not a mere worker selling his l3bor, but a semi-independent unit 
which maintains a direct relationship with both land and product, thus increasing 
his interst and initiative under the aparceria arrangement. Thirdly, the apar-
cero is in a co-responsibility position with the landowner himself; hence, the 
bigger the crop's yield the higher his final returns. For these reasons it is 
expected that the sharecropper will take more interest and care of the delicate 
tobacco leaves just as if they were his own. 
In spite of these advantages some landowners complain that under the 
aparceria arrangement they have to provide colonos with some tareas of land to 
harvest household crops. Thus available terrain is lost for the main crop. But 
even in these cases landowners know that the aparcero's nuclear family labors in 
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the tobacco fields without any payments at all in a variety of labors. The 
Son for not asking a wage for their labor hours is that this practice will rea 
increase the production costs which the colono will have to cover. But in a 
por administracion arrangement they will ask for a wage just as any other day 
laborer. 
A greater advantage of this sharecropping organization resides in 
economic terms. Under this arrangement sharecroppers help the owner to finance 
a share of the harvest; if the owner were running his estate under the alternate 
por administracion arrangement, his prof its would be lowered. The por adminis-
tracion arrangement calls for all workers in the farm to be day laborers with 
a proportionate number of encargados {foremen) who are paid weekly for their 
services on a year round basis. All production costs are paid by the land-
owner and profits return only to him. In some cases prof its are divided with 
the foremen according to liquidation arrangements --ranging from two to five 
per cent of the prof it from the tobacco grown in each foreman's plot. 
Returning to the example of A.E. and don X, let us imagine that they 
were working on a por administracion arrangement and the former was one of the 
foremen with a weekly pay of $15.00 --normal wages for foremen range from $15.00 
to $20.00-- plus breakfast and lunch during six days of work. In the actual 
case we have seen that A.E. 's 68 tareas yielded $5,668.90 of which he received 
$2,834.45 corresponding to his 50% share. Production costs running on A.E. 's 
share can be calculated by subtracting from the $2,712.48 which his record 
showed as withdrawn for household use and production costs. The amount he 
used for household expenses: roughly $504.00, estimating that he received an 
average of $12.00 per 42 weeks (from September 11 to July 22 when the tobacco 
Was sold). Thus his share of production costs for 68 tareas of tobacco amounted 
to $2,208.48. 
If don X were running the farm under the por administracion arrangement 
th•is $2,208.48 would be his own debt plus the other costs normally covered by 
him under the a medias arrangement. He would also have to pay A.E. his weekly 
salary, which only for the tobacco season amounts to $630.00. Thus, the 68 
tareas of land harvested by A.E. under a por administracion arrangement would 
cost don X $2,838.48 besides the normal production costs which he already 
finances under the sharecropping arrangement. 
This new cost differs from the 50% A.E. actually received under the 
aparceria contract to cover costs by only $4.03 on the deficit margin. In 
other words, under the por administracion arrangement the 50% share normally 
allocated to A.E. under the sharecropping organization does not provide a pro-
fit to the landowner nor is it even able to cover production costs. This 
situation would be more critical if he has to pay the latter's nuclear family 
labor. 
The perception of large landowner's sharecroppers of the aparceria 
organization has been phrased by a Villa Gonzalez informant: Ei traibajo dei 
apaiceiro e como un eclavo; poi ei raincho, airada i insecticiida, me quiitan 
ei sudoi. This informant, however, and 29 other sharecroppers of a large 
landowner in V·illa Gonzalez, El lngenio and Jacagua, when asked whether they 
would prefer day laboring to sharecropping, all answered negatively. Both 
for economic and social reasons the aparceria labor arrangement is better for 
them than day laboring. Economically, they not only have a weekly income 
normally higher than that of a day laborer, but they have the opportunity of 
obtaining an end of the season 1 iquidation profit. At the same time by share-
cropping, they maintain a steady employment in· contrast to the day to day living 
of the agricultural laborers. Furthermore, they maintain a direct contact with 
the land and a personal relationship with the landowner. From the links with 
the latter, they expect a number of favors protecting them throughout the whole 
Year. 
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This is not to say that their position is co~fortable and t~at they will 
like any change in their adaptational network. But only that their condition 
,,ot 
Ore secure and stable than that of day laborers. Among the changes they f s m 
would like to see taking place in their present day environment they mention 
· desire to own the sharecropped land, or to increase the size of the plot their 
already owned by them if this were the case. At this time it is too early yet 
to predict if the agrarian law #289 recently approved by the National Government 
(March 1972), will actually change the fate of colonos and change the share-
cropping system. It does provide for the illegitimacy of any sharecropping 
contract which might propose to the colono to harvest less land than the 
necessary for subsistence (60 irrigated tareas, or 100-150 non-irrigated tareas?). 
It offers them the option to purchase the sharecropped land, under certain con-
ditions, with the financial help of the Dominican Agrarian Institute. This 
purchasing option if accepted by the sharecropper is unappealable by the land-
owner and will take place whenever both sides agree to it at a price determined 
by the Agrarian Institute and approved by the landowner. At the same time, 
aparceros are granted use of the land as long as they maintain their status of 
sharecroppers. In other word~ under normal conditions they cannot be removed 
from the land as long as they maintain the agreement--thus freeing them from 
any arbitrariness from the owners. 
At the end of fieldwork, aparceria contracts were signed in the presence 
of officials from the Agrarian Institute under similar conditions to those 
existing in previous years. The two main differences were that now the contracts 
Were written and public agreements including an optional purchasing clause 
favoring the sharecropper. The landowner was free to sign the contracts or 
not, but in any case the sharecropper could at any time choose to purchase the 
land if so desired; by signing the contract a fixed date of the land sale is 
established unless the sharecropper signs renouncing his privilege. 
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If this law is enforced, new sharecroppers will probably not be taken 
by landowners in order to evade the colono's option to buy the land and his 
legally granted access to the land. In this situation, the por administracion 
t ern will probably become more popular among large landowners. Evidence of sys 
this was obtained in Villa Gonzalez where members of the landed elite were 
trying to dislodge old sharecroppers and re-organize their labor organization 
by introducing the por adminstracion system. 
One of the labor arrangements most dear to sharecroppers, in contrast 
to the aparceria and the por administracion organizations, is the por liguidacion 
agreement .. Although not being presently implemented, it is usually mentioned 
by both aparceros and landowners. The liquidation organization is a variant 
of the aparceria arrangement, but would produce higher profits for the share-
cropper if implemented. Formally, it calls for all production costs to be 
covered by the tobacco income returns, and the prof its to be divided in equal 
shares (50-50) between the sharecropper and the landowner. The colono's 
rationale behind this labor strategy is that they presently have to pay more 
production costs than the landowner does. If the net profit is equally divided, 
instead of the money returning from the tobacco sale, then the aparcero prof it 
share will increase. This labor organization would work on the assumption of 
an equal partnership between laborer and owner. 
Harvest Finance 
As in the case of minifundist tobacco peasants, middle and big land-
owners' tobacco operations are also contingent upon production credits. Their 
ability to control and have access to financial resources will affect their 
farm production. Without production credits they would be unable to crop their 
lands or would have to reduce their operations to their own saving abilities. 
Usually, the capital asset of their lands is a sufficient guarantee for bank 
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and other forms of financial assistance. 
credits 
On the other hand, by controlling the finance money and administering 
they maintain a closer supervision upon the sharecroppers. This super-
1 t' 
vision, indirectly, is a guarantee to obtaining credit since most banks, and 
even middlemen, do not extend production credits to a sharecropper because of 
the financial risk they represent. To do this, the bank requires from the 
landowner responsibility for the credit reimbursement. The landowner would 
not assume this responsibility, which he needs to take in order to secure the 
credit, if he were going to administer the credit himself. The consequence of 
this is a tighter control upon the sharecropper, and financial responsibility 
for the landowner. 
Normally, a smaller-middle criollo tobacco peasant (controlling roughly 
80 to 150 tareas) will receive financial assistance from a middleman like other 
minifundist peasants, or from the Tobacco Institute. If he were harvesting Cuban 
tobacco on his land, he would probably be financed directly by an export house 
or again, by the Tobacco Institute. Criollo transactions are taken care of by 
the peasant landowner and the purchasing middleman in the farmer's shading house. 
Since all the curing and bulking of the tobacco takes place in the landowner's 
shading house this fact gives him an extra source of direct control over the 
last phase of tobacco production and its transaction. With the small harvests 
and the resulting reduction in bargaining power, market price prevails in these 
negotiations. The tobacco is considered to be sold once the middle man author-
izes the owner to mojar (wet) the bulked tobacco and hamper it at an agreed price. 
Sharecroppers, if existing, once they have indicated to the landowner that the 
tobacco is ready for sale, will not normally intervene in the negotiations. The 
middle landowner will liquidate him once the middleman transports the tobacco 
out of the shading house and pays for it. 
On the other hand, big landowners and tobacco entrepreneurs do not deal 
;I ,I 
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with middlemen. They recerve financial support from private banks or through 
the official production credits channelled by the Tobacco Institute; thus 
h will sell their crop directly to an export house trying to take advantage t ey 
of their purchasing power. If harvesting Cuban tobacco, the export houses 
dealing with this tobacco variety will also offer the producer another source 
of credit normally under the form of a contract providing for production credits 
and stable sale prices. 
Curiously enough, export firms do not want to finance big landowners 
producing criollo tobacco because of the strained relations resulting from the 
transactions with these more independent production units. On the other hand, 
big landowners prefer the marketing freedom they achieve through a bank credit 
to the restrictbns tied to the financial arrangements with an export house. In 
contrast to this situation, good relations seem to prevail between the export 
house and big landowners harvesting Cuban tobacco under contract arrangements. 
The difference probably resides in the price fluctuations between the two 
markets: while Cuban tobacco prices are more stable and even fixed in some 
Instances in the contracts regulating relations between producer and buyer, the 
criollo market prices fluctuate throughout the season according to the supply 
and demand of the product. Under these circumstances it is more important for 
the big producers to maintain their freedom to bargain their product. 
I 
CHAPTER V 
MIDDLEMEN LEVEL OF ARTICULATION 
One of the most enigmatic presences in the criollo tobacco industry 
is that of the middlemen (known as corredores or intermediarios). Although 
peasants themselves, they are looked upon by outsiders as the originators of 
minifundists and smaller-middle peasants stagnation. On the other hand, it 
is not uncommon for export houses to blame them for harmful marketing prac-
tices and dubious personal reputation. 
Middlemen are commonly known as corredores (runners) not so much 
because of their broker's role, but because of their geographical mobility. 
They go from a field parcela to the warehouse and back to another conuco, 
always being on the go for a tobacco harvest. They are small-scale merchants 
operating with the financial support of an export warehouse. With purchasing 
money obtained from the latter, they buy tobacco from minifundist and middle 
land holding peasants and transport it to the warehouses. As a dependent 
unit of the warehouse they are not expected to resell the tobacco nor to 
speculate on its price, but only to procure the crop on a commission basis. 
Social adaptational network 
The social origin of middlemen is exclusively fran the peasantry; 
furthermore, they are overwhelmingly minifundist and small-middle tobacco 
Producers in need of supplementing their income and/or aspiring to a better 
living. In some cases they also occupy official posts in their own communities 
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has local mayors (alcalde pedaneos), or members of a reli~ious lay organ-
s~ . 
• or even officials from a peasant organization. These cases, however, rzat1on, 
are not the norm. 
The average landholding control of 63 peasant middlemen from three 
different warehouses -- in Gurabo, San Jose de las Matas, and Cancas - was 
of 89.7 Tareas of land. All sixty three expressed as their main reason for 
being involved in middlemen operations the need to increase their plot's 
Income (hacer dinero). Only seven of them had other sources of income in their 
communities; three were local mayors, one was president of a Catholic commun-
Jty parish organization, and the remaining were involved in peasant's cooper-
atives. This group of 63 sharecroppers was part of a larger group of 70 
middlemen. Surprisingly, two of them were not landowners but landless day 
laborers, and the remaining five were sharecroppers of minifundist peasants 
who have left their nuclear families in charge of production. 
In relation to their own lands, middlemen have three main alternatives. 
These are as follows: (1) they will crop them with tobacco and leave their 
nuclear families in charge of production; (2) transfer the land to share-
croppers; or (3) produce in the plots some crops which do not require as much 
labor and time as tobacco itself thereby freeing them of agricultural duties. 
In any case, once their middlemen operations begin, their time will be fully 
pledged to the acquisition of tobacco. 
In possession of wide social networks, middlemen are normally well 
known in their local communities because of their inner-adaptational networks 
and resourceful personalities. The personal relations maintained during 
the year with tobacco growers and/or some members of the latter's inner-
adaptational networks will determine his middleman role. These social 
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TABLE 30 
MARKETING BEHAVIOR OF 120 MINIFUNDIST AND SMALLER-MIDDLE TOBACCO PRODUCERS IN THE CIBAO REGION, 1971-1972. 
FARM 
AREA 
(tareas) 
1-32 
32-8 
80-150 
TOTAL 
PREFERS TO SELL TO PRICE DIFFERENCE OF BUYER. ACTUALLY SOLD: TO MIDDLEMAN JO OTHER 
TO- ··---·-------· 
TAL Middleman warehouse $29.00/qq. but $30.00/qq but KIN RELATIVE GOD- I FRIEND I STRANGER I PARTY 
a conoc id(:>. FATHER a compadre. 1----·--· -,----- ---
50 47 3 34 16 19 6 15 9 
50 42 8 31 19 18 4 18 7 3 
20 10 6 9 11 8 2 4 4 
-
2 t + -·-1120 I 103 I 17 I 74 46 45 12 37 20 3 
(NOTE: This group of producers was presented with the following set of alternatives: 
(i) 11 lf at selling ti~e you are given the opportunity of selling your tobacco either to a middleman or directly 
to the warehouse; and both offer you the same prices, to whom will you sell your harvest?'' 
(ii) 11 lf at selling time a compadre of yoursoffers $29.00/qq., but a person known to you (a conocido) is 
offering a higher price of $30.00/qq., to whom will you sell your tobacco?" 
(iii) The final section of the present table identifies the relation existing between peasant and the person 
to whom he actually sold the tobacco. At least in six cases the middleman was both a kin member and a 
compadre. These instances were reported under the kin category. In seven other cases· he was both a friend 
and a compadre, but these cases were reported under the etter,s category). 
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Private relation of trust and confidence within this kin network is f he 
t urallY translated into respect and cooperation in the more public realm of na 
the inner-adaptational network. This adaptational system is most effective 
and self-assuring in market relations where the customary practices of cooper-
ation and public laws give way to economic interests and advancement of self-
interests. 
In this context, the middleman becomes a culturally significant unit. 
He is something like a transformational system in itself integrating both the 
peasant social organization and the outside market world. In this perspective 
they are cultural brokers for they stand guard over the crucial junctures or 
synapses of relationships which connect the local system to the larger whole. 
The middleman provides a way out to the peasant's tobacco without disturbing his 
adaptational networks cr·exposing him to impersonal market relations. The wider 
his social networks the broader his commercial operations. If local peasants 
know him on a personal basis and are able to identify him in the context of 
an inner-adaptational network, then they will permit business-like transactions 
to take place between them. 
Warehouse environmental handicaps. 
Warehouses also require from middlemen the maintenance and expansion 
of their social networks within the community. For them, peasants in contact 
with their middlemen become a potential tobacco clientele. The main reason 
behind their contingency upon middlemen is twofold. The first is the land-
holding control of their tobacco suppliers. The second is their inability 
to reorganize peasants marketing practices. While one of the most strategic 
aspects of warehouses environmental adaptation is the procuring of sufficient 
tobacco to purchase, they have to operate amid an alien social organization 
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f inifundist peasants. A great number of small harvesters of criollo tobacco o m 
to be contacted, financed, supervised, and persuaded to sell their crop to one have 
of the competing warehouses in the zone. Warehouses, however, have neither 
Personal contacts in the peasant communities nor sufficient personnel to the 
in touch and personally involved with the necessary number of minifundist get 
suppliers. In this context middlemen guarantee the warehouses the necessary 
supply of tobacco they need to operate instead of leaving them exposed to the 
spontaneity of a mass of small producers. At the same time they will be re-
sponsible for reimbursing the money advanced by the warehouses to minifundist 
producers to assist them with production costs. 
Warehouses have maintained the nineteenth century strategy of employing 
middlemen to secure tobacco. Each export house places its warehouses in the 
vicinity of a tobacco zone. Normally two and three warehouses, each one de-
pendent upon a different export packer, are grouped together. Each warehouse 
will select an average of 30 to 80 middlemen from the zone representing dif-
ferent communities and families, the number of middlemen fluctuates according 
to the warehouse's volume of operations. They will receive cash in two 
accounts: first, to advance to small producers during the lapse of the har-
vest; second to buy the greatest possible amount of tobacco. Through this 
arrangement the warehouses expect to reach out to the producers and secure 
enough tobacco. 
Two of the most cherished characteristics in a middleman from the point 
of view of the warehouse are: (i) his commercial resourcefulness in order to 
compete with other community buyers for the peasant's crop; and (ii) the 
control and maintenance of a wide social, adaptational network in the com-
munity, and even in the zone. From this he might secure his normal clientele 
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d be introduced to other growers outside his original range~ Honesty is an 
onlY the third characteristic expected from a middlemen. Its relative impor-
resides in the influence of their marketing practices upon field tobacco ta nee 
and the risk involved if they do not reimburse the advanced and the pur-price 
chasing money. As the president of an export firm phrased it during fieldwork: 
"Lo importante de los corredores no es que no sean unos ladrones, sino que 
compren tabaco. Pa'eso le avanzamos el dinero, pa'que compren tabaco; la 
mayor cantidad de tabaco, mejor para ellos y para nosotros". 
The nature of middlemen's work 
The third variable associated with tobacco's middlemen dependence upon their 
social adaptational networks as a core energy resource, is the nature of their 
income returns. Middlemen work under a commission arrangement contingent upon 
the volume of purchased tobacco. Thus, the higher the volume of purchased 
tobacco, the higher their returns. Their possible profits, then are associated 
with the number of peasants from whom they purchase tobacco, and the bulk of 
their harvests. 
Normally, price incentives although necessary are not sufficient motiva-
tion for minifundist peasants to sell their tobacco to a particular middleman. 
The latter will always try to face the competition from other middlemen, by 
keeping his purchasing price on an equal level with that of other buyers. 
This further reduces the price variable as a determinant of transactional 
arrangements. In this situation, the buying control of a middleman and his 
operation's profits are closely associated with each middleman's social 
resources. 
Purchasing niches and Zones of Influence 
Middlemen operations start at the time of the construction of the seed 
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to say the least. They contact future tobacco harvesters, offer them beds, 
their services, pledge financial support if needed during harvest time, and 
Some cases even grant them labor assistance. At the end of November and f n 
earlY December, coinciding with transplanting labors, middlemen start con-
tacting the warehouses. They drop by the tobacco warehouses, speak to the 
person in charge, and obtain their support during the coming season. The 
person in charge of the warehouse probably knows them on a personal basis, or 
if not they are introduced to him through a third person known personally to 
both of them. Contracts are sometimes signed between the warehouse and the 
buyer but normally they lack legal support. Other times a verbal arrangement 
prevails in their mutual relations. The main accord being that, unless ex-
plicitly granted the permit, the middleman is to buy tobacco exclusively for 
the warehouse. 
Warehouses normally take one, at most two or three, middlemen from 
each peasant community in order ot diversify their areas of contact. At the 
same time the rule is that middlemen from the same warehouse do not compete 
for the same tobacco. They divide their areas of operations under the 
guidance of the person in charge of the warehouse. This rule might break down 
at times during the season. Nevertheless, warehouse management tries to 
maintain some order in the buying procedures of their middlemen and normally 
they are successful in keeping independent areas of operation for every 
middleman by being well informed of their operations. Therefore what appears 
a disorganized and uncontrolled operation is actually a structured process 
relying upon the warehouses information of their middlemen's activities and 
spheres of influence. 
Curiously enough, some export firm officials do not recognize this 
Phenomenon. They refer to the anarchic situation in the purchasing operations 
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of their middlemen. In their opinion once the money is given either to be advanc-
ed or to purchase a harvest the money disappears with no security of ever coming 
back again. The information of 14 Gurabo middlemen's purchasing niches, and the 
market relations of two warehouses in San Jose de las Matas and Gurabo and in 
addition that from a local packer from Villa Gonzalez, indicates that this is 
not the case. 
The same might be said, although with some reservations, in reference to 
tobacco warehouse's zones of influence. Although there is no explicit rule 
prohibiting warehouses from purchasing tobacco in any zone, a rational division 
of purchasing areas is perceivable not only in the operations of the middlemen 
of one ware house, but also of the warehouses themselves. Two main reasons might 
account for this. First, the middlemen control of their purchasing areas. If 
one warehouse has access to some middlemen in control of wide inner adaptational 
networks and broad social relations, then it will be difficult for a second group 
of middlemen to compete with them in the same purchasing niche. This situation 
is most evident, for instance, in the local communities (parajes) of the towns 
of Janice and San Jose de las Matas basically controlled by one export company 
through the middlemen networks of one purchasing warebouse. Also in the com-
munities of Gurabo, Pontezuela, and Jacagua, where an almost rational division 
of purchasing niches exists between four export packer warehouses. Secondly, 
it is more profitable for the companies to implicitly divide among themselves 
tobacco zones into nearly independent purchasing niches. In this way competition 
·-already evidenced by the presence of almost 15 export firms each one with an 
average of 3 to 6 dependent warehouses, plus 35 local packers-- will be con-
siderably reduced. As a result prices can also be more or less controlled and 
tobacco purchased according to specific demands. 
This rational, although implicit and not invulnerable, division of 
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purchasing zones among the warehouses also results from their geographic allo-
cation which makes them contingent upon a specific group of local middlemen. 
In anY case in newly opened tobacco zones, or in the operating zones of ware-
houses from export firms who have been forced out of the market, or even when 
a new export firm wants to get into the market, competition increases and new 
zones of influence and niches of control have to be gradually re-established. 
For instance, during the 1971-1972 season a local warehouse in Tamboril 
started buying criollo tobacco. In order to compete successfully their strate-
gy was one of offedng middlemen of any other warehouse both relatively better 
prices and receiving their tobacco without as many quality requirements as 
competing warehouses. They were hoping to obtain their necessary supply of 
tobacco and integrate a network of middlemen thereby under-cutting other 
nearby warehouses purchasing operations. 
Advanced money 
Once he has obtained money from the warehouse, the middleman starts 
advancing money to peasants. This money is handed out free of interest, is 
advanced on solicitation., and does not carry any employment restrictions. 
As previously mentioned, the only condition attached to it is the peasant's 
obligation to sell his tobacco back to him; but this implicit selling agree-
ment applies only if the middleman offers to the peasant the regular market 
price of that time. The logic behind this provision is twofold. First, it is 
expected that the peasant will reciprocate the favor. Thus this strategy assures 
the middlemen a harvest of tobacco for purchase. This harvest in turn represents 
a purchase commission. Secondly, it is the most secure arrangement for the 
recovery of the advanced money. At selling time the middleman will get the 
tobacco and pay the peasant the difference between the harvest cost and the 
owed money. If it were not for this control mechanism at selling time, 
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rience shows that it would be most difficult to collect peasants• debts. 
ex Pe 
jhiS is because of their lack of either capital or financial resources. If a 
reimbursement of the advanced money is not obtained, the loss is suffered by 
the middleman who has to return the money to the warehouse at liquidation time. 
For this reason, the middleman does not advance money to any peasant 
indiscriminately. As a rule, a middleman does not offer money to minifundist 
peasants representing a high financial risk; nor to a peasant whom they know 
has already taken money, or who is going to ask an extra advancement from 
another middleman. This would find the peasant with a conflict of interests 
at selling time. Every peasant asking for advanced money will also have to be known 
by him personally or be introduced by a third person who might be accountable 
on his behalf if necessary. In the same way, sharecroppers will receive money 
only if the landowner makes himself responsible fa- the transactions and re-
imbursement of the advanced money. 
Data on the operations of 30 middlemen from San Jose de las Matas, 
Gurabo, Moca and Cancas, indicate that they advanced money to landowners 
ranging from 10 to 100 tareas of harvested tobacco with an average of $10.00 
to $15.00 per tarea. This was a very conservative advance since the average 
tobacco price for the field work season was $26.00/qq. with an average yield of two :1 
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quintals per tarea. Also middlemen did not give money to more than one third r 
of the ta reas of tobacco in each fa rm. The 30 middlemen advanced the amount of $38, 590 ·.:ll'.1 
11:' 
for an average $1,286.33 per buyer. The total number of peasants benefiting I, 
from these advances were, according to conservative estimates, 664 tobacco 
Producers with an average of $58.11 per peasant. 
Not all the peasants who sell their crop to a middleman have received 
an advance from him. In fact, rough estimates indicate that an average 
1~ 
·ddlernan, purchasing roughly 600 to 1300 qq. of tobacco per season, advances 
m• 
moneY only to one third of the peasants from whom he purchases the tobacco. 
His contacts to non-financed peasants is achieved through his inner-adapat-
tional network and his broader social network. He will secure the - 1clien-
tage of this group through the customary flow of favors and personal relations 
as previously mentioned. 
purchase money 
Middlemen might advance money to the producers as long as they consider 
it opportune. But normally when the barresuelo leaves are ready for harvest, 
they will stop advancing money and the first phase of the purchasing period 
starts, the tiroteo phase. From this moment on, if the peasant wants any 
inore money he will be asked to sell the barresuelo harvest. The average price of 
these leaves is $12.00 to $15.00/qq. The tiroteo phase lasts normally from 
middle April to May. During this time there is only a minimum tobacco price 
fixed by the export houses and the buyers do not purchase total harvests but 
only the barresuelo leaves. The second purchasing phase lasts normally from 
June till the end of August; it is known as the cosecha (harvest) phase. 
This cosecha phase is the most important since it is at this time that the 
peasant is expected to sell his whole crop, and not only some leaves. While 
it last; the middleman has to make the most to secure tobacco and is normally 
closely supervised from the warehouse in his purchasing operation. 
During the purchasing period, the middleman's job consists of keeping 
track of every single tobacco harvest in the community and passing this infor-
mation on to the warehouse. They are expected to know (1) the quality and 
harvest practices of each peasant's crop, (2) when it is available for sale, 
(3) the market prices of other warehouses, (4) the whereabouts of competing 
buyers, and (5) any service which a peasant might require. This information 
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k Pt current through daily visits to peasant plots and farms, and through f s e 
t interaction with landowners, day laborers, and sharecroppers. 
cons tan 
In the mean time, his relations with the warehouse will also change. 
NoW he will not ask for advance money but for purchasing money. In return 
the warehouse will ask him for tobacco before every new disbursement. The sole 
justification for the middlemen is their purchasing ability in a minifundist 
producing environment. In cases of conflict between the warehouse and a middle-
man during the purchasing period, the former will not pressure for a reimbursement 
of the owed money. The pressure is on the buyer to bring (tirar) the expected 
purchased tobacco. The money has to be invested in the acquisition of tobacco 
harvests, and not in personal vices of the middlemen. Also it cannot be used for 
market speculation against warehouses own interests. 
During the purchasing operations warehouse and middleman interests co-
incide at moments but conflict at other times. They coincide since both units 
are contingent upon a purchase commission for their income. The warehouse 
manager normally has a commission ranging from $1.50 to $2.00 per quintal of 
purchased tobacco, while the buyer receives $1.00 per quintal. Thus both units 
are working for the volume increase of the purchased .tobacco. But conflict is 
present in their relationships from a number of sources. First, it is to the 
warehouse manager to buy the greatest volume of tobacco at the lowest possible 
price since he normally works under a fixed, although flexible, budget. This 
is not the case of the middleman who only has to ask for the necessary amount of 
money without taking into consideration warehouse budgets. 
Secondly, conflict also arises from middlemen being cruzados at liquid-
ation time since warehouses are responsible for the recovery of the money given 
to the middlemen. 
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The source of the tension is in the middleman's inability, or lack of interest, 
in reimbursing the warehouse for the money granted to him in order to subsidize 
his operations. If the money is not reimbursed by the buyers, then the ware-
house manager will have to reimburse it to the export house from his own 
commission. The same cruzado problem results between peasant and middleman, 
and between sharecropper and landowner. In all cases the problem is the lack 
of capital and financial resources for which the cruzado could be pressured 
in order to repay the contracted debt. This is not to say that he is not 
pressured, but only that in most cases not even the fake of a bribed a11T1y or 
police member is able to secure the money. Legal action is almost never 
taken in these cases. 
A· third source of conflict springs from the middleman re-selling the 
tobacco. In other words, they will fake the market price and re-fix it at 
their own risk. This is accomplished either by offering the peasant a lower 
purchasing price than the official one, or by delivering the tobacco to the 
warehouse at a price higher than actual purchasing price. Through the first 
stratagem the middleman is shrinking the peasant's legitimate profit margin; 
while through the second strategy, he is inflating the market to the disad-
vantage of the warehouse. In either case, he augments his profits. 
According to our data both stratagems are employed by middlemen accord-
ing to special circumstances. The secret to their operations resides in the 
middleman's strategic position in the market structure. He has access and 
control of both extremes of the market: the buying warehouse and the producer 
peasantry. This environmental position gives him exact market info11T1ation 
frequently unknown to one or both of the units involved in the transaction. 
To offer only one example of this practice let us consider the 
1~ 
following actual case. Middleman N. bought 36 qq. at $28.00/qq. in Jacagua 
for a total of $1008.00. N. informed the warehouse that the bulked tobacco 
in the peasant's shading house when hampered amounted to less quintals than 
previously estimated. At this moment he delivered 20 qq. immediately to the 
warehouse at actual purchasing price; this delivery represented for him a 
$Z0.00 commission. The remaining 16 qq. of tobacco was kept by him in a small 
warehouse near his house. Seven days later when the market price rose to 
$30.00/qq, he delivered the tobacco at this new price, thus earning his com-
mission ($16.00) plus an extra $32.00 because of the price difference. In the 
mean time, the 20 qq. previously delivered by N. cost the warehouse not $28.00 
qq. but $50.40/qq. since with the $1008.00 purchase money the middleman had 
only bought 20 qq. and not the 36 qq. estimated. 
Still in other cases, the middleman will purchase the tobacco but 
inform the warehouse that a competing middleman is bidding on the same tobacco 
at higher prices, thus he needs to raise his offer in order to guarantee the 
harvest. In other instances, he might just tell the warehouse that the 
peasant is asking a higher price than he has been authorized to offer. In 
whatever case, the cultural significance of these operations rely in the power 
the middleman has through his contacts at the production as well as at the 
purchasing level. 
Warehouses normally know of these and other marketing practices of each 
one of their middlemen. But often they are not willing to stop them either 
because they are good bulk buyers of tobacco, or because they are afraid that, 
if suspended at the middle of the purchasing period, they might not reimburse 
the advanced money which normally averages from $1200.00 to $3500.00 during 
the purchasing period for an average buyer. In other cases, this practice 
is not habitual on the part of the middleman thereby not harming warehouse 
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If the warehouse decides to suspend his dealings with a middle-
n
hewill be so informed at liquidation time. It is not unusual for other 
rna 
warehouses to contract the suspended middleman if he has an established cli-
entele at the expense of any risk his marketing practices might present to 
therTI· 
Some meddlemen, as a policy, do not reimburse all the owed money ;either at 
the end of the tobacco season ior during the season itself. Instead they keep 
promising to pay the debt the next season. In this fashion, they try to force 
warehouse (amarrarlos)in preserving their services regardless of their mar-
keting practices. Sometimes they are succesfull for one or two consecutive sea-
sons at most. This strategy was best phrased by an informant who said: Con 
ei aimacen ay que estai cruzado; solo asi te dain liberta pa 1 hacei lo que 
uno quiere. 
The actual execution of the previously mentioned practices by middle-
men does not imply that all buyers do them. Rough estimates from our data 
indicate that only one out of every five or six middlemen habitually resort 
to such marketing practices. On the other hand, a false idea would be to 
assume that middlemen always have the upper hand in their transactions with 
the warehouses. In fact, they are closely controlled by the latter through 
two strategies: (i) control of purchasing money disbursements; (ii) and 
direct information on the ·middleman's operations in their communities. 
The warehouse's main strategy is to control the middleman's operations and 
maintain a record of each middleman. Curiously, written records have less 
authority than memorized accounts, and are not as carefully kept as the latter. 
The warehouse will at all times try to know how much money the middleman is 
given, to buy an estimated harvest of how many quintals, from whom, and at 
What price. 
d 
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The strategy and structure of the money disbursement is approximately 
follows: the money will be given to the middleman only in proportion to the 
as 
t of acquired tobacco he has already delivered to the warehouse. Because 
anoun 
rs•activities are supported by the purchasing money, the warehouse will bu ye 
try to provide him with funds sufficient to bargain and obtain tobacco har-
but not enough to give him the capacity to retain the tobacco and wait vests, 
for better prices. 
Thus every release of money is normally closely considered, and is far 
from being arbitrary. An estimate of the tobacco quintal to be purchased is 
made by the middleman and the person in charge of the wareshouse and an 
authorized purchasing price is given to the buyer. This is decided on the 
basis of the market conditions of supply and demand and the competition of 
other export companies. In addition, the person in charge of the warehouse 
will check how much tobacco he has bought -- and if none, he will inquire why 
not -- since the last money disbursemenL With this information he will be able 
to estimate how much purchasing money the middleman still retains with him. 
Contingent upon these three variables, the amount of money to be approved for 
release by the warehouse is agreed upon. 
Through this procedure not only is the release of money controlled, but 
also the buying price of the warehouse is set. The tobacco received from the 
middleman, normally, will only be accepted at the warehouse at the purchasing 
Price stipulated between middleman and the person in charge at the time of the 
lllOney disbursement. Thus, if he pays a lower price to the peasant, as long 
as he does not try to re-se 11 the tobacco at a higher price, it is of no con-
Cern to the warehouse. Every time he comes back to the warehouse, they will 
go through the same process for every new money release and tobacco transac-
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The money release strategy is complemented with a second mechanism 
of control: information of middleman's activities during the purchasing period. 
'fhe warehouse person in charge obtains this information either through con-
ations with other middlemen or by going to the field periodically. vers 
Middlemen provide the warehouse owner with an information network so accurate 
and precise that the latter is normally well informed of virtually all of his 
middlemen operations and of concrete tobacco transactions in his community. 
Nonnally each middleman reports his own and other buyer's operations to the 
warehouse manager on a personal basis thus establishing a mixed relation of 
trust and dependence. Through this personal link with each middleman, the 
person in charge of the warehouse is able to build in them a sense of impor-
tance and respect from which an attitude of cooperation and responsibility 
in the warehouse well-being flourishes. Once this is achieved, the flow of 
fnfonnation, and of favors, is all but abnormal. 
Still, it is normal for the warehouse manager to periodically visit 
middlemen communities and purchasing areas in order to further supervise his 
operations. He will try to karn about actual tobacco transactions, other 
warehouse middlemen's prices in the zone; future harvest for sale; and about 
arrangements between middlemen to sell tobacco either to him or to pass it 
over to another warehouse or ~bacco factory. In general, he is interested 
in every significant operation of the middleman in his own environment. If 
necessary he will pressure the corredor either by speaking to him directly, 
or by contacting members of his inner-adaptational network. These local 
Visits, not only increase the knowledge the warehouse management has of 
middlemen's operations, but also help to verify the data obtained through 
the middlemen's own network of information. They also reinforce the person to 
Person relationship established between the warehouse manager and the middle-
man. 
I 
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reliminary topology of middlemen A P 
The analysis of the records of two warehouses randomly chosen for the 
seasons of 1970-1971 and 1971-1972, including 67 middlemen working consequ-
tivelY for them during both seasons, suggests a preliminary typology of to-
bacco middlemen. On the basis of the volume of tobacco purchased, three 
types of middlemen could be distinguished: subsistence, average, and entre-
preneur middlemen. 
Subsistence corredores comprised 16 of the 67 middlemen. Their annual 
average tobacco purchase in a season ranges from 150 to 600 qq. of tobacco. 
The available information indicates that at least 12 of them are minifundist 
peasants themselves. Normally, their accumulated purchase commission and the 
money they owe to the warehouse at the end of the year balance each other off, 
leaving them without a significant profit or debt. Available information con-
finns the assumption that they buy tobacco not so much as a way to increase 
their annual income, but as an alternative to sustain themselves during the 
tobacco season. This they do by employing a share of the advance purchase money 
for household needs, thus obtaining a regular income throughout the season. 
This debt they repay at liquidation time with their accumulated commission 
money in the warehouse. In this perspective their strategy is to buy only the 
necessary volume of tobacco to cover their debts with the warehouse. 
A second group of middlemen are those purchasing an average of 600 to 
1300 qq. of tobacco per season. This group of average middlemen includes 39 
of the 67 middlemen. The information on 21 of these middlemen indicates that 
none are conuquero land holders but are owners of parcelas and middle size 
tobacco farms. Their accumulated purchase commission at the end of the 
tobacco season when compared with their debits to the warehouse normally 
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shoW a sizable profit ranging from $400.00 to $800.00. This figure, ob-
viously represents but a rough approximation of their actual profits. For 
instance, if some peasants did not reimburse to them the advanced money, or 
if they either lowered or increased the purchasing price, or if they bought 
a la flor tobacco, or any other such forceful practice. Data is not available 
-
on how many of these average middlemen did not reimburse owed money to the 
warehouses, but it indicates that at least 8 of them re-sold and classified 
their tobacco habitually., 
This information supports the assumption that they buy tobacco for the 
business it represents. Their strategy is to acquire more tobacco than the 
needed amount to repay the warehouse its money, including whatever they might 
have taken from them for household and personal expenses. Their legitimate 
profit return comes from the accumulated tobacco purchasing comniSsion in the 
warehouse. 
The third group, that of the entrepreneurs, consists of 12 middlemen 
in the sample. They are professional buyers because they will purchase not 
only tobacco but any other crop once the tobacco season is over. Their 
average seasonal acquisition of tobacco exceeds the 1300 qq. Available data 
on seven entrepreneur-middlemen reveals that five are middle landowners, 
and the remaining two are parceleros. These seven middlemen had an average of 
six comines (second middlemen) each one buying tobacco for them outside 
their traditional purchasing zone. Six of the seven for whom data is available 
classified their tobacco, bought a la flor, and habitually resold tobacco 
to the warehouses. At all moments their main strategy was to keep the capi-
tal working. Thus their accumulated commission at liquidation time, when 
compared with their debits to the warehouses, far exceeded the latter~ 
1:.I 
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The analysis of the record and operations of entrepreneur middlemen 
implies that they use every possible strategy to increase their profit, and that 
theY are highly successful in this. Their legitimate profits from the records 
could roughly be estimated as ranging from $950.00 to $5,200.00. To this amount 
it has to be added whatever extra-income they obtained through marketing practices 
other than those approved by the warehouses 
If this preliminary typology is representative of middlemen, it indicates 
that "harmful" marketing practices of middlemen are normally associated with 
higher purchasing scale operations. Also the range of operations of subsistence 
middlemen is probably 1 imited to the purchase of tobacco from the members of their 
own inner-adaptational networks. In contrast, the entrepreneur middlemen rely 
on a wide network of comines to augment their purchasing niches. Finally, some 
of the middlemen's legitimate profits are not as irrational as normally thought. 
This is especially true if it is realized that their commissions have to cover 
their own household and personal expenses, plus some of the handling costs not 
embraced by the transportation money which the warehouse grants him in addition 
to his purchasing commission. 
Middlemen Interactive Quasi-groups 
One of the most interesting aspects of middlemen adaptational networks 
is the ''interactive quasi-group"; (for a discussion of this concept, see Meyer 
1966). Local second middlemen (comines or piches), hamperers (enceronadores), 
tobacco classifiers (clasificadores), plus independent truck drivers (choferes), 
are the most significant figures of these quasi-groups. This interacting set 
of people are centered around the middleman. The actions of these members are 
connected only in so far as they are a part of the social network of the middle-
man or one of the quasi-groups' members. The temporary network is formed for 
the purpose of assisting the middlemen in various functions he has to perform in 
role, and thus permitting him more freedom of movement as well as increasing hfS 
his scale of operations. 
Like the middleman himself, classifiers and hamperers are from a rural 
extraction. In contrast to the middleman they normally are day laborers and do 
not O'lln land. Enceronadores are the most common workers of any middleman. A 
middleman will normally have two to seven hamperers working for him. Their job 
is to hamper the tobacco once it has been sold to the middleman, but it is done 
with the assistance of the landowner and some of the sharecroppers and day 
laborers if they are present. 
Through the performance of this labor in the tobacco shading houses, 
the hamperers liberate the middleman from a necessary operation and give him 
the opportunity to attend the purchase of other crops, to deal with the ware-
house, or to take care of any other necessary details. Although not intended, 
hamperers can also control the quality of the purchased tobacco, and any possi-
ble adulteration of the hampers content which might artificially increase the 
tobacco weight and thus its cost. A hamper's income varies considerably. He 
starts working at purchasing time, and on a daily basis. Average income for 
them ranges from $0. 15 to $0.25 per quintal of tobacco hampered; still other 
arrangements call for $0.50 to $2.00 per working day. 
In some instances, the enceronadores' role is transformed to that of a 
tobacco classifier; but usually there are two different persons performing these 
roles. While the labor is similar, their job is not. Classifiers, normally 
one to three per middleman, operate in the buyer's own warehouse. These are 
small countryside houses or even rooms where some average middlemen and almost 
all entrepreneur middlemen gather their purchased tobacco to either desnatar 
(classify the tobacco into criollo and olor tobacco) or to speculate with it 
by retaining the purchased tobacco until its price increases thus re-selling it 
to the warehouse as previously seen. 
I 
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The rationale behind the desnatar practice in which the classifier is 
an important unit, is that good quality criollo tobacco can yield inferfbr 
types of olor tobacco (tiene clase). These normally bring a higher price; 
secondly, the olor tobacco factories will buy this criollo tobacco as olor 
tobacco since normally they do not have sufficient supply of tobacco. The 
inferior types of olor tobacco acquired from a good criollo harvest are usually 
types A and P. Their prices are normally higher than that of criollo tobacco 
with the abnormal exception of the months of July and August of 1972, when 
criollo market price rose to $30.00/qq., while olor tobacco type P (picadura) 
was paid lowe~ ranging from $28.50 to $30.00/qq. In normal seasons, the desnatar 
practice is a sound economic strategy in which some, but not all, criollo middle-
men get involved. 
Those middlemen who classify their tobacco have to take a double risk. 
First, the harvest being classified must be of good enough quality to produce 
sufficient class tobacco to justify their labor and time investment. In some 
cases, middle landowners producing criollo tobacco classify their own tobacco 
thus increasing their profits. But paradoxically,mi~ifundist tobacco producers 
do not. Although data is not conclusive on this point, it seems that they do not 
want to risk investing money in classification labors without the certainty of 
being able to obtai:n tabaco de factoria (olor tobacco) in return. Sometimes 
they also mention their lack of knowledge to distinguish different types of 
tobacco. Nevertheless, the main reason probably is that they are pressured by 
middlemen not to do it. 
The second risk middlemen have to take with· desnatando criollo tobacco 
is the warehouses who do not approve of this practice. Their main objection being 
that they would be paying a high price for a lower quality tobacco. Furthermore, 
their own warehouse classification for better quality tobacco will yield lesser 
Percentage of types #1 and #2, thereby decreasing ther profits when selling the i I ,1 ,, 
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tobacco to the manufacturers. 
The third unit integrating the middleman interactive quasi-group is the 
truck driver. Normally he comes from a semi-urban environment and owns the 
vehicle. With one or two peones (day laborers) he leases his services to a 
group of subsistence and average middlemen in a purchasing zone nearby; 
entrepreneur middlemen frequently include in their scale operations a private 
vehicle. The truck driver average income is $0.25/qq. transported from the 
tobacco shading house to the warehouse. Any weight reduction (merma} before 
the tobacco is received in the warehouse or any hamper which gets lost is 
usually the responsibility of the middleman. 
In those cases where the truck is not able to get near the peasants' 
ranch because of road conditions, for instance in the hills of Janice and San 
Jose de las Matas, or in remote communities as Las Cuevas de Cevico, the 
tobacco is first transported by animals to the road, and then picked up by 
the truck. This process is known as recuas, and each bestia (animal} carries 
two hampers at a time amountmg to $0.25 each; if the trip is more than three 
or four kilometers, transportation will increase. 
Although a middleman's responsibility, transportation costs are financed 
by the warehouses. They normally add to the middleman's commission an extra 
$0.50/qq. for transportaion costs, and provide them with cerones (hampers , 
averaging $0.32 each} in which the tobacco is transported. Because the truck 
driver only receives $0.25/qq. of the $0.50/qq. for transportation costs, the 
middleman pays his hamperers from the remaining $0.25/qq. If the hamperer gets 
$0.15/qq., then the extra $0. 10/qq. still remains in the possession of the 
middleman. In other words, of the $1.50/qq. the buyer receives from the ware-
house (commission and transportation costs), he will probably keep $1. 10/qq. 
If he employs a classifier, his operational costs will go higher, but also his 
returns. 
11,, 
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Of all the members of the middleman's quasi-group, th~ comines or piches 
are in the most commercial relationsh:ip with him. They frequently operate out-
side the middleman's original purchasing niches (fuera de zona) thus amplifying 
his range and scale of operations. For the most part they are local store owners, 
but still others are officials of peasant local organizations, usurers, and local 
majors. Data is not clear in how the association between the middleman and his comin 1 
originates. But the analysis of ten middlemen operations from Pontezuela and 
ramboril suggests that they frequently are friends (amigos) from infancy times 
when living in a former community together, or that they are relatives. In any 
case their arrangement establishes for the comin to buy tobacco in his community 
and the comin:will also. inform him of tobacco transactions occuning in the area. 
The former will receive both advanced and purchasing money from the middleman to 
subsidize his enterprise, and if necessary, will also employ cash from his own 
commercial enterprise. In return, he will receive either a $0.50/qq. purchasing 
commission, or any profit resulting from the price difference when reselling the 
tobacco to the middleman; if the price margin is ample enough they might divide 
it according to specific share arrangements. 
Comines' purchasing operations in the community vary from those of the 
regular middlemen. They do not have the same degree of control of the latter 
over his original purchasing niches. Instead, they normally exploit any debts 
the peasant might have with them on account of other commercial, financial or 
legal practices, in order to buy their tobacco. 
Future of the Middlemen Distributive Role 
Tobacco middlemen, especially when buying in their own purchasing niches, 
maintain a network of person to person exchanges with their cl ientele which per-
sists over time and endures longer than any singk transaction. Along with 
market competition determining price in relation to supply and demand, there 
. I 
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are slight but significant exchanges of privileges between them ranging from 
matters of sale preference to obtaining cash, and a variety of other services. 
If this picture is correct, it in no way contradicts the assertion that tobacco 
middlemen --especially average and entrepreneurs-- have fully developed commercial 
motivations. In fact, the use of personal ism in their transactions is economically 
sound and simply reflects awareness of the characteristics of the environmental 
social organization to which they have to adapt. 
The purchasing practices of the middlemen with their strong personalistic 
element affects the nature of the internal marketing activity of criollo tobacco. 
Not only are peasants affected by the middleman's control of financial resources 
and market relation, but even the export houses consider their interests affected 
by their price speculations based on the twofold control of cash and tobacco 
harvest which their privileged position in the industry's distributional system 
grants them. Shephard, who has studied Caribbean internal economies, soundly 
warns against any unqualified judgments that, regardless of local conditions, the 
middleman is economically deleterious: 
It is dangerous to assume as some cooperative enthusiasts do, that 
middlemen are parasites who interpose themselves between producer 
and consumer and levy a toll on both without render1ng any service 
•.• We must not lose sight of the fact that middlemen come into 
existence in response to a demand by producers and consumers for 
the essential services they perform. They are induced to undertake 
these services in the expectation of profit and if the prospect of 
profit permanently ceases, they cease to operate. The fact that 
many middlemen earn profit cannot be accepted as conclusive evidence 
of inefficiency or of excessive changes for the services they perform 
... It is possible, of course, to eliminate particular types of middle-
men, but ..• (their) services are indispensable and the question is 
whether these services can be performed more efficiently by specialist 
middlemen or by organizations of producers (cited in Mintz 1956:22). 
It is all but revolutionary to admit that the present day market prac-
tices of middlemen have to be rationalized, and probably gradually eliminated, 
With the development of organizations of tobacco producers or even specialist 
middlemen. But this possibility is still remote amid a minifundist criollo 
172 
production characterized by a significant absence of production cre9it to these 
small producers and by local unstable producers' organizations. 
On the other ·hand, two questbns are most relevant at this junction. First, 
what shall be done to employ economically the labor freed by the reforms if they 
ever become successful. And even most important, will the reforms of marketing 
practices broaden economic opportunities for the producers, or disadvantage small 
producers by favoring the export houses? It should be remembered that some middle-
men, intensify competition and reduce chances for zonal monopolistic control by 
the export houses over the supply of any group or individual; especially since 
they operate with a relative margin of freedom in their purchasing niches because 
of environmental social organization, and apparently without unconditionally 
submitting themselves to the organized price-fixing schemes of the warehouses. 
CHAPTER VI 
EXPORT LEVEL OF ARTICULATION 
The Dominican crop of criollo and Cuban tobacco is bought and processed 
by an average of 13 to 15 export houses (casas exportadoras) operating in the 
country. This operation is accomplished through a network of dependent local 
warehouses and transactions with independent or semi-independent local packers 
(empacadoras locales). Once it has been packed, the tobacco leaves are exported 
through international dealer houses (casas matrices) who either subsidize or 
provide financial support to almost all the export houses. 
These export packers constitute the core of the export level of articu-
lation. Thetr cultural significance is analogous to the one of the middlemen 
because of their strategic position in the industry's adaptational network. Like 
the middlemen in the national environment, export houses conjoin two different envi-
ronments: the national producers and manipulators of tobacco, and the inter-
national dealers in virtual control of both capital and access to manufacturers' 
markets. The adaptational network of the exporters consists of a set of exchanges 
articulating both energy resources, tobacco and capital. Thus, their own existence 
is contingent upon both the purchase and processing of the tobacco, and the finan-
cial assistance and marketing cooperation of the international dealers. 
At the national sphere, their operations are most significant. During 
the ten months tobacco season in 1970-1971, these export packers put into circulatbn 
approximately $22.3 mill ion pesos in the Cibao region (cf. El Sol newspaper; 
Thursday, August 5, 1971). Presently their operations integrate a permanent 
labor force of 70,000 persons. Because of the nuclear family labor organization 
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's calculated to augment to 200,000 agricultural laborers {cf. Casals et al. 
Jt I 
1972 :9). Rough estimates call for 25,000 producers with a minimum of five agri-
cultural laborers each. On the other hand, each export house employs an average 
475 warehouse workers; and each of the estimated 35 local packers have a minimum 
of 150 workers. The remaining labor force comes from temporary workers involved 
in transportation and secondary industries of strings and hampers. 
As a concrete example of the economic operations of one of these export 
houses we might consider the investments of the Dominican Export Tobacco Industry 
(INETAB). In June 1972, the management of Inetab announced that the company was 
integrated by both Dutch and Dominican capital, but was controlled and administered 
by the latter. The assets were well beyond one million pesos. At the same 
time, it was reported a minimum investment of RD$1.5 million pesos for the 
purchase of 60,000 qq. of criollo tobacco in the 1972 season. This investment 
would generate presumably employment at the production level for 9,600 persons, 
and indirectly to 14,000 agrarian workers. In its own locale they required the 
services of 21 employees and 300 warehouse workers and in other dependent 
warehouses 300 workers were laboring (cf. El Listin newspaper, June 15, 1972). 
Tobacco Production Costs and Profit Strategies 
One of the most vital strategies of the export house operations is the 
purchase and control of tobacco by zones. The rationale behind this is strictly 
economic. Since the profit margin is contingent not only upon volume of pur-
chased tobacco but also upon higher yield of better types of tobacco when 
classified in the warehouses. These better types, such as #1 and #2 in criollo 
tobacco, and long-fillers in Cuban tobacco, receive higher prices from the 
manufacturers and thus augment the margin between tobacco cost and selling price. 
But the increase or decrease yield percentage of the tobacco is closely con-
tingent upon both ecological conditions and labor care of the plant during 
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This being the situation, the best option available. to the export 
is to acquire the tobacco not randomly but by selecting purchasing packers 
This strategy has become more urgent in the last years amid higher 
final costs of the tobacco to the export houses. Paradoxically, while the de-
mand for Dominican dark tobacco --but above all criollo tobacco-- is expected 
to increase during the period of 1972-1980 the exporters face the possibility of 
losing such markets. For instance, this seems to have been already the case 
with such tobacco markets as the French and the German. The main reason for 
this market loss is the sharp increase in Dominican tobacco prices. While 
Brazil and the Philippines, two of the Dominican dark tobacco competitors, 
for example, delivered their tobacco to Spain in 1967 at an average price 
ranging from US$32.00 to $35.00, and US$47.00 to $48.00 per 100 kilos respec-
tively, Dominican tobacco selling prices were US$45.00 to $50.00 per 100 kilos 
(see UNCTAD 1968:379). 
One of the main reasons for these strenuous competing prices seems to 
be the high costs of tobacco (see table 3f). From 1963 to 1972, tobacco field 
prices have increased an estimated 92% for criollo tobacco, and 11% for Cuban 
tobacco thus stimulating peasants to augment their production. While tobacco 
field prices have sharply increased in the last years, the same seems not to 
be true either of the tobacco field prices or the purchasing prices in competing 
countries as compared to Dominican exporter's tobacco costs. 
The high cost of tobacco in the field is probably related to a number of 
~ariables such as: middlemen marketing practices; export houses' inability to 
reach price agreements amid low national production and competitive purchasing 
Practices; and finally, their uncertainty of guaranteeing the necessary supply 
Of tobacco to operate and fulfill outside agreements with manufacturers. This 
COrnplex market situation is manifested through what is commonly referred to as 
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Prices (guerra de precios) among competing export houses for the acquisi-
• war of 
f the tobacco. 
tfOO O 
TABLE 31 
AVERAGE PRICE RECEIVED BY THE PRODUCER PER QUINTAL OF TOBACCO 1963-1972 
CRIOLLO CUBAN 
1963 14.89 46.32 
1964 15.65 47.51 
1965 14.62 42.65 
1966 15.54 40.28 
1967 14. 21 45.36 
1968 I: 15.74 48.25 
1969 19.50 51. 00 
1970 22.64 51. 46 
1971 (;';) 25.00 49. 10 
1972 ( ,., ) 26.00 
· (* pre! imi nary estimates). 
Source: unpub I is hed data from the Tobacco Institute 
This competition has put out of business more than two export houses in the 
1971-1972 season. Also there are concrete indications that at least three of the 
remaining export packers are either in collusion or already under a joint owner-
ship while at the same time maintaining different management. Other firms have 
divided their operations. While one deals with Cuban tobacco, the other buys 
criolJo tobacco. In all, the norm is one of overt competition with several behind 
the scenes alliances. 
In this adaptational environment, the national government policy up to 
the Present time seems to have been one of virtual laissez-faire. This is not 
so much because of a political and economic doctrine but because of technical 
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mpetence, national plitical instability and probably because of some depen-fnco 
Ce on the part of the government upon the volume of dollars (divisas) invested den 
'bY the i nternat iona 1 dea 1 ers through exporters in the country. In any case, the 
Tobacco Institute implicitly or explicitly has limited its efforts in technical 
and financial assistance to producers without interfering with exporters• oper-
ations. Its recent response to increasing prices and risk of losing European 
markets for the country's dark tobacco has been a special effort to increase 
production in order to augment the supply of tobacco to exporters. It is expected 
that this policy, in conjunction with the elimination of middlemen, will suffice 
to stabilize tobacco field prices. This strategy evades any interference with 
export house operations or confrontation with producers, while signaling middle-
men as the source of price inflation. 
Nevertheless, some private and official voices have recently called 
attention to the critical situation in which the Dominican dark tobacco might 
find itself in coming years if its prices are not stabilized. This is especially 
critical since other producing nations have been able to keep their costs down 
and manufacturers seem to be more interested in price .than in the quality of the 
dark tobacco. For these reasons they call for a pol icy of price harmonization 
and production controls: 
En vista de la pel igrosidad de la actual tendencia al alza de precios 
por razones de la aguda competencia y la tendencia de precios mas bajos 
en los productos finales hechos con tabaco negro, es indispensable 
implantar una pol itica de armonizacion de precios, que, aunque asegure 
al productor margenes de benef icio atractivos para incrementar la produ-
ccion, evite la sal ida de nuestor tabaco de los mercados europeos ••• 
Esta alza como hemos visto puede ser pel igrosa en terminos de mercadeo 
externo y quizas lo mas conveniente seria fijar niveles de produccion 
de acuerdo a las previsiones de la demanda mundial y conforme a las 
caracteristicas de esa demanda segun los mercados de posible acceso ... 
(cf. Casals et al. 1972: 4 and 10). 
The importance of the tobacco field price in relation to the profit 
margins of the exporters and for competitive ability with the tobacco of other 
Producing nations can best be shown by the following example. If for matters of 
I 
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· the criollo tobacco is only classified into three types #1, #2 and #3·, 
,1ar1tY 
and its average yield is 10, 50 and 40% respectively, with a selling price 
average of $100.00, $90.00 and $80.00 per 100 kilos of tobacco, then the average 
selling price for every 100 kilos is $87.00. The profit margin of the export 
house is between the selling price to the manufacturers and the tobacco final 
cost. 
During the last season --1971-1972-- the export house had to pay an 
estimated average $26.00 per quintal of criollo tobacco; in other words, $52.00 
per 100 kilos of tobacco. This field purchasing price went further up with 
middlemen's commission and the cost of transportation of the tobacco to the 
warehouse:$1.50/qq., or $3.00/100 kilos. Thus, for the purchase of 100 kilos 
of criollo tobacco and its transportation to the warehouse in order to start 
the manipulation and the packing processes, the exporter had already paid $55.00; 
only $32.00 short of the average selling price. These $32.00 per 100 kilos will 
have to cover all the remaining costs of production and packing, plus administra-
tive and financial expenses of the export house as they were estimated in table IS. 
This provides a profit margin to the exporters. The profit was estimated to 
range at the time of field work from 3.5 to 7% of the tobacco selling price. 
Obviously, the example is only a simplification since most export houses 
maintain a large scale operation (economia de escala), and they classify their 
tobacco in more types than here presented. Nevertheless, the fact remains that 
as the tobacco final cost increases, the export houses' own prof it margins shrink. 
In turn, some strategies are required to improve their own economic interests 
Without losing their competitive selling prices in the international market. 
In this situation, at least five alternatives are open to the exporters. 
They are: (i) to reduce tobacco field costs; (ii) to reduce elaboration and 
administrative costs; (iii) to force manufacturers to raise their purchasing 
Prices; (iv) to secure higher percentage returns of better tobacco types; 
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) and finally, to buy bulk volumes of tobacco thus establishing a large scale (v 
eration. op 
Tobacco Field Costs 
To the present, Cuban tobacco field costs are being stabilized through 
the practice of transactions made through contracts signed at the beginning of 
the season by both the producer and the buying exporter. The contracts provide 
normally for financial and technical assistance plus a tentative selling price. 
In some instances, the contracts do not provide any selling price and the export 
house actually operated through these contracts only as a credit source while 
parchasing its tobacco on the market at harvest time. The only case in which this 
latter practice was known to be employed was where the financial situation forced 
the company to appeal to this scheme in order to augment its capital. In any 
case, the contract strategy eliminates the middlemen. It also guarantees the 
export house a certain amount of the tobacco production from the beginning of 
the season without leaving them at the mercy of the competition of the free 
market to obtain their supply at harvest time. On the other hand, the producer 
will be guaranteed not only financial and technical assistance, but also a price 
·-normally a minimum price--for his crop. According to data from 30 producers 
under contract with an export house, this price security is considered by the 
growers as one of the most significant advantages of the contract arrangement in 
addition to the financial opportunities which they bring to them. At the same 
time one of the export packers recognized that there is so much demand from 
Producers to sign a contract with them, that they are purchasing tobacco exclu-
sively from contracted producers. 
But this is far from being the case in the criollo tobacco market. Export 
houses have not yet found a mechanism to stabilize prices in the field. The two 
~in reasons behind the spiralling increase in criollo prices seem to be 
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great number of small producers, and exporters inability ~o maintain price the 
d between them amid marketing competition. In addition to this they seem 
,ccor 
unable to guarantee in advance the necessary supply of tobacco to meet export 
engagements. 
This situation has increased the commentaries and explanations for the 
situation in reference to monopoly or a cartel division of the market on price 
the part of a few big export houses. It is argued private 1 y that some exporters 
are permitting field prices to run high to force other companies out of the 
market thereby protecting their capital investments and control of the market. 
The assumptions being that these two or three big companies are able to support 
even financial losses for a relative period of time, and have the ability to 
control the market if they so desire. Evidence of this strategy is found in 
discussions, the secret colluding of some export firms, the withdrawal from the 
market of minor companies, and the decreasing profit margin of the exporters. 
It is argued that all these variables were also present in Brazil during the 
last decade and that from an estimated 20 export houses, today only 4 are left 
In the market. 
Whatever the value of this explanation, the fact remains that up to 
this moment criollo field prices are rising and there is no indication that 
this situation will change in the coming seasons. 
Elaboration and Administrative Costs 
The second strategy calls for reduction of both processing and administra-
tive costs. Average estimates of export houses' administrative expenses range 
from RD$25,000.00 to $75,000.00 per year. These expenses are absorbed by 
increasing an average 3% of the final cost of the tobacco to its selling price. 
According to the presidents of five export houses, these costs are unavoidable 
Once their firms go into a large-scale operation which depends upon bulk volume 
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of tobacco. The same can be said of processing costs which are estimated to be 
JO% of the final tobacco cost. Because one of the pressing problems between 
t houses and manufacturers is the maintenance of a standard classification expor 
d manipulation of the tobacco 0n the part of exporters, the cost and invest-an 
111ent in the manipulation and packing processes are vital to them. 
Significantly, local packers' strategy is precisely this, to eliminate 
administrative expenses and reduce to a minimum the processing costs in the 
warehouse. In this way they wi 11 produce a cheaper tobacco than that of the 
export houses and will be abl~ to sell their tobacco to them with a profit to 
both organizations. While local packer~ administrative costs are virtually non-
existent, they can reduce their processing costs to an average 4% as compared 
with exporters' manipulation costs of 10% of the final tobacco cost (cf. table 
JS'). Thus, the rationale behind all local packers' operations is, for instance, 
to produce for $76.00/100 kilos, what it will cost the exporters $84.00/100 kilos 
in their own warehouses. In other words, to reduce all costs possible, sometimes 
even at the expense of quality factors. 
Manufacturers' Purchasing Prices 
If the previous two strategies to reduce the tobacco cost have been 
practically unsuccessful, especially in the criollo industry, the third one does 
not seem to be an exception. Sufficient data is not directly able to support 
this contention. Nevertheless, it seems to be highly probable that export houses 
through their international dealers have been unable to maintain their profit 
margin by proportionally raising manufacturers' purchasing prices in relation 
to their higher costs. Private exporter's estimates from two criollo companies 
report a tobacco field price increase in the last ten years of almost 92% per 
quintal, but a slow 57% increase in manufacturers' selling prices. These esti-
mates are supported by table 33 as well as the opinion of the president of another 
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e.><Port 
house while referring to their profits in the last four years: 
Si nuestras ganancias se han reducido a un margen de 5 o 6% anual no 
es por los corredores o porque le estemos pagando demasiado a los 
productores; sino porque los manufactureros no quiren comprender que 
el precio del tabaco y ce todo lo demas esta subiendo rapidamente. 
Nose trata de un fenomeno exclusive en el negocio del tabaco, sino 
de un proceso inflacionario internacional. Pero sin embargo, ellos 
se mantienen ahi sin ceder a nuestras necesidades con tal de mantener 
un precio estable frente a sus consumidores. 
Higher Percentage Returns of Better Tobacco Types 
The fourth and not exclusive alternative open to the exporters is to 
obtain their tobacco not randomly but by taking into consideration both the 
types yielding percentages and their processing costs per purchasing zone. The 
acquisition of better quality tobacco will increase the percentage of superior 
types thus augmenting the average selling price and then their profits. 
Turning back to our previous example, if instead of obtaining the esti-
mated average 10, 50 and 40% of criollo tobacco types, a company is able to 
secure a zone with a yielding average of 16, 57 and 27% of types #1, #2 and #3 
at the previously indicated prices. Then the average selling price for 100 kilos 
Is not going to be $87.00 but $88.90. This $1.90/100 kilos difference expands 
the profit margin of the export house and is most significant when operating a 
large-scale operation. Obviously, the situation is more complicated than this 
because elaboration costs per type vary, and warehouse classifications are more 
complex than we have presented. The price mechanisms, however, are the same 
and thus the example gives an illustration of the value of this strategy. 
Not all export houses are able to control the better quality producing 
zones such as: Cancas la Reina (Tamboril), Juan Lopez and La Laguna (Moca), 
la Torre (La Vega), La Canela (Santiago), Inoa and Canafito (San Jose de las 
~tas), or Unijica (Puerto Plata). In such cases they have to export great 
Volumes of low priced tobacco in order to maintain their operations and try to 
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·,n a profit; these operations are known as un negacio de centavos ( a busi-
obta 
S of pennies). In avoiding this alternative, some export buyers move from nes 
zone to the other, purchasing the better harvests at a higher price than 
one 
that of the official market price. The rationale behind this is that even 
when they have to pay higher prices to procure specific harvests, they will 
recover their investment when the tobacco is classified. Also, their practice 
will inflate the market to other export houses in their own purchasing zones 
of influence, leaving them to acquire average type yielding tobacco amid 
conditions of high final tobacco costs. 
Large-Scale Operations 
The fifth alternative open to export houses, not so much to reduce the 
final costs of tobacco, but to sustain their profits, is connected with the 
nature of their own operations. Export houses purchase seasonally an average 
of 20,000 to 60,000 qq. of tobacco criollo, and from 15,000 to 25,000 qq. of 
Cuban tobacco. Through this large-scale economy they are able to multiply 
their actual profits per quintal, and decrease processing and administrative 
expenses which further expands therr profits. But this large-scale operation 
Is contingent upon two variables. First, the national production of tobacco 
and the exporter's uncertainty in guaranteeing a sufficient share of it. 
Secondly, the control of their purchasing networks integrated by local ware-
houses and local packers. 
In this perspective, the export producer's ability to control purchasing 
Zones involves not only guaranteeing better quality tobacco but also greater 
Volumes of it. If the case were that an export company achieves virtual mastery 
over one tobacco zone, then it would also be in a better position to fix prices. 
ihis last event presently is only the exception in some tobacco zones and not 
the rule. At most, warehouses have been able to preserve zones or sub-zones of 
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for their purchasing operations through the control .of purchasing fnf Juence 
b their middlemen networks. niches Y 
"a rehouses 
The purchase and manipulation of tobacco for the export packers is mainly 
conducted through a network of local warehouses with their middlemen. There are 
different types of warehouses connected with the exporters. Among them, could 
be distinguished main warehouses, the properly called local warehouses, and pur-
chasing warehouses. 
Main warehouses are so characterized because they are normally contiguous 
to the export house's own offices; therefore, almost all of them are in the peri-
meter area of Santiago City. They allocate high quality processing equipment, 
and frequently maintain small scale purchasing operations thereby limiting 
themselves to processing the tobacco delivered to them by other warehouses. This 
ts mainly the case with those export companies intending to standardize the pro-
duction and classification of their tobacco thus monopolizing these labors in 
one warehouse with highly technical equipment. Other companies habitually deliver 
their better quality leaves to the main warehouses to be treated according to 
more elaborate curing and classification procedures. 
local warehouses are geographically distributed according to tobacco 
zones. They are normally placed in the core of a tobacco zone with fair communi-
~tion access and try to maintain their adaptational influence by means of middle-
~n operations and through price competition. It is not uncommon to find two or 
more competing local warehouses near one another. In such cases, if the pur-
chasing zone is an old tobacco area, each warehouse will probably control or 
have preferential access to specific sub-zones of the environment. These local 
Warehouses process and pack the tobacco they obtain for export. They do not, 
hcwever, have the equipment nor the skilled labor of the main warehouses. Through 
this ability to manipulate the tobacco they augment export houses elaboration 
I 
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itY and their physical space to operate. 
,apac 
Purchasing warehouses are a strategic device of a few export houses to 
gain control over specific purchasing zones and expand their range of further 
operations. In contrast to previous warehouses, these do not process and pack 
tobacco. Instead, once they purchase the tobacco they proceed to pre-select the 
Jeaves and deliver them to a main or a nearby warehouse. They are small scale 
organizations (3,000 to 12,000 quintals per season) in charge of tobacco in 
either new zones of production or in what formerly was considered a wider tobacco 
purchasing zone. In allJ they promote purchasing operations in close relation to 
local social organizations, and further protect the companies' financial invest-
ments by transferring to the managers the responsibility for the reimbursement 
of the advanced money. 
The number of these main, local and purchasing warehouses vary from one 
export house to the other. A close estimate of the purchasing operations of 
six export houses, three of them dealing only with criollo tobacco, one with 
Cuban tobacco, and the remaining two with both varieties, revealed a network of 
six main, ten local and five purchasing warehouses. In all cases, these warehouses 
were virtually subsidized by their export companies. Thus they are clearly dis-
tlnguishable from a local packer in that they purchase and pack tobacco for the 
export houses with the former 1 s money, and do not sell back to them a tobacco 
already theirs. In other words, as distinguished from local packers, warehouses 
are dependent organizations of the export packers. 
At the beginning of every new tobacco season exporters estimate the 
national production, their own purchasing ability, and the manufacturers' demand 
Of dark tobacco. Accordingly, they will fix a tobacco quota to every one of 
th . 
eir dependent warehouses and will start subsidizing the latter's operations 
. through weekly disbursements of money. These tobacco 11quotas 11 given to the 
~arehouses are most flexible since they result from estimates of their purchasing 
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'l'tY and the exporters international demands. In fact, they only serve as an 
abl I 
d. ator to the exporters of how much tobacco they will obtain through each fO 1C 
hasing channel and the investment they will have to assume during the tobacco pure 
According to actual market situations, the warehouses will be granted 
the opportunity or not to change the estimates made at the beginning of the 
The economic relations between export packers and warehouses are care-
fully recorded in formal and detailed warehouse reports. Weekly reports sent 
to the forme~ account for the volume of tobacco purchased during the week and 
the total amount obtained up to that time in the season including the prices 
paid, the warehouses own expenses and the other costs to be subsidized by the 
exporters. This information is further augmented through normal visits by the 
exporters to the warehouses and other informal means of communication. Thus 
when the weekly money disbursement takes place, the exporters know with virtual 
exactitude the situation of the dependent warehouse and its weekly needs. In 
most cases, the disbursement is only authorized after the warehouse manager 
personally justifies to the president of the export house previous and coming 
expenses. 
By keeping a record of price fluctuations, 1 tobacco purchased, and 
the type of tobacco, the exporters will be able to rationally authorize new 
purchasing prices to each warehouse in view of: (i) the warehouse local environ-
mental conditions; (ii) the regional market situation; (iii) and the exporter's 
ONn financial resources and tobacco supply needs. Only the export house can 
authorize new tobacco field prices, and it is expected that warehouses and 
their middlemen purchasing operations, would be regulated according to exporters' 
fixed prices and marketing guide! ines. 
Curiously enough, some of the patterns of control existing between the 
~arehouse and its middlemen, will now be implemented between export packers and 
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warehouses; and practically for the same reasons. For instance; the direct 
the 
t act of the farmer's management with warehouses through periodical visits allow con 
the exporters to inspect personally processing procedures, the quality of the 
purchased tobacco, and to learn about other export companies purchasing practices. 
At the same time, they reinforce their personal relations with the warehouse mana-
ger. Amid these relations, exporters will try to prevent warehouses from desnatar 
the tobacco and sell better types to olor tobacco factories or to competing ware-
houses at better prices. In addition, they will prevent the reselling strategem 
of the warehouses to themselves which might inflate the purchasing price of the 
tobacco. 
The ground and buildings of the warehouses are normally owned by the person 
in charge of their operations. Frequently these privately owned warehouses, after 
the tobacco season is finished, will start processing other crops like coffee or 
corn. Regardless of whether the warehouse manager is the owner or not of the 
buildings, they are normally either local residents or urban settlers in control 
of considerable financial, political and social resources in their environments. 
Through the operations of the middlemen, and the employment opportunities opened 
by their warehouses, they will further reinforce' their assets in the community. 
It is for their privileged adaptational position that exporters select them to 
direct local tobacco operations. In a sense, they offer to the latter an opera-
tional security non-existent in the rural environments. We might say the greater 
their local control and adaptational power, the more secure and successful the 
exporter's operations become. 
No matter who the owner of the warehouse buildings is, the export house 
Pays rent, unless it is already owned by them. The warehouse manager normally 
does not receive a salary from the export house but works on a commission base. 
His commission frequently ranges from $1.25 to $2.00 per purchased quintal. His 
responsibilities are not only to contact but also to organize processing and 
and packing labors. 
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At the same time he is responsible to the export house for 
l 
reimbursement of all the money granted by the latter for the finance and the 
purchase of the crop. For this reason, it is not only to his advantage to 
augment the quantity of tobacco purchased, but also to keep tight control of 
the middlemen operations. This is particular~ true at liquidation time. In 
manY cases, warehouses have to maintain their doors open at the end of the sea-
son for smaller quantities of tobacco, and receive them at inflated prices from 
those middlemen owing them considerable sums of money. Through this strategem, 
known as chiripeando tabaco, the warehouse manager is able to secure the middle-
men's reimbursement of owed money. 
Normally, warehouses are managed by members of the manager's inner-adapta-
tional network who are more frequently than not the manager's own sons and brothers. 
In fact, data from nine of twelve local and purchasing warehouses studied, supports 
the generalization that warehouses are a family business enterprise supported by 
the manager's inner-adaptational network just as minifundist plots were at a lower 
level and scale of operations. The main difference is that the economic goals be-
hind both operating units contrast: family subsistence in one and profit maximiza-
tion and environmental control in the other. It is for this reason that warehouse 
organizations become particularly significant. The social organization common to 
to the production and middlemen level of articulation becomes also relevant and 
efficacious at a higher level of adaptation. The warehouse management is shaped 
by the inner-adaptational network personalistic approach to environmental pressures. 
It must be able to integrate and organize both labor arrangements in the warehouse 
itself as well as outside purchasing operations. For this reason, warehouses have 
Proven to be so successful not only in their purchasing and manipulation operations, 
but also in establishing information networks with the middlemen and preserving 
control and assent in their environments. Warehouse managers possess not only 
control of land, financial resources, and outside community influence, but employ 
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energy resources through and in accord with rural social organization, thus 
their 
forcing their adaptational status. 
rein 
As an example, the importance of a warehouse organization is best illustrated 
from the following case. During the summer of 1972 an export house which in previous 
years has gone out of the Dominican tobacco market was trying to resume its opera-
tions in the Cibao region. At the moment they were examining two issue; in deciding 
whether a- not they would enter into the market of criollo tobacco again: (i) a 
tobacco field price stabilization which will guarantee them a 10 to 13% profit on 
their capital investment; and (ii) their ability to secure the services of three 
local warehouses which, because of their purchasing network, virtually controlled 
three vital purchasing zones. The rationale behind the latter iss~e was that the 
purchasing networks which the warehouse managers had integrated and their local 
power was not replaceable in order to control those tobacco zones. 
Local Packers 
Local packers adapt to the criollo export houses' environment by resolving 
two issues. First of all, the export house is unable to reduce tobacco costs; 
thus they pack tobacco at lower costs and sell it to them offering the exporters 
an opportunity to augment their own profit margin. Secondly, exporters are often 
unable to comply with specific datelines for shipments of manufacturers orders. 
In either case, they extend the physical plant of the exporters and their range 
of operations. 
For instance, in 1971, a leading export tobacco house was in need of 
4,000 pacas (packed tobacco, each pack weighing an average of 70 to 75 kilos) 
for a coming shipment abroad. The vice-president of the export firm went to a 
supplier local packer and bought the tobacco at $74.00/100 kilos. The tobacco 
cost to the local packer had been $65.75/100 kilos. Meanwhile, the export house 
sold the tobacco at $80.00/100 kilos; the six dollars difference between the 
Purchasing and selling price accounted for transportct:ion and fumigation expenses, 
exporter's own profit margin. 
pl US 
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Normally, local packers operate in the same fashion as a local warehouse. 
buy and manipulate tobacco working through their own middlemen network. In 
TheY 
cases, for example, in Villa Gonzalez where local packers are also big land-
50fl1e 
owners, this middleman dependence is significantly reduced. The tobacco is pur-
chased either directly from the owner's own farms, or the peasants deliver the 
tobacco directly to them. Local packers' operations comprise an average purchase 
of 8,000 to 18,000 qq. of criollo tobacco per season, even when the bigger packers 
might purchase up to 25,000 qq. For their operations they will normally invest 
from $60,000.00 to $150,000.00 per season. Their profits are commonly estimated 
by informants associated with export houses as ranging from 10 to 13% of their 
Investment. 
According to interviews, the general impression is that export companies 
would like to abolish transactions with local packers. The main reason is that 
their tobacco processing does not comply with manufacturer's requirements nor 
standards of classification and the processes are not standardized. Furthermore, 
In some cases its weight shrinks considerably after having been packed thus 
increasing the costs of the exporters. Although frequent complaints of this nature 
are heard, local packer's enterprise seems to be secure at present mainly because 
of the service they provide for export houses by supplying them with tobacco they 
need to comply with manufacturers' orders. 
The social origin of local packers' owners is normally from the landed 
elite and other powerful social and economical sectors from urban environments. 
Their power over rural environments seems to be secured through traditional control 
of the land and/or capital assets and financial resources. Although there is not 
sufficient historical data on this point, their role was most significant years 
ago when international dealers and exporters had to establish their enterprises 
~ithout previous acquaintance with the Dominican producers and its centers 
I 
11 
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of pa.'iers. In this situation they were contingent upon this social sector to 
anize their operations. Today their position is no less significant in the or9 
t ional environment, but exporters' dependency upon them has significantly na 
decreased, primarily because local packers are not able to export their tobacco 
directly and the exporters maintain their own independent warehouse organizations. 
Local packers might finance their own operations independently by ob-
taining a credit from the local banks. But most frequently they make special 
arrangements with particular export houses. In this way, they secure both a 
buyer for their packed tobacco and financial assistance for their operations. 
They become what is usually referred to as a satel ite of an export house. Their 
dependence implies that they sell their tobacco almost exclusively to one export 
house, and prices are mutually agreed upon with the exporters having the upper 
hand. At the same time, they are expected to cooperate with the marketing 
policies of the export house. 
In other cases, when the local packers want to maintain their purchasing 
and selling independence but are not able to, or do not want to secure all their 
financial credit from a bank, they take a middle position. They will ask for a 
bank credit plus an advancement from an export house to cover the cost of a 
stipulated amount of tobacco they will process to the exporters. In this way 
they maintain a semi-independent status in their marketing operations while 
establishing commercial links with a specific export packer. 
Obvlously, the local packers' main economic interest is to operate indepen-
dently in order to increase their bargaining power at selling time. But this ideal 
seems to be only a reality to less than seven local packers of the estimated 35 
Presently operating in the country. The lack of capital and the contingency upon 
export houses to find a market for their tobacco forces their status to be one of 
big, but dependent, local tobacco merchants. In fact, local packers' general 
inability to export their own tobacco is one of their greatest adaptational 
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liabilities. The main reason for this situation seems to spring out.of their 
limited capital resources both in terms of financial and technical resources. 
According to four owners of local packers from Vil la Gonzalez and Moca, 
· restricted access and control of financial resources confines their pur-the1r 
chasing operations to a local tobacco zone. If pressured, they could not compete 
with export house prices. Furthermore, a quality 11boundary 11 is placed on their 
procedures of processing and packing the tobacco because of the lack of appro-
priate technical equipment and skilled personnel. This situation is further re-
inforced by the fact that they have to lower costs below exporters' own costs in 
order to operate since they are not able to export directly. This situation is 
critical at the regional level of operation but it is even more critical at the 
export level since they are not able to maintain direct contact with international 
~nufacturers of tobacco. . International dealers are interested in financing 
bulk tobacco operations and prefer to deal directly with their own export houses 
rather than purcahsing and/or marketing small quantitites of tobacco from inde-
pend~nt and competing producers. On the other hand, local packers lack suffi-
cient capital to maintain an international selling organization (relaciones 
comerciales) to market their own tobacco. 
Export Houses 
Preliminary data indicates that there are three types of export houses 
regardless of whether they purchase one or both tobacco varieties for export. 
Considering the financial resources of only thirteen of the nationally operating 
export houses, they might be classified into: (65%) packing or commissioned 
exporters (8); (20%) semi-independent or with mixed capital (3); and (15%) inde-
Pendent exporters {2). 
Most of the export houses are both subsidized and partially staffed by 
international dealer organizations {casas matrices). These organizations 
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tee the necessary financial resources to the exporters either .in European guaran 
1, 5 at a 6.5% annual interst and then transfer this money to their commissionist ~n~ 
nizations through the Dominican Central Bank, or in local banks at a 9.5 to or98 
io.S% interest. Their subsidies will include tobacco purchasing costs in the 
field, warehouse production and labor expenses, transportation costs, and any 
other expenses resulting from the operations of the exporter. Also they will 
1118 rket and guarantee the packed tobacco to the buying manufacturers. Under these 
arrangements the export house becomes only a dependent packing organization of the 
casas matrices. Their status is similar to that of middlemen and warehouses since 
their profits are contingent upon a volume of purchased or packed tobacco through 
a commission on account of either one of these operations --normally $3.00 per 
purchased quintal. In some cases, the export house receives a percentage of the 
amount returning from the final tobacco sale instead of a commision. From this 
money the administrative expenses have to be covered; management salaries and 
local taxes are included in these expenses. The remaining money represents their 
profits. 
Because of this financial and marketing dependency, packing companies do 
not have any power to intervene in price dealings between dealers and manufacturers. 
Their role is only to deliver the tobacco when so requested and their responsibil-
lties end once the tobacco is shipped for exportation. At the same time, infor-
mation has to be provided continuously to their respective dealer organizations 
concerning purchased tobacco, prices, percentage yieldings and market conditions. 
In this way the dealers will know what their actual supply is in order to meet 
manufacturer~ demands. Interacting with both operating units, export houses and 
international manufacturers will instruct their export houses in matters of 
~rchasing, manipulation, field prices and export shipments. 
The main difference between a commissioned and a semi-independent export 
is the constitution of their capital asset. The latter's capital normally 
I, 
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from two sources: first, a group of national investors relatively in charge 
,ornes 
he company's purchasing and manipulation process, and secondly, from an inter-of t 
'onal dealer house which normally conducts marketing operations plus the open-
nat I 
and maintaining of tobacco markets. This situation automatically grants rela-ln9 
. e operational freedom to this second group of exporters. For instance, they 
tlV 
will normally be consulted in bargaining operations between dealer houses and 
118nufacturers. They might object selling prices and if the opportunity comes or 
Is established they might even conduct tobacco transactions directly with manu-
facturers without recurring to the assistance and contacts of the interantional 
dealers. Also, at the end of the season they have a right to selling profits 
as stockho 1 de rs. 
Finally, independent export houses finance their operations exclusively 
on their own account; normally they receive credits from local banks and their 
assets are owned by national investors. This option appeared, through interviews 
with the president of one of these companies, to be very difficult. This is 
because their credit resources have a high annual interest of 9.5 and 10.5%, 
and are not sufficient to compete purchasing and price pressures of the exporters 
financially supported or subsidized by international dealer houses. At the same 
time, their international selling network is reduced to fewer markets since they 
lack the information and contacts of international dealers. Often these inde-
Pendent houses have to transfer to international dealers the role of marketing 
their tobacco at the international level; thereby they establish a relationship 
similar in nature to the one existing between the local packers and dependent 
export houses. 
Interestingly enough, not only the number of independent exporters is 
highly reduced, but that of export firms conceived and run as family enterprises 
is also decreasing. Available data seems to indicate, although it is not con-
on the point, that export houses were organized in previous years for 
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·r national purchasing, processing and packing operations as family firms as 
the' 
the present minifundist plots and local warehouses. Father-son exchanges 
are 
integrated an inner-firm structure of trust and confidence amid a highly informal 
environment where little cultural patterns of cooperation between non-kin existed 
to guide required relationships, and where political and economic instability has 
been the norm. While the father trained his sons for future transfer of business 
responsibilities, their nucleus was further protected by the cooperation of mem-
bers of their inner-adaptational network. Apart from economical aspects --such 
as business secrets tightly kept, family incentives for work effort, constant 
communication, line of authority family reinforced-- the family firm also became 
a network of strong moral obligations built up for many years. 
If the family firm was to compete with large scale tobacco enterprises 
subsidized or supported by international dealer houses, it will probably have to 
expand its operations and and thus its environmental adaptation. New financial 
resources, complex purchasing operations and selling networks, and new specialized 
personnel, all have to be integrated in the firm structure to face a highly com-
petitive environmental market where maximization of profits and capital expansion 
is virtually the sole goal. Probably because of these environmental pressures, 
family organized export houses ceded their place to present day relatively imper-
sonal and business-I ike tobacco enterprises in which criteria of performance are 
introducing new standards of procedure which are not family orientated. 
Regardless of the export houses• inner-organization, this group has 
traditionally constituted the closest reality to a sector of an oligarchic center 
of control. In fact, their adaptational network has a broad and more sophistica-
ted range of operations and consequences. Their power over the distributive sys-
tern of the tobacco industry, and thus over the country itself, is based upon 
control and access to capital and sources of financial investments, the labor 
market, and the commercial relations outside the country. To the national government 
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f f a substantial source of divisas (dollars) brought to the country theY o er 
f their operations, and needed by the former to conduct its commercial because o 
n
sactions in the international market. To the labor market, their invest-
cra 
offer employment both in the field and in their warehouses. At the same 
,ents 
Producers depend upon them to sell their crops and to get credit assistance. time, 
the national government, unless it takes upon itself this function which fven 
not seem probable in the immediate future, is contingent upon these firms cfoeS 
to market the national product and obtain dollars for international exchange. 
The relations between the group of exporters are complex, and contrary 
to predictions they do not seem to be a closely knit operating unit in economic 
8~ political affairs. Alien exporters working for international dealer houses 
In the country seem the most aloof from national politics and the organization 
of the country's structure of power. Their only interest seems to be those 
related to their tobacco investments and packing operations. Their international 
dealer houses do not seem to be reinvesting their profits in the country, thus 
their interests are further reduced to the tobacco industry. 
But the same does not hold for national exporters either working indepen-
~ntly or in cooperation with casas matrices. Their personal family status, as 
well as their adaptational network depends virtually upon their power resources 
In the national environment. Thus normally they have to secure their position 
through direct involvement in national affairs, and influential control of their 
environment. Their adaptational niches are protected not only through economic 
and political relations resulting from their tobacco business but also through 
~mily and social ties with prominent families and groups in the country. Through 
-~ese exchanges they develop an inner-adaptational network with wider ranges of 
influence and authority in the country. These adaptational networks are analogous 
to the ones operating in the production and middleman level of articulation as 
~el] as between warehouse managers; the main difference is the articulation of 
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rests and environments they articulate and control. As in the panel inha f rite 
a
nization described by Leeds (1964) in Brazil, the members of these inner-
or9 
adaptational networks represent different specific economic interests in the 
CibaO region and the country as a whole. Thus the control of power on the part 
of the national tobacco exporters is multiplied and maintained as long as they 
Succesfully compete in the market. can 
In the market, relations among exporters are strenuous. Today three 
main market rules impregnate the operations of the tobacco export houses in 
their adaptational network. They are: secrec~ distrust and competition. This 
behavioral norm affecting their operations was frankly described by an informant 
who is president of a tobacco firm. He said: "In the tobacco business there are 
neither friends nor enemies but only a compulsing need to buy tobacco and earn 
a profit. 11 
This attitude seems to become clearly evident in the incapacity of exporters 
to cooperate as a group even in matters of supposedly common interest. For instance, 
price stabilization. Usually at the beginning of the tobacco season exporters get 
together in order to decide initial purchasing prices. In 1971-1972 they did so 
again, and agreed to sustain a common market price in order to protect themselves 
from a price war growing out from stratagems of speculating middlemen and competing 
companies' purchasing practices. They all agreed on a price and none was supposed 
to raise it without mutual assent. But in less than one week the agreement was 
broken and so recognized in a second meeting. No more accords were discussed on 
this subject, at least publicly, with the proper exception of dealings resulting 
from allied companies. According to three different informants, the agreement 
Was broken when after the first meeting one of the export house presidents went 
to ·one of his dependent local packer owners (a sate! ite) and told him to start 
bu · Yrng tobacco at a higher price. The reason for this being that the agreement 
Was only between export houses, and did not include local packers. 
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probably because of the market competition between export packers and the 
f formal norms of cooperation, a common saying among tobacco exporters be-1ack o 
relatively true: '~his is not a business for heart achers because from 
c:oines 
Year, and from transaction to transaction, everything changes in the year to 
industry." Nevertheless, it is surprising how well informed most com-tobacco 
panies are in relation to competitor's operations. It is true that most tran-
. and adaptational alternatives are secretly conducted. But this does sact ions 
not seem to prevent a flow of information which permits other companies to know 
the whereabouts of their competitors with a high degree of exactitude. Among 
other reasons, it seems reasonable to assume that this is so because their 
adaptational networks are much more patterned than usually assumed. They are 
all contingent upon a common exchange structure associated with the international 
dealer houses' control of markets and capital, and amid a market run according 
to the 1 aw of supp 1 y and demand. Thus ext rapo 1 at ions from one's own adaptat i ona 1 
network are also true of other competing exporters, and provide a reliable source 
of informaton. This structural information is further supplemented by communi-
~tions coming from warehouses and international dealers. 
Table 32 is presented in order to provide a relative idea of the magnitude 
and range of export houses' purchasing and packing operations. Sale values are 
not exact because it is a customary practice to fake them in order to evade taxes. 
(Table 32 follows on the next page.) 
lnternat i ona 1 Dea 1 er Houses 
If at the national sphere the export houses' adaptational networks are 
contingent upon the control they have of purchasing zones, at the international 
Sphere they are dependent upon dealer houses. This is the second strategic 
Qriab]e determining the operations of exporters primar11y because they have to 
finance their own transactions and market their packed tobacco through the 
}1 
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TABLE 32 
EXPORT HOUSE OPERATIONS DURING THE 1970-1971 TOeACCO SEASON 
fxPORT HOUSE 
L,---
D. T.M. 
Hebeeka, c.a. 
Kaubeck, c.a. 
Manipuladora de Tabaca, c.a. 
Empresas de Tabacos Tropicales, c.a. 
Quisqueya, c.a. 
FE TAB 
IPHACO, c.a. 
Felix A. Reinoso, c.a. 
COPATA, c.a. 
INETAB, c. a. 
Sociedad Comercial Tabaquera, c.a. 
Victor F. Thomen, c.a. 
Compania Anonima Tabacalera 
E. Leon Jimenes, c.a. 
TOTALS 
QUINTALS 
75,044 
56,059 
48,625 
48,913 
24,614 
13,439 
7,283 
6,653 
620 
6,535 
3,987 
12,740 
5,926 
30,056 
20,357 
359,251 
Source: unpublished data from the Tobacco Institute. 
VALUE (RD$) 
2,428,371 
1,484,281 
1,314,209 
1'541'288 
491 ,951 
371'164 
321,577 
129,661 
15,314 
18,264 
14,623 
340,289 
171,390 
1 '107 '663 
724,663 
9, 160,507 
services of these casas matrices. Just as local packers found an end to their 
operations in the premises of the exporters, now export packers• business ends 
at the gates of dealer's selling organizations. 
International dealers maintain large scale operations not only in the 
Dominican Republic, but also in other producing countries. Through these opera-
tions they acquire bulk volumes of tobacco providing them with bargaining power 
in front of both nat i ona 1 export houses and manufacturers. This cont ro 1 is a 
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further guarantee for their access and control of credit and capital resources. 
oealer houses also sustain a selling organization through which they keep track 
of tobacco markets and the specific demands and qua I ity requirements of manu-
facturers. Thus, their adaptational network results in a mapping of both the 
producers and the consumers environment which is not availabe to either one. 
This middleman position provides the necessary credit and capital to finance 
their purchasing operations as well as the maintenance of a selling organization 
of brokers. It also enables dealer houses to direct export house operations to 
the point of even fixing tobacco field prices to national exporters, and as 
strategically important, to virtually monopolize international tobacco marketing. 
Their international marketing procedures are supported by the large-scale 
of their operations. ManufadJ..Jrers prefer to purchase their tobacco from these 
international dealers instead of small independent exporters mainly because they 
guarantee manufacturers greater quantities of tobacco. This not only satisfies 
their operational requirements but also provides the maintenance of specific 
blends and complies with concrete quality standards. On the other hand, indepen-
dent local exporters will be able to guarantee only their own relatively small 
volume of tobacco, including fewer varieties and with higher risk of failing to 
deliver the product in case of crop failure in their own countries. 
A second important advantage to the manufacturers' transactions with 
casas matrices, is the latter's ability to de! iver tobacco at lower prices because 
of their large-scale operations. And, if necessary, they can sustain temporary 
losses in specific markets in order to over-run independent local exporters' 
Price competition. Another advantage resulting from large-scale operations is 
that they can sell the tobacco with a 90 to 180 days credit without any major 
financial hardship. In fact, it is customary among manufacturers, as in Germany 
for instance, to purchase the tobacco with payment delay. This practice is 
financially most difficult to independent exporters lacking financial resources 
1111
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and paying high interests for their bank credit. All these factors are reasons llil 
·1111.' tO explain why export houses are handicapped if they ignore international dealer r 
houses in planning their operations. 1'
11 
On the other hand, tobacco manufacturers both in Europe and in the Unit-
ed States, are content to derive their profits from the processing of the product, 
leaving credit responsabilities, the gamble and the risk of crop failure and 
the possible tumbling prices to the suppl icers. As long as they are assured by 
dealer houses of the chance to buy enough tobacco to satisfy the requirements of 
their operations and the overhead involved in these, they will probably avoid 
(i) heavy investments in cultivation and manipulation in producing countries 
like the Dominican Republic, or any other investment in general, and (ii) any 
attempts to supress international dealer's role. 
This situation seems to be reinforced since the manufacturers are not 
dependent upon the Dominican Republic, or any other single producing country, 
to supply their tobacco demands. They have no heavy expenditure in capital 
equipment in producing countries but in their own. As in the case of the sugar 
industry, where there is much investment in processin·g equipment, care is taken 
that the overhead on this equipment will be spread over the largest number of 
producing units posible. Thus a sugar mill must try to assume a large supply of 
the unprocessed crop. In order to do this they must own or control the land pro-
ducing the raw product. In the case of the tobacco industry, this would imply 
the purchase of great extensions of land eliminating minifundist independent 
tobacco production as presently practiced. It would probably also mean the 
substitution of the national distributive system presently integrated by middle-
men, local warehouses and local packers. But this capitalist pattern of operations 
is not presently necessary to manufacturers because of the tobacco supply guaranteed 
by dealer houses and the absence of manufacturing equipment in the producing 
countries. Thus the elimination of present day small producers and the complex 
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distributive system of the product in the nation~l market level does"not seem 
probable to occur. 
The same observation is val id in relation to the purchasing operations 
of the international dealer houses. They do not have to invest in processing 
equipment, and to evade excessive financial risks and dependence from any one 
single nation, they do not procure their product from a restricted or exclusive 
number of producers. If, for instance, the Philippine dark tobacco crop fails, 
they will purchase the necessary tobacco either in the Dominican Republic, Brazil 
or any other nation where they may be subsidizing exporters' operations. The 
international purchasing organization of tobacco (and other crops) 1 iberates 
the dealer houses from dependency on any country and the risk of heavy invest-
ments in any single producing country to secure their purchasing power. But at 
the same time, this situation seems to preclude the Dominican production level 
from obtaining a huge accumulation and/or monopolization of land and capital in any 
one single hand. This preserves its traditional organization in the tobacco zones 
as contrasted to the productive organization in the sugar zones in the country. 
Furthermore, with the absence of huge large-scale industrial capitalism 
and thereby the need to protect its investments, a cultural overlapping of pre-
industrial and industrial cultural patterns result. A number of normally recog-
nized pre-industrial patterns (cf. Sjoberg 1955) remain amid industrial manu-
facturing, financier activities, and market relations. The type of social struc-
ture required to develop and maintain a form of production utilizing inanimate 
sources of power is quite unlike that present today at the production, middleman 
and warehouse levels of articulation in the tobacco industry. At the very least, 
extensive industrialization requires a rational, centralized extra-community 
economic organization in which recruitement is based more upon universal ism than 
Particularism, a class system which stresses achievement rather than ascription, 
a small and flexible kinship system, a system of mass education which emphasizes 
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·versalistic rather than particularistic criteria and mass media. 
uni 
Modification in any of these elements affects the others and induces 
in other systemslke those of religion and social control. Most probably changes 
industrial large-scale capital investments with its factory orientated pro-
duction and control of great extensions of land, not only requires a special kind 
of social structure within the community but would provide the means necessary 
for its establishment. But these elements accompanying industrialization are 
not present at the production, middlemen and sectors of the export level of 
articulation. Not even a 11 rural proletarian••, with the exception of day laborers, 
is present; their predominance seems to be hindered by the market orientated 
independent minifundist tobacco household. 
Transactions between dealers and manufacturers are preceded by tobacco 
samples sent by the exporters to the manufacturers. The most common requirements 
expected from Dominican dark tobacco are low content of nicotine and residues 
of clorhine insecticides, lesser degree of humidity and standard graduation and 
packing. If the sample is accepted the manufacturer wi 11 pay 75 to 80% of the 
value and the rest upon receiving and inspecting the shipment; as previously 
S~Jd, 90 to 180 days of credit might be approved. 
Operations are made upon two bases. The first is mutual confidence. If 
the suppliers should deliver a tobacco shipment not corresponding to the sample, 
the manufacturer wi 11 not order any more tobacco from him. Secondly, there are 
no contracts for more than one season. The rationale is that manufacturers prefer 
to select from year to year the best crops and take advantage of better commercial 
conditions. This is not to say that manufacturers change from suppliers every 
season, but only that they prefer to maintain their purchasing freedom. As a 
lllatter of fact, manufacturers are very slow to change suppliers since the tobacco 
Obtained through them affects the blend characterizing their finished product 
0P0 n Which their final sales are contingent. Therefore, manufacturers normally 
I 
I 
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offer purchasing 11preference11 to their traditional suppliers .and thereby new 
market penetrations are difficult. They further protect themselves by keeping 
stocks of tobacco for an average of 24 months. 
The practice of only offering suppliers a purchasing preference over 
other dealer's tobacco increases the risk involved in the dealings of the casas 
matrices. All of their operations are normally done on an estimated basis. 
At the same time the difficulty of penetrating new market~ just because of this 
transactional custom, influences the behavior of the dealers. They are always 
prompt to supply any order received regardless of local prices and possible 
losses. Only by satisfying a manufacturer will they keep their market sales 
and establish bonds of trust and cooperation with buyers. 
Tobacco sale price is usually agreed to in U.S. dollars according to 
weight measures of 100 kilos if exported to Europe, or of 100 pounds if se~ to 
the United States. In the last season, because of the dollar devaluation, sales 
were approved in other European currencies. During sale transactions the rela-
tions between the manufacturers and the export houses are 1 imited to letter 
exchanges. On some occasions however, manufacturers send representatives to 
inspect the tobacco harvest and warehouse manipulation. During fieldwork, two 
such representatives seemed to be as well informed of Dominican tobacco pro-
duction, yields, and cost as any export house president. 
f If the export house sells his tobacco directly to the manufacturer, then 
i 
1 1 an average of 3.5 to 7% of the selling price of the 100 kilos of tobacco will I 
l 
I 
normally account for the exporters' profit margin. On the other hand, this 
prof it increases to an average of 6 to 13% if the sale is done through an 
international dealer house. In all cases, export transportation costs are taken 
care of by the buyers. Examining the profit margins, it becomes evident that the 
strategy of both the independent exporters and international dealers, resides in 
bulk transactions of better quality tobacco in order to increase their relatively 
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TABLE 33 
AVERAGE SALE PRICE OF THE DOMINICAN TOBACCO AT THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET 1963-1970 
:niiNTR IF<:; 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
--
~i:NEDlll ll\/FRAGF 26.34 29.46 32.64 26.08 26.64 35.42 36.29 36.52 
-
1111!=Rll(~E IN AMERICA 38.02 37.81 70.40 50.65 42. 19 45.80 47.23 47.99 
-
canada 29.32 23.20 --- --- 54.25 --- --- 37.86 
Chi le 25.00 --- --- 41. 51 34.34 --- 111 . 03 111. 79 
United States 38.28 35. 13 92. 77 51. 34 50.27 54.39 50.54 50.82 
puerto Rico 37.80 41. 81 50.18 --- 34.36 38.03 39.63 39.47 
Ha it i --- --- --- --- --- 50.49 --- ---
Uamaica --- --- --- --- --- 148.65 153.04 ---
Uruguay --- 26.38 --- --- 33,22 48.33 40.80 48.50 
venezue 1 a --- 83.92 --- 85.80 86.02 19.36 269.93 ---
i•W!=RAGE IN EUROPE 23. 12 24.02 27.60 25.63 23. 61 32.02 33.01 33,70 
Germany 24.19 24.15 26.04 22.21 22.88 24.91 29. 19 33.31 
Be 1 g i um 26.74 32.54 33. 14 34.06 31. 78 37.58 41. 05 45.07 
l)enma rk 29.68 38.03 41.93 32.51 32.42 40.82 38. 17 38.44 
~pa in 20.81 21. 70 20.45 19.58 18.29 30. 97 23. 93 30.95 
Canary Islands 24.97 25. 13 26.59 24.26 23.92 32.35 34.34 33,98 
~zores Islands 49.94 --- 42.49 34.00 --- --- --- ---
Holland 23.23 22.05 29.85 25.54 25.20 32.03 32,50 34.45 
Finland --- --- --- 30. 13 --- --- --- ---
France 21.04 19.02 26.47 --- --- --- --- ---
Great Britain 18.39 36.03 --- --- --- --- --- ---
Italy --- 32.97 --- --- --- --- --- ---
Portuga 1 32.03 27.65 --- 30.53 --- --- 38.71 35.00 
Switzerland --- 25.06 --- --- --- --- --- ---
VERAGE IN AFR I CA 24.25 21.46 23.86 20.69 21.64 30. 77 28. 11 31. b5 
~VERAGE IN ASIA 30,73 --- --- --- --- 40.51 --- ---
Source: Unpublished data from the Tobacco Institute. Price for 50 kilos 
in RD$. 
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low profit percentage. As a matter of fact, during our resear~h some export 
houses seemed to remain in the tobacco business not so much because of profit 
maximization that competition had reduced sharply in the last years, but as a 
waY of life (if covering costs) and to maintain their costly initial investments 
and organizations. On the other hand, interviews are indicative of a trend by 
which small dealer houses have been assimilated by more powerful and large-scale 
dealers. 
Normally, dealer houses will keep track of manufacturers' needs through 
a network of brokers earning from 3 to 5% of each final sale they arrange. These 
brokers are frequently in close contact with manufacturers and maintain a personal 
relationship. These are of strategic importance. Interviews reveal that some-
times sale transactions have to be arranged through these brokers because of their 
relationships with the manufacturer. Brokers normally operate in one country and 
for one dealer house exclusively; when the tobacco season is over they will prob-
ably market other products. At no time do they have access to the tobacco or to 
the money accounting for the payments. Only in this respect does their role 
differ from that of countryside tobacco middlemen. In some instances, indepen-
dent and semi-independent export houses are able to obtain the services of some 
of these dealers and thus directly keep track of the demands of manufacturers. 
Cases have been reported in which personal considerations have influenced the 
lowering of the broker's profit to even 2% of the final sale. 
In any case the role of the brokers under present day organization of 
the tobacco industry remains essential since they inform suppliers of new 
markets and their possible demands. At the same time through their personal 
relations with manufacturers they secure buyers to the former's tobacco. 
! 
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CHAPTER VI I 
THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF POWER 
Tobacco Eco-market System 
In supplying Dominican dark tobacco to manufacturers a complex organiza-
tion of exchange is necessary. Through it tobacco flows from the peasant's plot 
to the internatinal buyers with the intervention of the middleman, local packer 
and the export house. Two significantfeatures are characteristic of the opera-
tions of these units. 
First, the adaptational networks of the units are united by the flow of 
one common energy resource. In other words, the vehicle connecting the adapta-
1'1 
tional networks of these units is a common '~rticulating energy resource'', 
tobacco. The more dependent any unit is upon tobacco transactions to procure 
its ecological adaptation, the more vital this energy resource becomes to it. 
They might or might not be exclusively adapted to one articulating energy resource. 
But as long as they are accountable for the flow of tobacco from one level of 
articulation to the other, this commodity is an articulating energy resource. 
lmbedded in this feature is a distinction between specialized and diver-
sified adaptation. For instance, a peasant with a farm of 55 tareas seeded 
with criollo tobacco is more dependent upon the tobacco market prices than 
another one with 25 tareas of tobacco and 30 tareas of secondary crops. In the 
same way, international dealers normally purchase and market in addition to 
tobacco other crops such as coffee and cocoa. Regardless of the adaptational 
value of this strategy, their environmental control seems to be less contingent 
upon tobacco transactions than if they were dealing with only one articulating 
•--------..------20-7------~------~~ 
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energy resources. 
The second operational aspect of these units is the integration of a 
technoeconomic organization beyond the adaptational network of any one single 
unit or any one single level of articulation. No adaptational network within 
this technoeconomic organization is isolated or self-supporting. The degree of 
dependence of any one single unit upon the adaptational operations of the others 
varies and is open to specific study according to a quantifiable model of power 
reciprocities presented earlier in this work. The fact rema.i:ns, however, that 
the units are mutually dependent in order to guarantee the flow of the tobacco. 
Not only is a distinction of specialized versus diversified adaptation 
again relevant but we also find the problem of complexity and environmental 
overlapping. For instance, a criollo tobacco minifundist peasant not only has 
to worry about climatic conditions affecting his crop, but with tobacco market 
prices, market transactions, and production credits as well. Prices fluctuate 
according to market conditions of supply and demand analyzed by international 
dealers and export houses. Market transactions are contingent upon relations 
with producer organizations, inner-adaptational network and social activities. 
Production credits depend upon the private polic~1 of export houses through 
local warehouses and the official policies of the national government as well as 
upon community contacts with money lenders and store house owners. As a result, 
the peasant is exposed to what might be called a "broken environment••. In it a 
number of units interact, many from different levels of articulation, conditioning 
his adaptation beyond expected natural environment and community conditions. 
The technoeconomic organizat1on involving the exchange networks of 
tobacco for other energy resources forms what we shall call an eco-market system. 
An eco-market system is a complex distributive system of energy resources articulat-
ed through a series of levels and organized through the adaptational networks of 
the different operating units. It accomplishes two main functions. 
·,1· ~I 
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first, by means of this technoeconomic mechanism of industrial comprex societies, 
articulating energy resources are harnessed, transformed and distributed for 
future consumption by specific units in the society. Secondly, the eco-market 
t m protects the flow of various other energy resources of strategic importance sys e 
for the ecological adaptation of the units within the system. 
The term "eco-market system" has been elaborated and receives its meaning 
from two previously employed concepts in the anthropological literature: eco-
system and market system. As frequently employed in cultural anthropology the 
term ecology refers to three levels of relationship of man to his environment. 
First, to the relationship of a human community to its inorganic environment. 
secondly, to the human community relationship to the plants and animals that 
it depends on. Thirdly, the interrelationships between human beings within an 
organized social system and between human communities. Since human behavior 
is primarily cultural behavior, ecology is referred to in anthropology as 
cultural ecology. Briefly then, from a cultural ecologist perspective the 
culture of a social unit appears as a system in process in interaction with 
other systems; for instance, the biotic system. The key to understanding the 
developmental process of the cultural system 1 ies in this interactive relation-
ship. The total network of relationships between the systems is known as ecologi-
cal system or eco-system. 
The second concept he~ re-elaborated is Polanyi's market system pre-
vi6usly discussed in the Introduction to this work. Its employment tries to 
emphasize the fact that the eco-system of operating units in contemporary 
industrial societies is articulated by specific market relations. Polanyi 
(1968:32-35) convincingly argues that it was not the coming of the machine as 
'l J such, but the invention of elaborate and therefore specific machinery and plant 
that completely changed the relationship of the merchant to production. The 
use of elaborate technology involved the development of the factory system. 
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industrial production ceased to be an accessory of commerce organized by merchants 
as a buying and selling proposition. Now it includes long term investments with 
corresponding risks. Thus, unless the continuance of production is reasonably 
ed Such a risk is not bearable. assur , The fiction in regard to such "commodities'' 
as labor (human activity), land (nature) and money (a token of purchasing power 
which comes into being through the mechanism of banking or state finance), supplies 
a vital organizing principle in regard to the whole society. It affects the whole 
society because no social arrangement is allowed to exist that might prevent the 
actual functioning of the market mechanism of buying and selling contingent upon 
the priced flow of these non-commodities. 
The tobacco eco-market system has been defined in relation to the 
exchange through which an articulating energy resource is harnessed as a raw 
product and successively transformed until it is ready for consumption. It should 
be noted, however, that after the final tobacco products are manufactured a new 
process starts. Industrial manufacturers supply and depend upon local distribu-
tors and commercial houses to market their final products to the public at large. 
The commercial level of articulation as well as the manufacturing level of the 
tobacco eco-market system were not studied during field work for two main reasons. 
First, time was not sufficient in order to conduct this research. Second, the 
manufacturing and commercial levels of articulation take place outside the Domini-
can Republic in Europe and the United States. Hopefully, future research will 
fill the gap and determine these phases of the flow of the commodity to be the 
last two stages of the tobacco eco-market system. 
The Tobacco Eco-market System: A Segmentary Organization? 
A segment is, generically, one of an indef1nite number of parts comprising 
a whole in which one part is like another in structure or composition and func-
tion. It also refers to the common process of growth by division into equivalent 
t 
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parts. 
The tobacco eco-market system resembles in its functional organization 
at each level of articulation the segmentation studied by Sahl ins at the tribal 
Jevel of sociocultural integration (1961). 
In his study, Sahl ins expanded the concept of habitat to include the 
presence or absence of neighboring tribal groups. According to him, a tribe is 
a segmented organization. It is composed of a number of equivalent, unspecial-
jzed, multifamily groups, each the structural duplicate of the other. Each 
segment, composed by a collection of kinship and residential units, not merely 
patrilocal bands, is economically as well as politically autonomous. Segmen-
tation then is studied as an adaptation to specific pressures faced by the Tiv 
and the Nuer tribes. It refers to the fact that each segment of a tribal 
society is an autonomous replica of all the others, without centralization of 
control. This replication denotes numbers of people which can vary greatly in 
each of the segments. The adaptive advantage of the segmentary 1 ineage is the 
form taken by a tribal society when it settles in an area previously inhabited 
by other groups. But if there is not pressure to establish a confederated 
defense or offense against neighboring tribes, there will be 1 ittle inclination 
on the part of the segments to unite. 
If the Tiv-Nuer segmentary 1 ineage is a "political machine 11 , the eco-
market system is a technoeconomic adaptive form. It guarantees the flow of 
energy resources in an industrial complex society between heterogeneous environ-
ments achieving a stage of organic solidarity regardless of patterns of conflict. 
The principal selective pressures associated with the origin of the tobacco 
eco-market system are: first, the more extensive technical ability of industrial 
societies in contrast to hunting and gathering, tribe, chiefdom, and pristine 
state sociocultural systems. This is specifically true in relation to the 
technological refinement of industrial societies and the division of labor it 
requires coordinated by centers of control and of role specialization. Secondly, 
I 
, I 
I 
212 
. 
we find the complexity of the distributive system common to complex societies 
where producing and consuming units do not necessarily coincide. Thirdly, the 
geographical mobility within and between contemporary societies augments the 
range of contact and exchange of any particular group, city or state beyond 
f its own frontier. Fourthly, the market economic system under which commodity 
transactions take place in industrial societies emphasizing the accumulation of 
capital, financier investments, and monetary equivalencies. 
At first sight, the differences between a tribal segmentary lineage as 
defined by Sahl ins and the tobacco eco-market system seem overwhelming. The 
tobacco system is not politically or economically autonomous. It operates 
within a wider societal environment and under specific regulations of various 
independent states. In addition, each level of articulation is not the replica 
of the other. Especially, when analyzed in terms of scale of operations, environ-
mental control and adaptational specialization. Whether or not the tobacco eco-
l market system as a unit is the replica of other operating market systems in industrial societies will have to be decided by future comparative studies. 
In any case, the differences between the tribal segmentary lineage and the eco-
market system seem to result from their different adaptations: to a tribal and 
to an industrial level of sociocul~ural integration. This adaptational differ-
ence also accounts for their contrasting mechanical and organic solidarity. 
Regardless of the previous differences, the structural operations within 
each level of articulation of the tobacco eco-market system are analogous. The 
differences in scale of operations of the different units at the various levels 
of articulation reveal functional operations recurrent throughout the eco-
market system, especially, in relation to the conditioning imposed upon them 
by market based transactions. These similarities are so basic that they suggest 
this technoeconomic organization as a segmentary adaptive mechanism character-
istic of industrial complex societies. 
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The present discussion does not intend to argue whether or not eco-
market systems are segmentary organizations. It only wants to acknowledge 
the possible taxonomic precedent of the tobacco eco-market system in an evolution-
ary perspective. Some of the structural similarities recurring at each level of 
articulation and conditioning the ecological adaptation of the units within the 
system will be considered in the following subsections. But .the scope of the 
argument will be wider than mere structural similarities in the operations of 
the different operating units within the levels of articulation. 
Adaptational Strategy 
To be ecologically adapted is to be able to control and use the necessary 
environmental energy resources. These, by definition, are the means environ-
mentally available for the subsistence, survival and expansion of the operating 
unit's existence. The success or failure of the adaptational process is determined 
by the cultural perception of the control and use of what Wolf has called "cul-
tural necessities 11 (1966:6). 
In industrial complex societies there are two characteristic features 
associated with the flow of energy resources: first, more energy resources are 
employed by the social units than is available in any single environment; secondly, 
access to society's energy resources is normally conditioned to a previous func-
tional transformation of them through an "instrumental energy resource'': liquid 
assets or just money. Under these conditions direct access to the energy 
resources is restricted on the part of the laboring units within society. Con-
siderations of kinship, marriage rules and descent and residential units, formerly 
of prime causal importance to determine access to the group's energy resources 
are now substituted or conditioned by evaluations of legitimacy and labor outputs. 
The labor output of the units in their adaptational networks has then to be (i} 
Valued and (ii) proportionally converted into the instrumental energy resources 
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of the society. After this process takes place the unit will. exchange its instru-
mental energy resources for other resources being controlled, transformed and dis-
tributed by the cultural system. 
The main task of the adaptational process of the units in the society is 
I then to increase their bargaining power at the market place in order to control 
t 
the necessary amount of instrumental resources which are to be converted into 
other energy resources. To achieve this goal the adaptational strategy of all 
units within the tobacco eco-market system consists in increasing the value of 
their operations in competition with the remaining units in the system. 
The reason for this strategy lies in the fact that the value of their 
labor output is arbitrary; in other words, it is culturally determined. If 
they are able to increase their power base within the eco-market system the 
units will find themselves in a better position to determine the value of their 
operations to be then transacted for instrumental energy resources. The sign 
of this environmental exercise of power is related to their ability to control 
and determine the flow of tobacco through their intervention in the process of 
harnessing, transforming and distributing this commodity. By controlling the 
flow of tobacco they preserve or improve their position within the eco-market 
system. In addition, the units reinforce the value of their operatbns in the 
system. 
Core Energy Resources 
The control exercised upon the flow of tobacco in the eco-market system 
is contingent upon environmental power harnessed by the units and strategically 
employed within the system. Furthermore, the status and role of each operating 
unit (stratification) within the tobacco eco-market system is causally depen-
dent upon its power resources. 
The unit's power base in the system is obtained through the control of 
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••core energy resources". These are the strategic resources upon which the process 
t 
of production, transformation and distribution of the articulating energy resource 
of the eco-market system is based: i.e., land or technology. By strategically 
utilizing and controlling core energy resources the units within the system are 
able to influence a fluctuating volume of energy. The larger the volume the 
greater will be the unit's power over the flow of tobacco in the system. At the 
core of the market transactions then lies an environmental power base contingent 
upon the unit's control of core energy resources. 
The eco-market system is mainly the ~ructure for the power manifested in 
the strategic employment of means of power according to marketing conditions. 
By harnessing control over the environmental core energy resources the intervening 
units strive to ~ei_nforce their power domains within the eco-market system and 
within society at large by controlling greater amounts of instrumental energy 
resources. At the same time, their power domain in the eco-market system will -
further reinforce their previous control over core energy resources. Thus a I generalization summarizing the process of ecological adaptation within the 
tobacco eco-market system is as follows: Power over core energy resources gen-
erates control over the flow of articulating energy resources (tobacco). This 
increases the bargaining power over instrumental energy resources and further 
reinforces power over core energy resources. 
The analysis of this propositon will be undertaken below to determine 
how control over core energy resources is obtained and the interaction of diff-
erent forms of resources. But first some marginal considerations in the following 
two sub-sections are necessary. 
Market Exchange 
The exercise of power within the eco-market system is best exemplified 
in the structural mechanism through which the tobacco flows. The internal 
organization of the system is marked by power based transactions. These tran-
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sactions have a market structure of exchange, i.e., supply and demand. Through 
it at least two energy resources flow: tobacco and liquid assets. A supplying 
' unit offers on demand the tobacco under its control to a purchasing unit. The 
commodity is exchanged at public market price for a certain proportion of liquid 
assets controlled by the former unit. In this fashion tobacco will finally 
reach the manufacturers and the consuming public while a reallocation of liquid 
asset takes place. 
The operating units do not exchange tobacco with the eco-market system 
as an entity. Within the system each operating unit articulates with another 
one in their market relations. Thus their adaptational networks are environ-
mentally delimited with respect to the range and scale of their operations by 
their relations with specific limiting units. 
The articulation taking place between the units at different levels and 
with assymetrical power bases manifest a patron-client structure. Variations 
do occur in the relations of international dealers and manufacturers from those 
of peasants and middlemen obviously. But in all cases the following character-
istics seem to be present. First, the relations are established by units when 
"instrumental friendship" (see Wolf 1966b:16) reaches a maximum point of imbalance. 
This one unit is clearly superior to the other in its capacity to control the 
flow of tobacco in the system as well as of granting other goods and services. 
Secondly, the relations grow out of the need or mere desire to procure adapta-
tional advantages. Thirdly, the relations are not patterned exclusively nor 
primarily upon objective norms of behavior but according to personal standards 
of confidence and trust. Fourthly, at the core of the relations there is an 
explicit principle of competition which seems to strive toward the leveling of 
i nequa 1 it i es. 
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formal Elements of the Tobacco Eco-Market System 
As previously discussed the most significant units within the tobacco 
eco-market system are: 
At the production level of articulation: sharecroppers, minifundist 
peasants, and small-middle land owners. All of these run a household with lack 
of sufficient control over land and production credits. In addition, there are 
middle, entrepreneur, and big landowners who normally depend upon sharecroppers 
to run their under-exploited farms and estates. 
At the middle level of articulation: middlemen articulate small scale 
producers with tobacco packers through their social networks and control of the 
local peasant social organization. 
At the export level of articulation: warehouses and local packers directly 
secure the tobacco through their purchasing middlemen networks, and pack the leaves 
for overseas shipment. Export houses direct operations in their domains and con-
trol the flow of capital within the eco-market system. In direct contact with 
the former and frequently subsidizing their operations are the international 
dealer houses. They control access to final marketing of the raw tobacco leaves 
thereby securing access and control of the flow of capital and financial resources 
within the eco-market system. Finally, a level which has been included within 
the export level of articulation is that of the tobacco manufacturers. Concerned 
with the demands of the specific markets for their final products they purchase 
the tobacco from the dealers thus initiating the operations of the whole system. 
The operations of these units within the tobacco eco~market system are 
supported by the control achieved and preserved upon core energy resources. First, 
these are capital resources in the form of land, technology, financial resources, 
and other kinds of fixed capital. Secondly, these may be social networks in and 
outside the market place through which production and commercial operations occur. 
(See f i g u re 1 , ) From the strategic interplay of these core energy resources the 
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market power of the unit or~inates. 
' poWer Organization in the Tobacco Eco-market System 
I 
No operating unit in the tobacco eco-market system controls all these 
core energy resources. At least, not to the same degree. Normally, however, 
control over one of them extends access to other available core energy resources 
in the environment. A case in point, for instance, is that of the landed elite. 
Through their command over land they secure their adaptational network and 
guarantee not only loans and technological inputs in their estates if so desired, 
but also ascendency over the local social networks. 
Control over energy resources is not a sufficient guarantee of ecological 
adaptation. This process in the eco-market system is submitted to selective 
pressures of competition according to market rules. Thus inefficient employment 
of, or a critically limited access to, or both of the former alternatives, might 
hinder the adaptational chances of an operating unit within the system. An 
example of the second alternative is that of sharecroppers and minifundist 
producers. They are in control of reduced extensions of labor land and under 
deleterious labor arrangements. Thus they are unable to improve their financial 
standing and to capitalize sufficiently to meet cultural expectations. They 
maintain a process of adaptation characterized by its chronic indebtedness and 
dependence upon other power holding units in the societyand the tobacco eco-market 
system. 
The selective pressures determining the process of ecological adaptation 
are closely related to the strategic significance of the environmental core 
energy resources. The value of these resources is not necessarily fixed or 
standardized. In each level of articulation and in association with the opera-
tions taking place within it, the strategic value of these energy resources 
fluctuate. This seems to be the case with such core energy resources such as 
I 
I 
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land and technology. Nevertheless, still other resources are irreplaceable and 
their value seems to be standard regardless of the scale of operation of the 
units and their level of articulation. Such seems to be the case with financial 
resources and social networks. 
An illustration of the differential relative importance of core resources 
is the case of land control. The significance of land resources is not identical 
for a middleman in his role of a tobacco buyer in comparison to a sharecropper 
or a minifundist peasant. In the same way, the operations of international dealer 
houses and exporters are not contingent upon the ownership of specific plots of 
land or even great extensions of land. As long as they are able to purchase the 
crop and do not have to protect large capital investments in processing machinery 
they seem to evade production responsibilities and control over the land. The 
same is true for tobacco manufacturers. But to producing units it is not so ir-
relevant whether or not they hold control over 10, 30, 150, 800 or 3500 tareas 
of land. 
In the cultural perspective the strategic importance of financial 
resources is unique. At the core of all adaptational networks within the 
tobacco eco-market system is financial resources, either in the form of loans, 
production credits, advanced money, bank credits or the like. Access to and/or 
control over it is a condition sine gua non to the operations of all units with-
in the system. Regardless of the unit or of the level of articulation, the 
tobacco eco-market system itself is contingent upon this single form of energy 
more than on any other for the maintenance of its operations. It is the medium 
by means of which one form of capital is transformed into another. Therefore, 
command over financial resources virtually become the most determinant variant 
in the power network of the system. Contrell ing and then providing access to 
its use is the main power strategy within the eco-market system. 
Both small and large-scale operations within the tobacco eco-market 
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system require financial resources beyond the means of family financial pools. 
Thus there are three fundamental alternatives of getting the necessary form of 
capital: from a large foreign corporation, from a domestic corporation that 
will pool the resources of investors, or from the government which uses its 
taxing or borrowing power to acquire the funds and channel them through the 
Agricultural Bank and the Tobacco Institute. International corporations, banks 
and other financial organizations become necessary as a means of assembling and 
distributing funds and credits. This is especially when the state is not the 
exclusive investor as in a socialist country. In any case, the machinery of 
investment is a necessary counterpart of the operatons within the tobacco 
eco-market system. 
There exists a significant feedback relationship in the eco-market system 
between control over financial resources and control over other core energy 
resources, especially capital. Normally, the greater the power ova- financial 
resources the easier it becomes to control other forms of core energy resources, 
and vice versa. This relationship might be stated as follows: The degree of 
power of a unit upon financial resources is directly proportional to the unit's 
power base upon other environmental core energy resources. 
For instance, let us consider the situation of minifundist peasants. 
Even when in control of their own plots they remain vulnerable to the strategem 
of financial powers. Normally, they are in need of production and household 
credits but their lack of capital resources further undermines their access 
to the former. Thus, although in possession of small plots, peasants are not 
able to be economically autonomous or to maintain independent control of their 
environments. This seems to be one of the critical reasons behind the failure 
of most land reform programs in Latin America in general: (and is granted to 
the peasant but his dependence cJrcuit is not broken. He is not supported with 
financial, technical, and marketing assistance. This situation is further 
• .................... ~~-
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aggravated when banks officially subsidized transact with these small-scale 
producers under a commercial pattern normally applied to bigger land holders 
and other agricultural and industrial investing units. 
The flow both of 1 iquid assets and therefore of capital resources in 
general into the tobacco eco-market system is basically related to the operations 
of international dealers and manufacturers. Their operations are contingent 
upon both the cultural valorization of tobacco by a consuming sector of society 
and the commercial phase of the final tobacco products. The reason behind this 
is that if no one were to consume the commodity, manufacturers obviously would 
not invest in the purchase and processing of the product. Since tobacco cannot 
be eaten, commercial production of it would be paralyzed. With this situation 
the flow of energy resources within the eco-market system would cease. 
Although related, one factor accounts for the flow of these energy 
resources into the tobacco eco-market system and another one explains how capital 
is accumulated at certain levels and within the domain of specific operating units. 
As previously noted, there is a positive correlation between control over capital 
energy resources and domain over financial resources. specifically. This situa-
tion in part encourages a concentration of environmental power in the hands of a 
few units within the system. In the normal process of adaptation, if not affected 
by other units outside the eco-market system (such as state control) the accumu-
lation of energy resources is in the power network of some units to the exclusion 
and detriment of others. 
This accumulation of energy resources is reflected in the power net-
work wi~in the eco-market system. As already seen, power is exercised by the 
units upon the flow of tobacco through their control over supply in conditions 
of market competition. But the control of supply is associated with the scale 
of operations of the units. The ability to extend the range of operations and 
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thereby the power of any one unit over other environments will generate a larger 
scale of operations. The goal is to articulate the operations of various adapta-
tional networks plus having access to the flow of energy resources in those 
environments. This can be summarized by the following generalization: The 
degree of control over core energy resou\ces is proportional to the scale of 
operation of the unit and to its control of supply within the eco-market system. 
The control of ~pply within the tobacco eco-market system, however, further re-
inforces the unit's accumulation of power within the system. 
For example, export houses by financing local warehouses extend their 
influence into specific tobacco zones. As a rule, efficiency of operations 
remaining constant, the more local warehouses within the domain of the export 
packers the higher the volume of tobacco they control. It also follows that the 
higher the volume of tobacco controlled by the export house the lesser the power 
of any single warehouse in its transactions with the exporters. Thjs then 
increases the exporter 1 s power base in dealing with international dealers. 
Because of the close association between scale of operation and control 
of supply on the one hand, and power over core energy resources on the other, 
the phenomena of capital accumulation frequently becomes a political affair. 
There is normally an accumulation and transmission of power at the same levels 
of articulation and between the same operating units. Power becomes self-
perpetuating in the system; it establishes a way of 1 ife for the operating units 
whcih is handed on from generation to generation and normally along family lines. 
The structure of power resulting from the endogamous nature of power hinders the 
adaptational opportunities of other units in the system. 
A state of dependency of some units under the power domain of others and 
maintained through patron-client relations is evident within the system. This 
contingency is not related to the necessary functional interdependence of the 
unit 1s operations. Dependent units such as sharecroppers and minifundist peasants 
L------
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in relation to the landed elite, or even exporters when related to international 
dealer houses, find themselves unable to control ther own environments. 
The crucial problem to solve in this perspective becomes: how can each 
operating unit maintain an independent and autonomous power base in its environ-
~ ment thus evading negative or unbalanced .power exercised over them from the units 
in control of the eco-market system? Furthermore, how can the national govern-
ment break the structure of power within the system to guarantee the independent 
operations and environmental control of the units in their respective environments? 
These questions become still more crucial in view of the following dilemma 
facing small scale national units within the system. The scale of operation of 
any unit in the tobacco eco-market system is proportionally related to the prox-
imity it maintains to the manufacturing level of articulation. In other words, 
the largest scale of operations is associated with tobacco manufacturers and 
international dealers and decreases proportionally as they remove themselves 
away from direct relationships with the formers. 
The only apparent exception to this propositon seems to be the presence 
of middlemen above the production level of articulation. Their adaptational 
network, however, is contingent upon a minifundist tobacco production. Thus, 
the scale of operation of these middlemen has to be analyzed in relation to that 
of minifundist peasants and not in association with entrepreneur and the landed 
elite operations. As a matter of fact, all indications are that middlemen 
maintain a larger scale of operations than minifundist peasants and thus a more 
secure power base. 
The articulation of the units at one level or another within the tobacco 
eco-market system is related to two social variables in additbn to their control 
over capital energy resources. They are: the unit 1 s social networks, and its 
control of environmental information. At this point it is relevant to note 
that the structural arrangements and the social networks in the tobacco eco-market 
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become mutually contingent upon one another. Furthermore, the social 
tworks underlie the access to and the accumulation of capital energy resources. ne 
The organization of the tobacco eco-market system of the Dominican 
dependent upon social relations inside and outside the market place. 
These social networks might be commercialJy oriented and thus relatively transi-
tory and not necessarily bounded in space or time, or very intensive and person-
orientation. Regardless of the characteristics of these social net-
increase the range of influence of the units beyond their own original 
Without these social contacts and exchanges, each unit would be 
to its own kin relations. Thus each set of core energy resources --cap-
and social networks sustain each other. 
As previously noted, social relations between different operating units 
the form of patron-client relations in the eco-market system. This is 
especially apparent at the national sphere where objective criteria of efficiency 
and competence is mediated by person to person arrangements and personal loyal-
Operating units within the system are not only contingent upon their 
ascribed statuses because of kin affiliation, their ~perations are restricted 
beyond any possibility of achievement (by corporate or private enterprise) 
through ranges of social influence dependent upon patron-client structures. 
Structured according to a criterium of fidelity to the patrons, these relations 
confine mobility from one level of articulation to another within the system. 
In addition, patron-client relations provide an organizational pattern of social 
~exchanges between operating units and guarantee social contacts to take place 
beyond objective role qualifications. Therefore, any enterprise within the 
tobacco eco-market system is limited to those known and trusted by the units 
: on a personal basis and roles become restricted and ascribed to closed groups. 
Mobility of personnel characteristic of industrial economies does not seem to 
hinder patron-client associations in the system. 
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It might be noted that if large capital investments were ever to take 
place on the part of tobacco manufacturers or international dealers with its 
consequent elimination of a minifundist production, then this situation will 
probably change. The protection of capital will require a new social organiza-
tion within the system causing structural changes at the production and middlemen 
level of articualation. This rearrangement will modify the present nature of 
the social networks built upon the operations of independent units. In any case, 
the fact remains that today, even behind the 11preferential 11 relations determining 
the transactions of manufacturers and their suppliers of tobacco, adaptational 
operations are contingent upon criteria of personal ism between independent 
patrons and clients in this stratified distributive system. 
These social networks are closely related to the flow of information 
within the eco-market system. Through these social relations the units have 
access to environmental information outside their original range of operations. 
This information permits the mapping of various environments to the exchanging 
units. When the social relations are maintained between units in the same power 
domain, the flow of information is normally uni-directional. The information 
' flows to the more powerful unit controlling the relations. This communication 
network guarantees a feedback process to the units extending their adaptational 
network. Through it it their power base is further secured and their exercise of 
power becomes more effective. 
It is highly significant, for instance, that while peasants do not know 
of exporter's operations, the latter have a mapped environment of the farmer's 
production activities. In the same way, exporters through their contacts with 
warehouses know of market conditions within the middlemen level of articulation; 
but the contrary is not true. The same observation might be made in relation 
to international dealer houses transacting with exporters about the latter's 
domain, or to manufacturers•• control of information of the operations and 
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organization of the eco-market system as a unit. 
At this point then we contend that power is going to be not only the 
effective control that one operating unit holds over the environmental resources 
of another unit, but that this 11effective control" of any unit's environment is 
related to the control of information about its environment. Power exercise, 
then, is contingent upon the ability of a unit to become ecologically adapted 
in relation to its environmental information. Thus the units within the tobac-
co eco-market system are dependent upon an informational feedback process 
obtained through their social networks to direct their power based operations. 
Summary 
It seems appropiate to conclude that the structure of power within the 
tobacco eco-market system is contingent upon three features. First, the scale 
of operations of the operating unit and thus its control of supply within the 
system. Secondly, operational information within the system further related to 
control and access to environmental core energy resources. Finally, social net-
works and capital resources as here defined, especially capital in the form of 
financial resources, are the most significant and universally valued core energy 
resources to gain control over the flow of tobacco within its eco-market system. 
The latter's technoeconomic organization is the "playground" for power based 
transactions to gain access to instrumental energy resources. 
These conclusions have been presented in a set of propositions above. 
For reasons of clarity they are listed below. 
(1) The technoeconomic organization resulting from the exchange networks 
of tobacco for other energy resources is an eco-market system. This we have defined 
as a complex distributive system of articulating energy resources through a 
series of levels of articulation and organized by the adaptational networks of 
different operating units. 
·----~--------~~-------
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(2) The status and role of each operating unit within the tobacco eco-
market system is functionally dependent upon its power resources. 
(3) The task of the adaptational process of operating units in industrial 
complex societies is to increase its bargaining power at the market place in order 
to control the necessary amount of instrume~tal resources which are to be con-
verted into other energy resources. 
(3a} The adaptational strategy of all units within the tobacco eco-market 
system is to increase the value of their operations in competition with the remain-
ing units in the system. This they are able to achieve by controlling and deter-
mining the flow of the articulating energy resource of the system. 
(4) In order to understand the marketing process within the tobacco eco-
market system three energy resources can be distinguised: (i) instrumental energy 
resources (liquid assets); (ii) articulating energy resources (tobacco); (iii) core 
energy resources: capital (land, technology, financial resources, and other forms 
of fixed capital), and social networks. 
(5) The process of ecological adaptation within the tobacco eco-market 
system is summardzed as follows. Power over core energy resources generates 
control over the flow of articulating energy resources (tobacco). This increases 
the bargaining power over instrumental energy resources and further reinforces 
power over core energy resources. 
(6) This exercise of power over core encergy resources is summarized by 
the following proposition: The degree of power of a unit upon financial resources 
is directly proportional to the unit's power base upon other environmental forms of 
core energy resources. 
(7) The accumulation of energy resources in the range of operations of 
specific units is summarized by the following proposition: The degree of control 
over core energy resources is proportional to the scale of operation of the unit 
and to its control of supply within the eco~market system. But the control of 
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supply within the system further reinforces the unit's accumulation of power 
within the eco-market system. 
(8) The scale of operation of any unit within the tobacco eco-market 
system is proportionally related to the proximity they maintain to the manufac-
turing level of articulation. 
(9) The articulation of the units at one level or another within the 
tobacco eco-market system is related totvo social variables in addition to their 
control over capiltal energy resources. They are: (1) the unit's social net-
works which normally are of the patron-client form, and (2) their control of 
environmental information upon which the efficient exercise of power is con-
tingent in the system 
Industrial Complex Societies and Eco-Market Systems 
Before concluding, a number of questions seem pertinent to suggest 
possible trends of future research. The most crucial one of these deals with 
the representativeness of the tobacco eco-market system in relation to other 
technoeconomic organizations in industrial complex societies. Future research 
could examine the following question cross-culturally: Is the technoeconomic 
sub-system of industrial complex societies articulated by a number of eco-market 
systems which define the flow of energy resources in the society? Hopefully, 
the use of the comparative method in answering this question will contribute 
to better place the eco-market system organization in an evolutionary perspec-
tive and contribute to determine its regularities and cultural effects. 
The study of other articulating energy resources should try also to 
determine the organization of their eco-market systems as well as to establish 
significant parallelisms with the tobacco eco-market system. In these researches 
special importance has to be given to more complex eco-market systems. For 
instance, the one of the automobile or the oil industry. These more complex 
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systems provide a market for a number of other eco-marketing systems thus 
increasing their power base in the society at large. 
From the point of view of the social structure, special interest should 
be given to whether or not units adapted to corresponding levels of articulation 
and with similar power bases in different eco-market systems constitute a sub-
culture of society. This line of research will illuminate the relationships 
existing between the technoeconomic organization of society and its social 
structure. Specifically, it will contribute to the understanding of such con-
cepts as 11 the culture of poverty1 1, 11 ghettos 11 , "masses", and 11el ites". This 
approach of research will hopefully provide a holistic view of industrial com-
plex societies. 
Anoth~r · set of questions in need of being answered is the role of the 
state and other service organizations in industrial societies. Using a graphic 
image, the eco-market system articulates the labor market of society vertically 
at different levels of articulation and with different scales of operation. 
Meanwhile, the state and other service organizations (the Church, the military, 
etc.) provide a horizontal inter-locking of society. They serve as a vehicle 
of union to the operations of different eco-market systems. In addition, they 
procure to articulate the composing units of these eco-market systems to a wider 
cultural frame of reference and of action beyond the technoeconomic subsystem 
itself. The power base of these horizontal inter-locking systems is another 
important ground for future analysis, especially in correlation with their 
exchanges with eco""market systems. 
Finally, future research will have to take the problem of a typology 
of energy resources both for eco-market systems and for inter-Jocking systems 
in industrial complex societies. Concretely, this typology needs to be further 
elaborated from the one here presented. The importance of this line of inquiry 
being that human societies do not seem to rely upon a single energy resource; 
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or in the case of industrial complex societies, upon a single set of these energy 
resources. The problem then consists in analyzing the strategic importance of 
the various articulating and core energy resources in industrial complex societies 
to determine their influence upon the organization of the latter. The result of 
these studies should provide a closer understanding of power within and between 
contemporary societies. 
APPENDIX 
Field Research 
The field work which resulted in the present study took place from June 2 
to September 16, 1972. Once in the field two main handicaps pressured the actual 
conduct of the investigation: available time and funds plus lack of prior know-
ledge on the subject matter. I had read how Anthropologists feel lost in their 
first field experience. But during the last week of May, I remember myself sit-
ting at the monument to the National Restoration in Santiago City, and thinking 
that none of those reports did justice to the sense of disorientation that I was 
then experiencing. In fact, at the time I started to think that the whole enter-
prise was impossible. was an explorer with a theoretical map in his hands but 
unable to find a compass to put him on the road. 
Since early 1972, I started to plan the research. The main goal at the 
time was to conduct an ethnography on the structure of power in the Cibao commun-
ity of Gurabo with which I had previous contacts. But once in Gurabo the four 
months of actual field time proved this project to be out of reach. 
It was then that the idea of studying the organization of power in the 
tobacco production and exportation was born with the help of Dr. Ken Sharpe. 
The intention was frankly exploratory, and there was no detailed research to 
follow or desire to test pre-conceived hypothesis or theoretical models. Myself 
and the few assistants I had at the time were all too young and inexperienced to 
have calculated the dimensions of the enterprise we were ready to start. Mainly 
for this reason, the present work is preliminary in nature. Merton would refer 
to it as a 11post-factum sociological interpretation11 of the field data. And in 
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fact he would have been correct even in reference to most of the material in the 
first chapter. Such explanations, Merton would theoretically add, 11 remain at the 
level of plausability rather than leading to compelling evidence ..• The documen-
tary evidence merely illustrates rather than tests the theory 11 (1957:93s~}. This 
final statement could be argued (cf. Liebow 1967:10-12; Becker 1958; Gans 1962}. 
But evading epistemological questions at the time, I will agree with Merton with 
the hope that the degree of probability behind the hypothetical model of power 
and of the technoeconomic organization in industrial complex societies here de-
veloped stimulates future research on these problems. 
The discovery of the existence of the different units operating in the 
tobacco eco-market system was, in large part, through accident. During the first 
four to five weeks of fieldwork the field diary reveals day after day, new oper-
ations and new persons appearing in the environment. One interview lead to another 
just as one operation seemed to justify the following. Gradually the whole sys-
tem became a unit in itself and surprisingly familiar; as a matter of fact, its 
original complexity seemed at the end all but natural and expectable. Nevertheless, 
before that moment came, more than a dozen instances of almost despair had to be 
endured. 
Two problems are crucial in any research: the selection of the units of 
study, and their representativeness. The former question, as far as it was also 
a geographical problem did not prove to be difficult to solve. The historical 
record, common knowledge and present day national statistics all clearly identi-
fied the Cibao region as tobacco country. In addition, the 1971 sixth national 
agricultural census indicated the province of Santiago as the core of this industry. 
Guided then by the results of the agricultural census (at the time still 
being counted in a Santiago office in the old municipal building, by early field 
interviews in some of the export houses with which I had previous personal con-
tacts, and by studying the area of operations of almost all export houses and the 
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Tobacco Institute, a number of concrete communities were then selected for 
specific and intensive study. They were: Gurabo, Pontezuela, Jacagua, Tamboril, 
Licey, the western region of Moca, Cutupu, San Jose de las Matas, Villa Gonzalez, 
El lngenio and Janico. Not all of these tobacco zones were significant for the 
same reasons. For instance, in Villa Gonzalez and El lngenio great landholdings 
predominate with production of Cuban and plor tobacco. In addition, the former 
has a number of local packers but no export house warehouses. In Moca, Tamboril 
and San Jose de las Matas, on the other hand, minifundist peasants grow criollo 
tobacco and there is a considerable number of local warehouses. While Tamboril, 
Jacagua and Villa Gonzalez are traditionally tobacco zones, San Jose de las Matas 
and Cutupu are not. Regretfully, new tobacco zones as Dajabon and San Critobal 
were not even visited. Other communities 1 ike La Torre, Cotui and La Canela 
were sporadically visited, and some casual interviews were conducted there as a 
technique of control. 
In order to cover this territory the following arrangement was achieved: 
I was to make contact with either a group of peasants, of middlemen or a ware-
house in each zone. Normally I was introduced to peasants by peasants, to 
middlemen by middlemen, and to warehouses by export houses. In each zone I 
freely labored in the capacity of the group under study according to the parti-
cipant-observation technique. This observation took place while conducting 
the same labor activities that the units under study would normally conduct. 
Through this strategy I was able to: First, obtain direct experience of labor 
conditions and market strategies. Secondly, establish rapport with my informants 
and community persons at large. Thirdly, introduce myself in the community as 
a student interested in learning about their daily life by participating in it. 
did not follow a rigid time schedule, but moved from one community 
to the other, and from one category of labor to the other, depending on circum-
stances. Surprisingly, no major opposition or even suspicion was encountered. 
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When bulking and hampering tobacco in a peasant's shading house, when purchasing 
the crop or when working in a warehouse, I was expected to labor as any other 
one in the group without any privileges. First moment curiosity aroused by my 
presence normally disappeared when it was noticed that I mastered the Spanish, 
was a student looking for new experiences; was not telling anyone what to do 
or how to do it, and was interested in their 1 iving conditions and adaptational 
strategies. 
I would have to guess at this time that my physical appearance was one of 
the main reasons why was not considered to be a political informant (cal ie) sent 
to them. Furthermore, it seems to me in retrospect that the fact that I labored 
hand in hand with them was a point in favor of establishing rapport with everyone 
regardless of my national and social precedence. In addition, while in a place 
I tried to accomodate my own standard conditions of 1 iving to those of my host's. 
This experience of entering into the world of these peasants, middlemen and ware-
house laborers and managers, was the most rewarding experience of all. It lasted 
throughout the fieldwork with the exception of two weeks. 
In only one community this pattern of data gathering was not followed. 
In Cutupu I stayed four days only, and during that period of time I relied heavily 
on the Catholic parish priest to introduce me to minifundist peasants. I have to 
acknowledge that his services were valuable, and his expertise "in the f ield 11 
most revealing. 
From the methodological point of view, the value of the short one to 
three weeks labor in different communities might be questioned. Obviously, they 
could not substitute for the intensive field work of one to two years in a com-
munity. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the objective of the study 
was not community nor value oriented. I was interested in a synchronic region 
wide view of the operations of a technoeconomic organization. 
The data was collected mainly through participant observation as already 
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mentioned. But in addition, something like an information hetwork of 17 peasants, 
middlemen and employees of warehouses and export packers was formed. The orignal 
group was of 21. In some cases.this arrangement has worked very efficiently up 
to the time in which this report is being written. They served as field assis-
tants in the full sense of the word and permitted me to widen the range of oper-
ations considerably as well as to cherish their friendship. Twelve of them had 
only grammar school, and only two had finished high school, none had college 
training. None of them received special training beyond precise instructions on 
what to look for and, if possible, to report it back to me. They were specifically 
instructed to ignore any 11confidential 11 information for we were not establishing 
any secret eliciting operation. I have to confess that their knowledge of the 
operations of which they are part proved to be a great asset to the information 
I received from them. The services and the intelligence of these anonymous 
peasants, laborers and employees is a significant proof of their responsibility, 
initiative and labor. None of those involved in this quasi-group was paid or 
worked beyond their customary range of operations. 
During field work a questionnaire consisting of ten problem solving 
questions was constructed with the cooperation of three of the above mentioned 
assistants. Some of the results are presented in chapters four· and f1ve. The 
object of the questions was to obtain a larger sample in some crucial matters. 
It was administered by the three persons just mentioned and myself. At the 
beginning we though of putting it on paper and distributing it, but the 1 iteracy 
factor recommended the other option. The questions were verbally read to the 
randomly selected interviewed persons and then reported back by the interviewer 
on his own record sheet. It was not possible to apply the questionnaire in all 
communities under study because of time pressures and some technical difficulties. 
In addition to this technique, open questionnaires were constructed for 
specific informants in each category of labor with the assitance of five other 
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field assistants of the original assistant group previously·mentioned. These 
interviews with more than 45 informants, tried to explore the informants' work 
histories, their geographical and social mobility, wealth and property, associ-
ations and affiliations, kinship and friendship social networks. Normally the 
informants were interviewed more than three times during fieldwork and always 
under informal conditions. Frequently the interviews took place while at work 
in the field so that every question would be introduced casually and growing 
out of the activities of the moment. 
It was obvious from the outset that if legitimate comparisons between 
the informants were to be made, that the data involved would have to be collected 
under rigourously standardized circimstances and that further, these data must 
be at least minimally quantifiable. ~s all anthropologists are acutely aware, 
satisfying such conditions in field research is difficult in the extreme. However, 
following a series of conferences between field assistants and consultation with 
persons skilled in sundry interviewing, an interviewing program was decided upon 
that, .with luck, had a chance of being successful. 
The interviewswith four exceptions were conducted by myself. At the 
beginning the use of a tape recorder was planned. But soon it proved to be 
an ill-though idea. Especially peasants and middlemen seemed afraid of it 
and it even increased suspicion as if it were a matter of forcing them to say 
something while maintaining a record of it. Besides, it proved to be quite 
difficult to be carrying a tape recorder while at work. For these reasons, their 
answers were recorded in small notebooks like the ones normally used by middlemen 
to keep track of their operations. Use of the memory proved to be a great asset 
under the circumstances. 
The informants who participated in these open interviews were normally 
randomly selected. The relationships to be established were reinforced by 
circumstantial variables. For instance, the informant's ability as a "good" 
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informant, the rapport existing between us and the physical accessibility to 
them. In over all, these informants proved to be a most valuable source of 
information about daily family and labor life. The interviews themselves were 
conducted without conspicuous evasion or withholding of information. 
The study of big land estates, local packers and export houses was done 
by means of interviews and special visits to the places. The factors behind the 
selection of these informants are mixed in nature: at times they were selected 
randomly, at others by pure accident, and still others were determined by cir-
cumstances. For instance, ten export houses were initially visited. Of these 
two had to be discarded because of absolute lack of cooperation. In all, however, 
the interviews with export houses were conducted in an atmosphere of friendliness 
and mutual curiosity. Not all questions were answered, but more than was initially 
expected. As a matter of fact, in four of these export houses, cooperation was 
significantly open. The same generalization is val id for big tobacco landholders 
and local packers. 
The interviews with the members of these units were more formal in nature 
than the ones with peasants and middlemen, but still basically informal and un-
structured. I tried to present the same outline of questions to all of them 
according to the type of their operations. Their questions ranged from social 
life to business operations, and from their perception of peasants and middlemen 
to the European market, tobacco manufacturers, and international dealers. On 
some occasions the tape recorder was employed in these interviews. Nevertheless, 
the norm was to use a notebook. As in the case of the peasants, the tape recorder 
gave an air of formality and gravity to the interview that seemed to inhibit the 
conversation rather than to facilitate it. 
The interviews with presidents and officials of export houses, of local 
packers or with agricultural entrepreneurs and big landholders were normally 
conducted in their off ices or houses, and lasted from one to three hours. To 
r 
' 
239 
conduct one of these interviews I had to prepare a set of specific topics to 
discuss with them. In addition, I normally had to leave the peasant community 
in which I was working at the time, take a shower, change clothes and go into 
"another world 11 • I have to admit that this minicultural shock was most signifi-
cant in enlarging the perspective of the study and in understanding the complexity 
of the problems under consideration. 
My primary informants, either at the peasant communities or at the local 
packers and export houses, are distinguished from other persons who provided me 
with information on the basis of the purposes of my relationship with them 
(research) and the time devoted to the relationship. And even in these circum-
stances I should acknowledge that lasting and profound friendships were originated 
within these relationships. 
Earlier it was mentioned that one of the main problems in a fieldwork is 
the representativeness of the units of the analysis. The problem of sampling or 
representativeness is familiar to anthropologists. How representative are the 
responses of the informants? How much important information is lost when it is 
impossible to deal with a statistically representative sector of the population 
studied? Facing similar questions Plotnicov responded: 1 ~here is little that 
ethnographers can do to compensate for such possible data lacunae and the biases 
of selected informants that may together skew analysis and interpretation. 
This is the region where ethnographic field work partakes of common sense and 
art as much as scientific methodology. Merely to attempt a comprehensive 
ethnographic description of a society would require a company of researchers 
with unlimited time and funds 11 (1967:26; cf. Gulliver 1965:97). 
Obviously the problem of sampling is a vital one. It is my personal 
belief that anthropology should not depart from common sense and art in its 
attempt to outline the significant areas of social interaction. But this 
objective should not be an excuse to evade the conventional norms of scientific 
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methodology. In a way the original idea was to intermix 11bones and- flesh 11 : 
extensive questionnaire techniques and statistical treatment of the data with 
participant-observation and intensive field interviews. As it turned out this 
goal was unobtainable. My personal inexperience and also probably insufficient 
time and funds, undermined the full employment of the questionnaires and of more 
sophisticated statistical techniques. But at no moment the reason for this 
omission was the 11 impersonal flavor 11 of questionnaires. 
For these reasons, I sincerely hope that the results of this work be 
turned into an hypothetical questionmark and that further research will try 
to prove its regionwide representativeness and the theoretical value of the 
technoeconomic model of eco-market systems. As a matter of fact~ this is an 
appeal to statistical handling of the data as well as inter-disciplinary 
11 intersubjectivity1 1 • For the time being, however, this descriptive and inter-
pretive material is considered to be applicable to the population sectors 
from which it was obtained and elaborated. It goes without saying that an 
ultimate test of a scientific method is its ability to yield results that can 
be replicated by independent investigators. 
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